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Abstract
This thesis investigates ethical debates that surround the definition, the conduct, and the
occasions for humanitarian military intervention. I argue that properly-called
humanitarian interventions must be directed by partly-altruistic intentions, and just war
theorists should resist the emerging trend that discards right intention as a central
requirement in favour of a more consequentialist analysis. I argue that interventions must
be conducted in a manner that is consistent with the humanitarian purpose and would be
accepted by the innocent non-combatants who are themselves risked by the rescue effort.
This morally requires that interveners weigh harm to non-combatants particularly heavily
in their proportionality assessments, even if that harm is merely an unintended side-effect
of otherwise permissible acts, or even if that harm is primarily attributable to an
aggressor’s anticipated unjust reprisal to intervention. The extraordinary justice of an
intervener’s cause cannot license mass killing, and defenders of intervention should resist
the urge to privilege abstract principles above policies that might better protect the most
basic interests of innocent persons. In the end, I contend that the justified occasions for
full-scale intervention will tend to be restricted to cases of mass-atrocities.
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Introduction

In an often-cited paper, Peter Singer provocatively argues that, when it comes to saving
lives, distance is morally insignificant.1 He argues that just as a passerby ought to save a
drowning child from a pond, so too are we morally obliged to contribute to relief efforts
to save distant others from preventable deaths. In both cases, he argues that the good at
stake is enormous, and the cost relatively small. Though it is also intended to save distant
others from death, humanitarian military intervention is much more difficult to justify
than is the humanitarian aid that Singer recommends. Unlike humanitarian aid, military
rescue attempts often pose considerable danger for both the rescuers and the
beneficiaries. Many who endorse Singer’s articulation of the duty to aid distant others
may reject the permissibility of humanitarian intervention. As David Luban writes,
“[d]istributive justice may require your money, but it cannot require your life.”2 This
thesis investigates some of the reasons military intervention for humanitarian ends
inspires disagreement even among those who are generally convinced that we have duties
to aid distant others. In particular it is concerned with the manner in which intervention
should be conducted, and the occasions that might rightly call for intervention.
The first chapter specifies a definition of humanitarian intervention. Upon
hearing the general topic of my thesis, colleagues often rhetorically reply, “Has there ever
been a humanitarian intervention?” Often implied is the view that properly-called
humanitarian interventions must be entirely altruistic and that since a state’s mobilization
1

Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence and Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, no.3 (Spring, 1972),
229-243.
2
David Luban, “Intervention and Civilization: Some Unhappy Lessons from the Kosovo War,” in Global
Justice and Transnational Politics, ed. Pablo De Grieff and Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
MIT Press, 2002), 94.
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of its army is never entirely selfless, there never has been a true instance of humanitarian
intervention. I think this is mistaken and that rightly-called humanitarian interventions
need not be wholly and exclusively altruistic. Nonetheless, I argue that humanitarian
intentions are an important component of rightly-called humanitarian interventions, and
that any additional, self-interested intentions must be morally consistent with the interests
and rightful autonomy of those intended as the central beneficiaries of the action.
In his paper “Ending Tyranny in Iraq”, Fernando Tesón argues that the 2003
invasion of Iraq was justified as an instance of humanitarian intervention.3 He argues that
the invasion had a humanitarian rationale to free the victims of tyranny and defend the
free world from terrorists by forcibly spreading democracy into rogue states which act as
breeding grounds for terrorism.4 In response, Terry Nardin argues that Tesón drastically
extends the traditional understanding of humanitarian intervention which, he argues,
involves a much more limited strike against the perpetrators of ongoing or imminent mass
atrocities as a means of saving others from unjust aggression (rather than as a means of
protecting the intervening state itself from unformed and distant harm).5 Nardin argues
that Tesón’s view might be better described as defending ‘reform intervention’ or
‘revolutionary intervention’. He contends that Tesón’s position belongs in the literature
on empire, rather than that on humanitarian intervention. In his rebuttal, Tesón dismisses
Nardin’s complaint as “merely terminological,”6 insisting that the central question is not
whether the invasion of Iraq is an instance of humanitarian intervention, but whether it is
3

Fernando Tesón, “Ending Tyranny in Iraq,” Ethics and International Affairs 19, no. 2 (September, 2005),
1-20.
4
Ibid, 11.
5
Terry Nardin, “Humanitarian Imperialism,” Ethics and International Affairs 19, no.2 (September, 2005),
21-26.
6
Fernando Tesón, “Of Tyrants and Empires,” Ethics and International Affairs 19, no.2 (September, 2005),
27.
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justified. “I don’t particularly care about labels,”7 Tesón writes.8 Yet, he continues to
use the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ to describe the 2003 invasion. Throughout his
rebuttal this continued use of the term might merely be careless use of language, but his
refusal to give it up also enables him to trade on the qualified moral approval that it often
evokes. The terminological discussion is certainly not the pivotal moral debate about the
Iraq war. Still, it is an important one given that the term ‘humanitarian intervention’
often carries a positive connotation and considerable rhetorical force. The first chapter
attempts to articulate a definition of humanitarian intervention that is thick enough to
account for the qualified positivity the term often inspires, but also not so thick as to
suggest that rightly-called humanitarian interveners must be, in every respect, above
criticism or blame.
The second chapter reviews various pacifist arguments against military force in
general, and humanitarian intervention in particular. It is often argued that military action
cannot help itself to the language of humanitarianism; that war is, by its nature, nonhumanitarian. While there could be a clear tension between humanitarian goals and
military means, I argue that force can coherently be used in defense of humanitarian ends,
and that circumstances may be sufficiently dire that military force will be the lesser of
two evils. I contend that military intervention can be welcomed by those who are
themselves endangered by the rescue effort when the alternative is, for example, nearcertain death by a murderous mob. Indeed the (reasonably believed) consent to
intervention by those who are supposed to be its beneficiaries is morally required. I
7

Ibid, 28.
Against the charge of imperialism, Tesón writes, “…a world without a hegemon but replete with dictators
is worse than a world in which a hegemon exercises beneficial influence. If being a humanitarian
imperialist means advocating that the hegemon use its might to advance…freedom, human rights, and
democracy then I am a humanitarian imperialist.” Ibid, 30.

8
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argue that pacifism fails to adequately equip the targets of aggression, but also that the
humanitarian purpose places special restraints on the permissible conduct of intervening
military agents.
In the third chapter I examine the just war tradition’s requirement of
proportionality and reasonable prospect of success. I argue that humanitarian interveners
must satisfy a thicker conception of proportionality than self-defenders, so humanitarian
intervention is not necessarily justified whenever revolution is. I argue that humanitarian
interveners are required to give considerable weight to anticipated reprisals and to weigh
harm to non-combatants particularly heavily. This thick conception of proportionality
makes certain kinds of modern military tactics morally off-limits to humanitarian
interveners, such as the use of overwhelming air power. This conception of
proportionality may sometimes require interveners to limit themselves to modest goals
that risk few lives, if grander goals are likely to leave significant carnage in their wake.
In the fourth and final chapter I examine the justified occasions for intervention. I
argue that the occasions for intervention should generally (though not absolutely) be
limited to situations of ongoing or imminent mass atrocities. Fernando Tesón argues that
humanitarian intervention should be permissible against non-mass atrocity committing
tyrannies, when, among other conditions, the victims of tyranny want intervention and
when intervention satisfies the requirement of last resort and proportionality.9 I argue
that, while Tesón’s position is not categorically mistaken, I show that his conception of
proportionality is problematic. A policy of full-scale intervention against tyrannies the

9

In addition to his previous works cited, see Fernando Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry Into
Law and Morality, 3rd ed. (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, 2005); Fernando Tesón, “Eight
Principles for Humanitarian Intervention,” Journal of Military Ethics 5, no. 2 (2006), 93-113.
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world over is unlikely to satisfy a robust conception of proportionality given the harms
that are predictably inflicted by the use of military force.
Against pacifist criticism, I argue in the second chapter that war can be restrained,
but I do not pretend that modern war is an act of surgical precision. Some argue that
humanitarian intervention should be likened to police action rather than war,10 but I think
this is mistaken because it unrealistically softens the impression of what intervention is
likely to entail. If humanitarian intervention can be justified, it must be justified in a way
that openly acknowledges its destructiveness, a perplexing and horrible fact that
understandably leads many to endorse pacifism.
In an attempt to persuade the Virginia House of Burgesses to send troops into the
American Civil War, Patrick Henry is attributed as saying, “give me freedom or give me
death!”11 Individuals or unified communities may fairly make such claims, and they
may choose to risk their lives for the sake of political freedom. But if Henry’s quotation
is re-imagined from the perspective of third-party interveners attempting to root out a
non-atrocity-committing tyranny, it might be ‘Give you freedom, even though it’s going
to be bloody.’ Something goes morally amiss when Henry’s sentiment is imagined from
a third-party perspective, and for a variety of reasons interveners cannot kill people to
free them from tyranny. They cannot, as one American major put it, ‘destroy the town to
save it.’12 In general, the occasions for full-scale military intervention must be

10

George R. Lucas Jr., “From jus ad bellum to jus ad pacem: re-thinking just-war criteria for the use of
military force for humanitarian ends,” in Ethics and Foreign Intervention, ed. Deen K. Chatterjee and Don
Scheid (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 73. For a similar view see, J. Bryan Hehir,
“Intervention: From Theories to Cases,” Ethics and International Affairs 9, no.1 (March, 1995), 7.
11
Speech available online at http://www.history.org/almanack/life/politics/giveme.cfm (accessed October
23, 2010).
12
Attributed to an American army major in Vietnam by Peter Arnett in “Major Describes Move,” New York
Times, February 8 1968.

6
particularly egregious, and even in the face of egregious atrocities, interveners are bound
not only to pre-empt or stop aggression but to minimize harm to innocents.
I argue that moral philosophers who engage the ethics of war should pay
considerable attention to how their theorizing may be employed in the world. Arguments
that rely heavily on abstract thought can produce conclusions that would be
extraordinarily dangerous in the world in which we live. At the same time, arguments
that involve detailed thought experiments can be valuable insofar as they reveal
discrepancies between actual military ventures and the ‘ideal’ case. In doing this,
abstract theorizing about remote possibilities may help challenge the half-truths so often
furthered by government spokespeople. I do not contend that abstract theorizing is
utterly misplaced in the ethics of war literature, but I do think that philosophers should
consider the consequences that may follow from the adoption of their views. This is not
always a responsibility that philosophers acknowledge.
This thesis is not centrally concerned with the legal status of humanitarian
intervention.13 Chapter VII of the UN Charter permits war in self-defense, and wars
authorized by the Security Council when these address threats to international peace and
security.14 Various agreements prohibit states from terrorizing their citizenries, but
nonetheless prohibit third parties from intervening militarily on behalf of the victims.15
Even the 1948 Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
permits the prosecution of the perpetrators of genocide, but does not authorize armed
13

For a detailed work on this subject see Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian
Intervention and International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
14
Taylor Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure (Oxford:
Oxford University Press (SIPRI), 2007), 9-10. See also, Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII:
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml. (accessed 23 October 2010).
15
See, for example, Declaration on Principles of International Law, Friendly Relations and Co-Operation
Among States in Accordance with The Charter of the United Nations. Available at
http://www.hku.edu/law/conlawhk/conlaw/outline/Outlne4/2625.htm (accessed October 18, 2006).

7
intervention to stop genocide.16 The interventions approved by the Security Council in
the 1990s have been formally authorized under Chapter VII analyses, rather than under
any independent doctrine of humanitarian intervention.17 This continued interpretation of
what constitutes a ‘threat to international peace and security’ has led some to argue that
there is in fact a customary law or precedent for humanitarian intervention, even if the
right does not exist in any explicit, codified form.18 This thesis is centrally interested in
the moral debate, though in many ways the moral and the legal debates are connected.
Eventually, the purpose of the moral debate is to critically examine current law and
determine whether it is morally defensible. I present this thesis as a contribution to what
is, and must be, a multi-disciplinary discussion.

16

Charles B. Shotwell and Kimberly Thachuk, “Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Legitimacy”
Strategic Forum 166, (July 1999), 3 Available at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA394703&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
17
Thomas Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 47-48.
18
Fernando Tesón has defended the existence of a customary right of intervention since at least 1988. See,
Humanitarian Intervention, 1st ed. (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Transnational Publishers, 1988), 127-200.
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Chapter 1
Defining Humanitarian Intervention

1.1 Introduction
This first chapter attempts to determine a conceptually and morally tenable
definition of humanitarian intervention. Although in common conversation the term
‘humanitarian intervention’ sometimes refers to the work of bodies like the Red Cross,
here it describes the use of military force to end humanitarian atrocities, and I reserve the
term ‘humanitarian aid’ to describe the work of organizations such as the Red Cross. The
fairly common, sympathetic response that is elicited by the term ‘humanitarian
intervention’ makes it vulnerable to political exploitation, and its exploitation has led
some to believe that any action publicized as ‘humanitarian intervention’ is really just
thinly-veiled cultural imperialism- or worse. Such critics may see no point in articulating
a more careful definition. However, I argue that the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ is
worth salvaging from political misuse because it is also associated with an important
practice (or at least an idea) that is worth preserving. The goal of this chapter is to
discern how the term should be defined and employed. To begin, I broadly identify
some of the current meanings of the term and highlight their central points of
disagreement.
I argue that there are five possible conceptions of humanitarian intervention and
that most actual conceptions of humanitarian intervention can be understood as variations
on these five. The first conception requires both entirely altruistic intentions and a
perfect outcome. The second requires entirely altruistic intentions only. The third requires
the desired outcome and only some altruism, while the fourth requires only some
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altruistic intention. The fifth requires only a good outcome. Multiple variations on these
five general positions are possible. For example, one can argue that humanitarian
intervention requires both a decent but imperfect outcome and some altruistic intention,
or perhaps that it requires a purely altruistic intention with a relatively good but not
completely bloodless outcome.
In the end, I argue that properly called humanitarian interventions are
interventions against ongoing or imminent atrocities in a foreign state that involve
considerable altruism and a morally consistent agenda. Interveners must intend, and
publicly declare their intention, to protect potential victims of atrocity and/or attempt to
contain the aggressors. While I think that many already assume that humanitarian
interventions must have publicly declared humanitarian intentions, the view is worth
articulating in part because there is a growing movement among some academic just war
theorists that questions or even explicitly rejects right intention as one of the necessary
features of a just war.19 I also argue that humanitarian interventions must have
reasonable prospects of causing only proportionate harm, and I follow George R. Lucas
in his insistence that they also require careful planning which, at the very least, seeks to
avoid even the unintentional commission of injustices such as the ones it tries to stop.20
Before describing the five general conceptions of humanitarian intervention, I
must say something about the view that humanitarian intervention exists whenever an
intervening agent identifies it as such, as though calling it a ‘humanitarian intervention’
makes it so. There seem to be two possible versions of this view, one dangerously naïve

19

David Mellow, “Iraq: A Morally Justified Resort to Force,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 23, no.3
(2006), 300; Jeff McMahan, “Just Cause for War,” Ethics and International Affairs 19, no.3 (2005), 5.
20
George R. Lucas Jr., “From jus ad bellum to jus ad pacem: re-thinking just-war criteria for the use of
military force for humanitarian ends,” (see n.10) 78.
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and the other much more cynical. On the one hand, one might believe that if the agents of
the intervening state call it a humanitarian intervention, then it is one. On this entirely
implausible view, virtually anything would or could count as humanitarian intervention,
so long as it was publicized as such.
On the other hand, one might argue that humanitarian intervention exists
whenever it is in a state’s interest to invade another country under the guise of
humanitarianism. This definition strips the term of any moral worth and, though it solves
the naivety of the first definition, it essentially denies the possibility of an intervention
that centrally intends the halting of humanitarian atrocities (or at least it assumes that, if
such an action were ever to exist, it wouldn’t be rightly called a ‘humanitarian
intervention’). Here too, anything would count as a humanitarian intervention though its
being rightly called one would do nothing to recommend it. Neither the naïve nor the
cynical versions of the ‘calling it makes it so’ definitions of humanitarian intervention are
adequate. Both rob the term of any moral currency.

1.2 Five Conceptions of Humanitarian Intervention
In order to save its moral currency and to protect against its political exploitation,
some argue that a rightly-called humanitarian intervention must have entirely altruistic
ends and that these ends must be sufficient to motivate the intervening agent(s) involved.
George R. Lucas Jr. sometimes seems to adopt this view, arguing that,
Intervening nations and their militaries should possess no financial, political,
or material interests in the outcome of the intervention, other than the
publicly proclaimed humanitarian ends …., nor should they stand to gain in
any way from the outcome of the intervention, other than from the general
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welfare sustained by having justice served, innocent peoples protected from
harm, and peace and order restored.21
Anthony Arend and Robert Beck similarly require pure altruism of humanitarian
interveners, insisting that “the intervention’s purpose must be essentially limited to
protecting fundamental human rights.”22 This constraint on appropriately labelled
humanitarian interventions is largely responsible for Arend and Beck’s refusal to describe
military actions that are commonly referred to as humanitarian interventions as such, and
to conclude that “…genuine instances of humanitarian intervention have been ‘few and
far between,’ if they have occurred at all.”23
In addition to a kind of Kantian purity of heart utterly unpolluted by self-interest,
this first view requires that agents are successful in their intentions because they halt
atrocities and injure a minimal number of innocents, if any at all. Call this first
conception the Successful Altruist view. Not only must the interveners, on this first view,
aim only at halting atrocities, but they must actually achieve their aim. The intention, the
act, and the consequences must be, in a sense, perfectly synchronized.24
Imagine, for example, an intervention against a campaign of ethnic cleansing
underway on a far-off, isolated island of no political significance to any other country.
Imagine that the island’s humanitarian crisis poses no material threat to international
peace or security. Still, the altruistic agent successfully intervenes, injuring no innocents.
The absence of any additional motives for intervention- apart from a desire to stand up
for the victims of atrocity- enables us to see more clearly that the humanitarian intention
21

George R. Lucas Jr., “From jus ad bellum to jus ad pacem,” 87.
Anthony Arend and Robert Beck, International Law and the Use of Force (London and New York:
Routledge, 1993), 113
23
Ibid, 114.
24
Nicholas Wheeler is a good critic of this view in his book Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention
in International Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
22
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is sufficient and wholly responsible for the intervention. Certainly if such a wholly
selfless action were successfully executed, leaving no innocent dead, then I think it would
be rightly described as a humanitarian intervention.
One might argue, however, that it is wrong- too strict and demanding- to reserve
the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ entirely for actions that are successful and kill no
innocents. A second possible view is that humanitarian interventions can include actions
that despite having purely altruistic intention and despite making the utmost effort,
including the acceptance of significant personal risk, are ultimately unsuccessful. Call
this second conception the Unsuccessful Altruist view. An intervention might be
unsuccessful either because it fails to end the atrocities, or, rather differently, in ending
the atrocities it causes a significant amount of unintentional harm to the very victims it
seeks to protect. On this second view, despite its unfortunate consequences, the
altruistically intended action against ongoing atrocities is sufficient to qualify the action
as a humanitarian intervention. The harm it causes is of course regrettable, but does not
morally indict its agents nor disqualify it as a humanitarian intervention. Supporters of
this view might insist that it is better to make some rather than no military effort against
atrocity, even if ultimately it only serves an expressive function. Failed attempts at
rescuing victims of atrocity, on this second view, are humanitarian interventions,
nonetheless.
Both of these first two conceptions of humanitarian intervention are criticized as
being too exacting, for losing in realism what they gain in moral credibility. At least in
our current world order, it seems that states (or their organizations) are the only possible
agents of intervention and it’s reasonable to doubt that states, as we know them, could
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embark on risky and entirely selfless military campaigns. As Mona Fixdal and Dan Smith
acknowledge, “Humanitarian intervention is never purely humanitarian.”25 Indeed many
add the normative claim that states ought not to be the kinds of institutions that embark
on risky and entirely selfless military campaigns.26 Two possible reasons might support
this view. The first is that a humanitarian intervention should answer to what Allen
Buchanan has called the internal legitimacy problem, that is, the problem of justifying to
the members of the intervening state the expense and serious risks of a military
campaign.27 The second, related reason to insist that interveners have some self-interest
in the campaign is that self-interest may more reliably sustain the political will necessary
to satisfactorily carry through a military action. In the absence of any self-interested
reason for intervention, interveners might retreat and return home at the first sign of
danger. Interventions in Rwanda and Somalia are often described as cases where
interveners had little self-interested reason to stick around, and so withdrew quite quickly
after meeting resistance.
For some, the necessary or likely involvement of a state’s self-interest simply
means that genuine humanitarian intervention in our current world order is impossible,
but for others it means that a less idealized conception of humanitarian intervention is
required. A third possible view, therefore, is that an altruistic concern for the plight of
victims should be necessary and dominant, but needn’t be the only goal of the
humanitarian intervener. As C.A.J. Coady concedes, the humanitarian motive “need only

25

Mona Fixdal and Dan Smith, “Humanitarian Intervention and Just War,” Mershon International Studies
Review 42, (1998), 284.
26
Tony Blair, “Doctrine of the International Community” (speech, Economic Club, Chicago Hilton, April
22, 1999) http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/154-general/26026.html.
27
Allen Buchanan, “The Internal Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention,” The Journal of Political
Philosophy 7, no.1 (1999), 71-87.
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be dominant, not exclusive.”28 Or, as Thomas Weiss argues, even if the altruistic
intention isn’t dominant, it is nonetheless very important: “As motivations are inevitably
mixed, the humanitarian rationale need not be exclusive, but it should be explicit.”29
Let’s call the view that requires some altruism coupled with the actual achievement of the
desired outcome the Successful Partial Altruist view. An advantage of this view is that it
better corresponds with actual historical examples widely (though not uniformly)
described as genuine humanitarian interventions, such as Tanzania’s 1979 intervention in
Uganda.30 In such cases, part of the intervening state’s intention is to pursue its interests,
such as, for example, its interest in stopping a flood of refugees or its interest in
preventing the expansion of violence across state borders.
Alternatively, it might be argued that some altruistic intention to end atrocities
should be, on its own, sufficient for a military action to be rightly called a humanitarian
intervention. On this fourth view, neither real success nor Kantian purity of heart is
required. Call this the Unsuccessful Partial Altruist view. This fourth conception of
humanitarian intervention is the least demanding so far, requiring neither purity of heart
nor the achievement of the desired outcome. Its most plausible defence might involve
imagining a case where interveners, despite their making the utmost effort and taking on
substantial personal risk, ultimately were unable to achieve their goal perhaps because,
upon reconsideration, the full execution of the plan would have resulted in an

28

C.A.J Coady, “The Ethics of Armed Intervention,” Peaceworks 45, (July 2002): 5,
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=30075 (accessed on October 28, 2010).
29
Thomas G. Weiss, Military-Civilian Interactions: Humanitarian Crises and the Responsibility to Protect,
2nd Ed., (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 34.
30
Though, Weiss himself denies that Tanzania’s campaign was properly described as an instance of
humanitarian intervention, Ibid, 181-189. Nicholas Wheeler defends a more common view of Tanzania’s
campaign in Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), 111-136.
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indefensible number of deaths.31 A mission might also fail to protect innocents because it
is understaffed or because it wrongly attempts to maintain neutrality between aggressors
and their victims, employing a peacekeeping model where there is no peace to keep.
Both the Unsuccessful Altruist and the Unsuccessful Partial Altruist views might
be criticized for failing to require that, in addition to certain kinds of intentions,
humanitarian interventions require successful outcomes. A fifth and final possible view,
therefore, might maintain that it is simply the overall consequences that qualify an action
as a humanitarian intervention. Call this the Good Outcome view. There seem to be two
versions of this position.
The first version, advanced by some consequentialist-minded pacifists, holds that
what matters morally is not what you intend but what you actually accomplish. The idea
is that violence that predictably leaves any innocents dead cannot call itself humanitarian,
no matter how altruistically intended. Robert Holmes, for example, argues that
“intentions are of questionable relevance to the moral assessment of acts” and that, “if
one prohibits the killing of innocents, he cannot then invoke good intentions to justify
proceeding to kill them.”32 Effectively Holmes denies that any realistic military action
can be called ‘humanitarian’ or that any reasonably possible war could be just since
military actions (at least as they currently proceed) inevitably kill innocents. Holmes’s
view on humanitarian intervention would seem to be that since even a military action
intended to halt atrocities cannot reasonably avoid killing innocents, there simply is no
such thing as justified armed intervention.33
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The second version of the Good Outcome view, advanced by decidedly more
militaristic theorists, is that what matters ultimately is that good things happen as a result
of military action. So long as, overall, humanitarian goals are served, it is irrelevant how
the interveners conceptualize their actions or describe their motivations. Militarists might
continue that we only care about altruistic intentions because we associate them with
certain kinds of good outcomes, but if the desired outcomes can be brought about without
any altruism at all, then so be it. Some might dismiss the concern with intentions as a
kind of academic fussiness, prissy moralism, or unrealistic idealism, if more selfish
intentions can be said to do as well or better.34 After all, it might be argued, it is the
welfare of the victims, not the purity of the intervener’s character, which is our main
concern.
Both of the Good Outcome views rightly impress the importance of actually
achieving humanitarian ends and taking responsibility for the predictable consequences
of our actions, something that the dominant debate about legitimate intentions certainly
under-appreciates. Indeed, in the context of something as severe as military force, faith
in the Kantian idea that the good will is all that matters morally seems at best
irresponsible, and at worst, positively dangerous.35 Yet, the Good Outcome view might
also give the name of humanitarian intervention to a military action that was solely
intended to usurp a country’s oil or diamond resources, for example, but incidentally and
unwittingly ended atrocities. While one should always be pleased to see the end of
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humanitarian atrocities, it nonetheless seems dishonest and politically dangerous to
describe such actions as humanitarian interventions.
Both the pacifist and the militarist versions of the Good Outcome view wrongly
gloss over morally significant differences between various kinds of military campaigns.
Intention and motive are certainly not all that matter morally, but sometimes they rightly
make a difference both with respect to how we describe actions and to whether we think
them justified. For example, a person who sits horrified as she is forced to watch her
friend drown (perhaps because she cannot swim herself and has no accessible life
preserver) witnesses a death. Contrastingly, a qualified life guard with a life preserver at
her feet who happily sits and watches a friend drown in order to inherit her friend’s
fortune allows a death or, arguably, kills. The person who happily watches her friend
drown might also be described as merely witnessing a death, but this would hardly be the
most informative or relevant description of her act. The Good Outcome views dismiss
how the intentions and motives of agents can make a material difference not only to our
moral evaluation of particular acts, but to how we describe what actually happened.
A parallel from criminal law might be useful here. In order for a crime to be
proven, prosecutors must demonstrate that the accused completed both the physical
element required for the crime, or actus reus, and the mental element, or mens rea.
Failure to adequately demonstrate that the accused possessed the ‘guilty mind’ at the time
of the relevant action disqualifies that action as a crime. Though the contexts are rather
different, and I’m not suggesting that humanitarian intervention ought to be considered
criminal, the parallel seems to be that both domestic crimes and humanitarian
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interventions require the conjunction of the appropriate mental and physical elements.
Neither element on its own suffices.
After rejecting both the naïve and cynical versions of the ‘calling it makes it so’
conceptions of humanitarian intervention, I’ve outlined five basic views. The Successful
Altruist view requires perfectly executed Kantian altruism, whereas the Unsuccessful
Altruist view requires only altruism. The Successful Partial Altruist view requires
successfully executed partial altruism, and the Unsuccessful Partial Altruist view requires
only some altruism. Finally, I described two versions of the Good Outcome view, the
first requiring no killing of innocents, and the second requiring merely a favourable
benefit to harm ratio (setting aside for the moment the difficult question of how such
ratios can be measured at all). Multiple variations and qualifications are made to these
possible conceptions of humanitarian intervention, but drawing out these basic positions
helps to illuminate some of the important points of disagreement, including whether
rightly called interventions require purity of heart, or some altruism, and/or whether they
require actual success, and if so, how much.

1.3 Objection #1: States Don’t Have Intentions
There are two important objections that can be made to the discussion so far. The
first is that states and their agents, who are currently the only viable agents of
intervention, simply aren’t the kinds of entities that can have intentions.36 Any talk of a
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state’s ‘purity of heart’ involves a kind of category error, since states simply aren’t
unified entities that have mental states we can meaningfully describe as either pure or
impure.
I use ‘intervener’s intention’ in this discussion to describe what can be reasonably
taken to be the collective intentions of a state’s top decision-makers who endorse and
authorize a military campaign. In a democracy these intentions may vary amongst the
individual agents who together make up a single government, so I take it that a state’s
intentions are likely to be very mixed and rather fluid. Also important is that these
intentions may or may not reflect the wishes of the majority of a country’s citizens. A
state’s governing agents, for example, can intend and initiate an aggressive invasion of
another country even when a substantial number of the citizenry are opposed to it or, at
least, do not have an informed opinion about it. In such a case, though the state in
question invaded another, it would be wrong to say that the invasion was sustained by a
collective intention shared by all (or even most) of the state’s members. It seems that
there are acts committed by and rightly attributed to states, even though the state as a
whole, citizenry and government together, cannot be said to have stood behind it in a
morally robust way. In the current state of affairs, given the wide discrepancy of opinion
that can exist between citizens and their governments, it’s descriptively true that state
actions needn’t necessarily be propelled by a collective intention shared by all or most of
the state’s members. The desperate need for greater accountability of politicians and for
genuine democratic involvement extends beyond the scope of my project here, but it is
certainly of central importance in the wider project of promoting genuine, long-term,
international peace. At any rate, reference to a ‘state’s intentions’ or ‘an intervener’s
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intentions’ is used here as a short hand way of discussing the collective intentions of a
state’s top decision-makers when they initiate and perpetuate military action.37 Again, I
take it that in real world cases such intentions are very likely to be rather mixed affairs.
Matters are complicated when the objectives of a state’s government change or
expand after the initiation of a military action whether humanitarian or not. This
phenomenon of “mission creep” poses an interesting problem for defining humanitarian
intervention. Do humanitarian intentions or objectives need to be present from the very
beginning of a campaign for it to be rightly called a humanitarian intervention? Suppose
a state’s intentions in carrying out a military action change so that a rightly called
humanitarian intervention could grow out of what was initially a non-humanitarian
military action. Logically it seems possible for a state’s intentions to alter so dramatically
after the initiation of a campaign that a rightly-called humanitarian intervention might be
said to emerge out of a non-humanitarian military campaign. Practically, however, the
prospect seems unlikely. It seems more likely that a non-humanitarian mission might be
found to have some very good humanitarian consequences and that these consequences
get trumped up as motivating or central goals as a means of ‘selling’ the war.
Humanitarian emergencies might also develop in part because of a state’s aggression
(perhaps because the military campaign demolished power plants and hospitals, or
worsened a food shortage), and the aggressing state might then rightly accept
responsibility for addressing the resulting humanitarian crisis. Again, it seems dishonest
and conceptually confused to refer to a state’s attempts to provide for the very people it
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deprives of basic life-sustaining services as a humanitarian intervention, however
important and praiseworthy such provision is.

1.4 Objection #2: Narrow Conception of State Interests
A second objection that might be made to the definitional discussion so far is that
I have interpreted the concept of state interests too narrowly. One might argue that it is in
a state’s interest to halt humanitarian atrocities even when they pose no threat to its own
or its allies’ peace and security. States can have an interest in upholding the human rights
of peoples with whom they are wholly unconnected, one might argue.
While I think that broadening the scope of a state’s interests to include the
upholding of human rights everywhere reveals a commendably cosmopolitan spirit,
ultimately, I do not think it is accurate to say that it is in a state’s interest to intervene
against humanitarian atrocities on far-off, isolated islands with which it is utterly
dissociated. In the absence of anything like a United Nations military, it may well be that
states do have moral responsibilities to attempt to protect victims of atrocity, but this is
not to say that it is always in a state’s interest to do so. Likewise, simply by virtue of
being at the right place at the right time, individuals can acquire moral responsibilities to
attempt to aid others, even if it cannot reasonably be said to be in the individual’s interest
to attempt a rescue, especially if the rescue attempt poses some personal risk. One might
hold a thoroughly Socratic view wherein everything good one can do is in one’s interest
because it nurtures or brings harmony to one’s soul. It is difficult to see, however, how
this Socratic interpretation of interests can meaningfully apply to states. It would be
bizarre to say that a state ought to intervene or else its soul will be corrupted. In short,
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it’s mistaken to conflate responsibility with interests. States have interests in those things
that support or facilitate the functions for which they are supposed to exist, and it is not a
defining function of a state that it attempts to prevent or halt all humanitarian atrocities
the world over. States, however, when they are appropriately situated to aid, may well
have responsibilities that extend beyond their interests.
Critics of my view may defend a currently popular argument that it is in the
security interests of Western states in particular to intervene against the humanitarian
atrocities committed within so-called rogue or failed states. Tyrants or chaotic anarchies
left unchecked weaken the stability of the international order, it is argued, either by
emboldening tyrants who might go on to undermine their neighbours’ rightful
sovereignty, by providing opportunities for drug trafficking, by producing environments
where health pandemics thrive, or by providing environments in which anti-Western
terrorism might bloom.38 There is certainly truth to such claims, and I appreciate the
pragmatic benefits of linking humanitarian atrocities to the financial, health and security
interests of Western powers. Westerners might be more inclined to care about the plight
of distant others if we can be made to see that our vital interests are also at stake. I fear,
however, that it is something of an overstatement to say that halting humanitarian
atrocities the world over is, always and everywhere, in the interests of Western states,
given that Western powers, including Canada, seem content to continue ‘business as
usual’ with brutal tyrannies when it is deemed to be economically beneficial. The
containment or removal of some genocidal tyrants may well coincide with the security
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interests of the West, but there is not always a necessary or robust connection between
allowing atrocities to continue and the increased insecurity of Western states.

1.5 A Critical Defense of the Requirement of Partial Altruism
Ultimately I defend a Partial Altruist view of humanitarian intervention. Though
an altruistic intention is one essential feature of what makes a military action an
appropriately called humanitarian intervention, pure altruism seems an unrealistic
standard, too ideal to be of much use. I argue that humanitarian interventions require
morally consistent agendas, by which I mean that rightly called humanitarian
interventions may involve additional, non-altruistic intentions when these intentions are
morally (not merely logically) consistent with the intention to end atrocities and empower
victims. Rightly called humanitarian interventions cannot involve additional intentions
that are fundamentally at odds with the intention to rescue victims for their own sakes.
They may, however, involve additional, extraneous or incidental intentions when these
are not to the subject country’s disadvantage and do not undermine the victims’
autonomy.
Determining whether an intervener has a morally consistent agenda is not
something that can be mechanically deduced since, in a technical sense, all sorts of
intentions can be artfully construed as being consistent with the intention to aid and
empower victims of atrocity. Ascertaining the consistency of an intervener’s moral
agenda will require critical analysis. For example, some creatively argue that the
intention to take over a country’s resources after the atrocities are ended would be
morally consistent with the intention to rescue victims of atrocity. This might be
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suggested when the state in question is so devastated by the intervention that it could not
properly take care of itself. While it may well be that in some places temporary UN-led
protectorates are necessary to help a country’s citizens reorganize, this is, at least in
principle, quite different from a project of foreign control by ambitious capitalists or
zealous communists, for example. The intention to exploit a country’s resources for
private gain, or to annex and subjugate a country, is not morally consistent with the spirit
of empowering and protecting victims of atrocity, no matter how well such consistency is
defended by crafty spin doctors. A morally consistent agenda, however, may well
include some strategic purpose in addition to the humanitarian end, such as, for example,
the intention to reduce a flood of refugees over state borders.
Again, determining whether a state has a morally consistent agenda is not likely
something that can be ascertained by using threshold conditions, though there are
certainly extreme cases where a morally inconsistent agenda will be manifestly apparent
to any reasonably impartial observer. Ascertaining whether interveners’ actions do not
disadvantage the subject country or undermine their reasonable autonomy is likely to be a
qualitative and messy judgement. Agendas can be more or less consistent, more or less
defensible as humanitarian. For example, interveners may not attempt to overtly usurp a
subject country’s resources, but they may demand access to its resources, or discounted
rates for its resources as a kind of compensation for the risks and expenses accrued to
them over the course of an intervention. The greater the scope and strength of such
demands, the less morally consistent the humanitarian agenda appears.
My insistence on a morally consistent agenda might be objected to by Alex
Bellamy and Fernando Tesón, using the distinction often made in moral and legal
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philosophy between motives and intentions. Both Bellamy and Tesón have recently
argued that what matters in humanitarian intervention is that a state’s intentions are partly
altruistic, its motives, they continue, are inconsequential.39 They agree that while state
leaders may be selfishly motivated, their intentions may be entirely legitimate and that it
is intention that matters in describing and assessing state actions. Selfish motives, they
agree, might morally indict state leaders’ characters, but they are irrelevant to defining a
state’s actions unless, presumably, the motives grossly undermine the humanitarian
outcome.
Tesón then controversially contends that the ongoing war in Iraq was and is a
humanitarian intervention, and that those who deny this fail to comprehend the distinction
between motive and intention. Tesón argues that even if the US government was
motivated by a desire to gain power, or access to oil or to suppress a potential threat, its
intention and its effect was to liberate oppressed people from tyrannical rule, and,
therefore, it was a humanitarian intervention.40 He insists, “It is bizarre to oppose the
intervention in Iraq when it had the intent of deposing a horrific tyrant and did so, merely
because the men leading the intervention had motives unrelated to the act of liberation.”41
Later Tesón insists that, in fact, US agents’ motives were partly humanitarian.42
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Tesón is careful to insist that after liberating a people from atrocities humanitarian
interveners can neither rightly abandon the newly liberated victims nor seek to impose
their own brand of tyranny.43 He rightly argues that imposing a new form of tyranny
would negate the moral value of the initial act of rescue, transforming it into a mere
stepping stone of a much more sinister plot. However, while I agree that there are no
doubt certain personal and non-humanitarian motives that leaders might have that cannot,
in and of themselves, be said to undermine an intervention’s morally consistent agenda
(such as, for example, incumbency, or a wish to make their mothers proud), I feel
compelled to point out that not all non-humanitarian motives are created equal. While we
might be too harsh to insist, as Kant did, that a morally estimable act must be motivated
by duty and duty alone, we would certainly not be demanding enough if we supposed that
a humanitarian action could be one that is widely motivated by, for example, a desire to
secure more power in the Middle East. In identifying humanitarian interventions, one
cannot simply bracket all unsavoury aims as ‘mere motives’ and then select and trump up
the morally better ones as ‘intentions’. While my insistence on a morally consistent
agenda in humanitarian intervention is not wholly at odds with Bellamy or Tesón’s view
on the significance of motives, I think that they are wrong to argue that this distinction is
underestimated or “crucial”44 to the humanitarian intervention debate. It would truly
seem that we were misdirecting our philosophical and political efforts if we were to
spend our time sifting through leaders’ motivational structures, deciphering and arguing
about what counts as a mere motive and what as a full-blown intention. I prefer instead
to simply put all of a state leader’s goals on the table and make them subject to moral
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scrutiny. We should abandon this misplaced talk of motives versus intentions, and
replace it with the question ‘does the intervener have a morally consistent agenda that is
centrally or importantly humanitarian?’
Another, somewhat different critic of my partial altruist view might argue that a
state’s real intentions are virtually impossible to decipher, making intentions superfluous
to identifying an action as a humanitarian intervention. Critics might argue that sinister
or self-serving intentions can always be packaged or marketed in humanitarian-sounding
language. As Bellamy himself warns, even Hitler “insisted that the 1939 invasion of
Czechoslovakia was inspired by a desire to protect Czechoslovak citizens whose ‘life and
liberty’ were threatened by their own government.”45 Intentions, this objection says, are
immaterial for defining and identifying humanitarian interventions because humanitarian
intentions can all too easily be fabricated.
Admittedly the intentions of an intervening state may often be different from its
expressed intentions. Again, calling a military action a humanitarian intervention doesn’t
make it so. In this vein, many have convincingly argued that it is often the case that we
can reliably ‘read-off’ an agent’s intentions by his or her actions.46 As Brian Orend
argues in a somewhat different context,
….intentions are not infinitely redescribable, nor irreducibly private…. Agents are
not free to claim whatever laudable intention they want in order to justify their
actions, however heinous. Intentions must meet minimal criteria of logical
coherence and, moreover, must be seen as being connected to patterns of actions
that are publicly accessible.47
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Take again, the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Humanitarian concerns are often cited
as central intentions in that campaign and indeed some academics, such as Tesón and
David Mellow, justify it entirely in humanitarian terms.48 However, many are distrustful
of the claimed humanitarian intentions given that they were widely promoted only after
other reasons given for the war proved misguided or false.

Despite attempts to warn

civilians about impending attacks, coalition bombing and ground warfare is argued to
have foreseeably killed thousands of civilians.49 In addition, it seems that relatively few
preparations were made regarding how to protect and provide for civilians in the
immediate post-combat setting.50 Quite apart from the issue of the just cause for war, if
one were to read-off the intentions from such actions, then it seems that one would be
hard-pressed to call them robustly humanitarian even if there did lurk a genuine sympathy
for Saddam Hussein’s victims, and even if the military action provided some important
humanitarian benefits.51 To borrow Kantian language for a moment, it seems that in the
context of military action an intention is not to be understood as “a mere wish,” but rather
as “the straining of every means so far as they are in our control” 52 to secure its
realization. Sometimes determining what an agent’s intentions are will involve serious
48
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moral work and admittedly it may be that in some difficult cases an agent’s real
intentions will forever be obscured. Often, however, it seems that intentions are not
inalterably mysterious and inscrutable.
Tesón himself agrees that a state’s intentions cannot simply be taken to be
whatever a state publicly declares them to be. He says, “[w]ords lack magical power, so
whether the intervention is humanitarian cannot depend on the government saying so.”53
Generally this point is meant to discourage people from assuming a state’s intentions are
benevolent simply because the state publicizes them as such. Yet, Tesón takes this
insight in a rather unusual direction, insisting as he does that a state may engage in a
humanitarian intervention without publicly declaring any humanitarian intention. State
leaders, he says, may secretly possess humanitarian intentions but choose not to
pronounce them if they think their publics or the international community wouldn’t be
supportive of war for humanitarian reasons.54 That is, Tesón rejects the reliability of a
state’s stated intentions not only because states might attempt to exploit humanitarian
causes for selfish benefits, but because of the possibility of essentially covert
humanitarian wars. “[P]oliticians,” he says, “have all kinds of reasons to prefer some
rhetoric over another, usually based on their calculations about how best to sell their
policies to the public.”55 Governments, that is, may have humanitarian justifications that
they choose not to use.56
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There is some historical support for this claim. India’s 1971 incursion into East
Pakistan, Vietnam’s 1979 deposing of Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge, and Tanzania’s
campaign into Uganda and removal of Idi Amin, were all ultimately (though not entirely)
defended as actions of self-defense rather than as humanitarian interventions.57 While
India did initially describe its action as a humanitarian one, it encountered international
resistance to a right of humanitarian intervention and so amended its argument to one of
self-defense.58 All three of these actions are now commonly, though not unanimously,
described as humanitarian interventions.59 If these actions are rightly called humanitarian
interventions, then it might lend some support to Tesón’s view that properly called
humanitarian interventions needn’t publicly declare any humanitarian intent.
However, I generally find Tesón’s argument dangerous and implausible.
Dangerous because it invites post-hoc humanitarian rationalizations given for nonhumanitarian wars, and implausible because it seems that in this day and age a politician
would only strengthen her case for a particular military campaign by citing genuine
humanitarian intentions. There is growing international support for the permissibility of
using military force to end humanitarian atrocities, including, for example, support for the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s publication
Responsibility to Protect (often referred to as ‘R2P’) that was adopted, with some
revision, in 2005 by the United Nations General Assembly.60 This document
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emphatically endorses the permissibility of the international community’s resorting to
military force as a last resort to ending atrocities.

It also seems less likely than it once

was for a war defended in part on humanitarian grounds to be denied UN Security
Council authorization, because in the last twenty years the Security Council has
repeatedly argued that humanitarian atrocities can be a threat to international peace and
security, and authorized military action to halt atrocities under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. Given this political and intellectual context it seems unlikely that a state would
have a sufficiently compelling humanitarian justification that it would choose not to use.
In theory, I suppose, leaders could be ‘conniving’ to initiate covert humanitarian
interventions without the consent of their citizenries because they do not actually want to
endorse a more general duty to aid or the legalization of a clear doctrine of humanitarian
intervention. Yet, if that was the case, such behaviour would hardly seem worth
promoting, revealing as I think it does support for the continued concentration of military
power in the hands of the few and disrespect for democracy, not to mention contempt for
the prospect of developing adequately restraining international laws on humanitarian
intervention.
I do not deny that it is probably easier for politicians to convince their citizenries
to endorse a proposed military campaign by using self-interested, rather than
humanitarian language, and that this may give rise to the need to supply additional, nonaltruistic reasons for action.61 David Luban, for example, has noted that in attempting to
‘sell’ the Kosovo war, Bill Clinton sometimes insisted on taking the ‘moral low ground’
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by defending the war as serving America’s commercial interest in European stability.62
This admission that more traditionally self-interested arguments may be required to
mobilize public support for humanitarian interventions, however, seems entirely
compatible with the view endorsed here that properly-called humanitarian intervention
must nonetheless be, in large part, aimed at stopping atrocities, and must publicly declare
such aims before the fact. These humanitarian aims must be part of a morally consistent
agenda that does not exploit the victims it intends to rescue, or undermine their rightful
claims to autonomy.
I do not think that there is as much international antagonism towards the idea of
humanitarian intervention now as there was in the 1970s when India, Vietnam and
Tanzania eschewed talk of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and opted instead to use the
language of ‘self-defense’. This is not to suggest that a ‘right’ of humanitarian
intervention is utterly uncontroversial today only that the international community seems
to have considerably warmed to the idea.63 Few, in either the global North or South,
think that humanitarian intervention is absolutely never justified.64 This makes it less
likely that a genuine humanitarian intervener would feel compelled to describe and
defend its actions in non-humanitarian language. It also makes public declaration and
right intention seem worth holding onto as conditions for a rightly called humanitarian
intervention.
It seems that a more realistic and perhaps scarier objection than that malign
intentions can be dressed up in humanitarian-sounding language, is that aggressors can be
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themselves convinced by their own rhetoric. One worry here is that the possibility of redescribing intentions enables agents to go ahead with whatever they desire, deluded in a
crusading conviction that all their aims are good. Interveners may deceive themselves
into thinking that their cause is centrally humanitarian in order to overcome lingering
internal moral conflict. Another worry is that those who are convinced of the
overwhelming justice of their cause will come to think that such a great good justifies any
amount of mass suffering caused in its pursuit. Either way, the objection again is that
ultimate intentions are of questionable relevance to determining whether an action is a
humanitarian intervention.
This difficult problem haunts the ethics of war literature more generally. If
aggressors in history, pacifists often argue, have always been persuaded by the justice of
their cause and have believed themselves to be intending good, then in order to avoid the
scourge of war we must simply abandon the use of military force as a permissible means
of conflict resolution altogether. Yet a wholesale rejection of the realistic possibility of
justified humanitarian interventions has its own problems, an issue I take up in the
following chapter on pacifism. First, I would answer that humanitarian intentions should
never be considered a sufficient condition for an action to be a humanitarian intervention,
nor do I think that anyone has ever seriously made such a proposal. For the moment, I’ll
simply repeat that we must always investigate a state’s claimed intentions and consider
how well their actions reflect them. When an intervening state consistently pronounces
humanitarian intentions, but employs means that markedly increase the risks to civilians
and virtually eliminate the risks to themselves, the humanitarianism rings hollow.
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Some have avoided the problems associated with including humanitarian
intentions in the definition of a genuine humanitarian intervention by defending a sort of
hybrid of the Good Outcome and Partial Altruist views. Nicholas Wheeler, for example,
argues that the minimum threshold conditions for a humanitarian intervention should
exclude a state’s intentions because such a requirement wrongly directs the focus of
attention to the interveners, rather than the experience of the victims of atrocities.65
Wheeler cautions, however, that interventions that only satisfy his minimum threshold
conditions (just cause, last resort, proportionality and positive humanitarian outcome)
should not be praised.66 Praise, he says, should be reserved for those actions that are
intended, at least in part, as disinterested, humanitarian actions, and, better yet, publicized
as such. He argues that the means chosen to carry out an action are of paramount
importance, arguing that “the key question is not the purity of motives but the
relationship between motives and humanitarian outcomes.”67 He continues,
…non-humanitarian motives disqualified an intervention as humanitarian only if it
could be shown that these, or the means employed, undermined a positive
humanitarian outcome. Interventions that satisfy the criteria of humanitarian
motives, humanitarian justifications, legality, and selectivity have progressively
better humanitarian qualifications than those that meet only the minimum threshold
requirements.68

Taylor Seybolt has similarly argued against the primacy of humanitarian intention,
insisting that the just war tradition’s criterion of right intention “is important but
overrated”69 and that it is in fact preferable for states to have self-interested motives that
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accompany the humanitarian intention in order to better assure that they will ‘stick it out’
even after taking some casualties.70
In many ways I find Wheeler’s proposal attractive. He isolates the bare conditions
required for a mission that is rightly described as a humanitarian intervention, arguing
that if it is rightly-called a humanitarian intervention, then it is justified though perhaps
not praiseworthy; it is permissible but not laudable. So, not just any military action with
humanitarian benefits can call itself a humanitarian intervention and, also, being rightlydescribed as a humanitarian intervention doesn’t guarantee that the action is
praiseworthy.
Yet, I remain uneasy about the prospect that on Wheeler’s view a rightly-called
humanitarian intervention may be entirely and unabashedly self-interested, so long as the
means and outcome are, overall, desirable. I maintain that the minimum threshold
conditions for being rightly described as a humanitarian intervention should include a
publicly stated, partly altruistic and morally consistent agenda, because, in principle, it
seems that people with entirely self-interested goals shouldn’t get to call themselves
humanitarians. It is gravely disingenuous to adopt the term humanitarian intervention to
describe a purely self-interested mission, even if the mission produces some desirable
humanitarian consequences, and even if the mission might, all things considered, be
justified.
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Wheeler’s decision to exclude right intention from the minimum conditions may also
have unintended bad consequences. It seems that interveners might be held to higher
standards of caution in their actions if humanitarian intentions were explicitly stated than
if they claimed only self-defense, for example. I worry that civilian lives lost collaterally
(or indeed intentionally) will be more easily dismissed if the interveners make no claim to
be engaging in a humanitarian mission and instead see themselves as the threatened
victim, engaging in a war of self-defense. Self-identified interveners might be more
likely to use means that minimize risks to civilians than military personnel who
understand their mission as a crusade by the victimized, free world to root out terrorism,
for example. The act of calling a military action a humanitarian intervention may have a
significant effect on the manner in which it is carried out.

1.6

Must Properly-Called Humanitarian Interventions be Successful in
Producing the Desired Outcome?
In addition to my lingering concern about the importance of intentions in

humanitarian intervention, I wonder what sorts of failures might disqualify an action from
being called a humanitarian intervention. Jeff McMahan has argued decidedly that “[i]n
the case of intervention… the intended effects need not be realized. An unsuccessful
intervention is still an intervention.”71 I agree with McMahan’s basic view, but a little
more explanation is needed. It seems that rightly-called humanitarian interventions are
likely to become humanitarian failures for two reasons. First, the interveners adopt some
practices meant to significantly reduce their own risk of injury at the expense of non-
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combatants. Second, they fail because they are under-equipped, and/or underestimate the
complexity or seriousness of the situation.
My account of what kinds of humanitarian failure are consistent with an action
being rightly called a humanitarian intervention requires a brief summary of the just war
tradition’s three areas of analysis. The first area of study identifies constraints on the
justified resort to force, and collectively these constraints are understood as the jus ad
bellum requirements. These requirements include some or all of: just cause, right
intention and public declaration, proportionality and reasonable prospect of success, right
authority, and last resort.72 The second area of inquiry describes constraints on the
manner in which just military ventures can be carried out, and these constraints are
collectively referred to as the jus in bello rules. These requirements at least include some
or all of: non-combatant immunity/discrimination, proportionality, necessity, and a
prohibition on certain kinds of heinous weapons.73 The third, developing area of inquiry
involves articulating constraints on the justified terms of post-war settlements, which
taken together are referred to as the jus post bellum requirements.74

The requirements of

the just war tradition are notoriously elastic, so even after establishing the terms of the
debate particular just war theorists will often disagree about whether the conditions are
satisfied in particular cases. The just war tradition is best understood as a tool for
discussing, and hopefully restraining, military action than as a formula that can
mechanically deduce the rightness or wrongness of particular cases.
I contend that a rightly-called humanitarian intervention must at the very least
satisfy the basic ad bellum criteria of the just war tradition. It would be wrong to call a
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military venture a ‘humanitarian intervention’ if it had insufficient cause for the use of
force (for example, the rights-violating regime wasn’t sufficiently atrocious to warrant a
resort to armed force).75 It would also be wrong to call a military action a ‘humanitarian
intervention’ if it was supremely likely to cause a disproportionate amount of harm, or if
other non-violent means of conflict resolution have a reasonable chance of successfully
achieving the just cause.76 And, as I have argued, it is wrong to refer to the use of armed
force that is neither intended to nor declares an intention to end atrocities as a
humanitarian intervention. Just cause and right intention are neither individually nor
jointly sufficient for a military campaign to be rightly called a humanitarian intervention.
It is not enough that atrocities are ongoing and a just cause exists, nor that interveners
have a desire to end those atrocities. Having reasonably satisfied all of the ad bellum
conditions, the initial resort to force will tend to be prospectively justified, or at least
excused, in a rightly-called humanitarian intervention. That is, the resort to force will
tend to be morally permissible, or ultimately wrong but not blameworthy such as if, for
example, the intervening agents’ proportionality assessments were based on faulty but
very reasonably believed judgments of the circumstances.
Rightly-called humanitarian interventions, however, may on occasion fail to
abide by all of the in bello rules, making them, in some respects, humanitarian failures
that are rightly subject to serious criticism. Such violations would usually occur because
they were deemed necessary as a means of protecting the interveners themselves from
lethal risk. With properly-called humanitarian interventions that violate some of the in
bello rules, it may be more accurate to describe the mission as a whole as excused rather
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than justified. That is, the action would have been just had its intentions been carried out
using means that were more truly discriminating, proportionate, and necessary to the
achievement of the just cause. It says something in favour of an action that it is properly
called a humanitarian intervention, but it does not rightly insulate its agents from all
criticism or blame.
We should be profoundly suspicious of the intentions of self-proclaimed
‘humanitarian interveners’ who persistently and consistently violate in bello rules. Their
in bello violations may be so gross and systemic that their humanitarian intention is
called into question. This would make their satisfaction of the ad bellum requirements
doubtful, and thus challenge their claim to the use of the term humanitarian intervention.
A single, isolated violation of the in bello rules probably wouldn’t disqualify an action
from being rightly described as a humanitarian intervention, but sustained or repeated
violations could. It would be difficult for interveners who repeatedly impose wholly
disproportionate and unnecessary carnage on innocents to convincingly or fairly describe
themselves as having the right intention, even if there is a just cause and even if the use of
force is rightly deemed a last resort to achieving it. Appalling and regular violations of in
bello rules will tend to forfeit rightful use of the word ‘humanitarian intervention.’
Sometimes, however, humanitarian failures can result not because of overt
violations of the in bello constraints, but because of a shortage of resources and
personnel. Under-equipped missions may be humanitarian failures, but they should often
still be called humanitarian interventions. That is, a militarily-backed rescue attempt
whose agents take significant personal risk and who closely adhere to the in bello rules
seems rightly described as a humanitarian intervention, even it the effort is ultimately
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unsuccessful. In such cases we should applaud those who made some effort while
simultaneously investigating whether a larger and better equipped force might have been
more successful.
Importantly, even those interventions that are often held up as decided failures
tend to have had some important humanitarian benefits. For example, during the UN’s
mission in Rwanda in 1994 (UNAMIR) up to 800,000 non-combatants were slaughtered,
yet UN soldiers were nonetheless successful in sheltering some 20,000 Tutsis in stadiums
and hotels.77 Or, during the UN’s mission in Bosnia from 1992-1995 (UNPROFOR),
many of its attempts to protect humanitarian deliveries were thwarted and many of the socalled safe-areas were decimated by Serb forces. Yet, still, UNPROFOR troops were an
important component of the moderately successful effort to protect those who fled to
Sarajevo.78 Both of these UN missions seem rightly described as humanitarian
interventions, even if overall they were shamefully inadequate. Some might argue that
such woefully inadequate missions don’t deserve the name of humanitarian
intervention,79 but I think this would be an overstatement. Unsuccessful actions (or at
least certain aspects of unsuccessful actions) may be rightly called humanitarian
interventions, though we can still roundly criticize leaders for sending troops with
inadequate mandates and resources.
I should add that it is also possible that a humanitarian intervention could yield
dire but reasonably unforeseen consequences. Intervening agents don’t have objective
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certainty about whether the means they employ will be successful or are best all things
considered. Even well-planned and well-executed actions that are reasonably predicted
to risk only proportionate harm can end up inadvertently producing harms that are
observably disproportionate to the benefits gained, or may simply fail to achieve the
desired ends. It may be that sometimes such an action would be best described as a
humanitarian intervention, though it might also be considered objectively or
retrospectively unjustified, all things considered.

1.7 Conclusion
I have argued that rightly called humanitarian interventions are actions that prior
to initiation appear to satisfy the spirit of the basic ad bellum requirements of the just war
tradition including just cause, reasonable prospect of success, proportionality, last resort,
public declaration and right intention. Ideally, they should also be carried out in
accordance with the just war tradition’s in bello rules of discrimination (civilian
immunity), proportionality, and necessity, though some instances of failure in these
respects wouldn’t necessarily disqualify them from being rightly called humanitarian
interventions. Repeated or consistent violations of in bello rules (usually as a means of
insulating the interveners themselves from any risk) does, however, rightly disqualify an
action from being called a humanitarian intervention. I have defended a version of the
Unsuccessful Partial Altruist conception of humanitarian intervention. Rightly-called
humanitarian interventions require humanitarian rescue as a central goal of a morally
consistent agenda. It is possible, however, for a rightly-called humanitarian intervention
to be unsuccessful in some respects if, for example, it makes civilians bear a
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disproportionate amount of the risk exposing them to harm that isn’t strictly necessary, or
if the effort is under-funded and under-equipped. A rightly-called humanitarian
intervention might also be unsuccessful if the effort produces some unforeseeable harm
despite its agents taking every risk possible to protect innocents and despite its being
well-equipped.
By strengthening the conditions required of a properly called humanitarian
intervention relative to Tesón and perhaps Wheeler, I am pressed to hold that in properly
called humanitarian interventions the initial resort to force should be prospectively
justified. At least, that is, the resort to force needs to be reasonably believed by the
intervener to satisfy all of the just war tradition’s ad bellum rules. I emphasize that the
belief needs to be reasonable, so interveners are rightly held to an objective standard of
reasonableness. It would not be sufficient for interveners to subjectively, but wholly
unreasonably, believe that they satisfied the just war tradition’s ad bellum constraints.
Yet, the mission as a whole might nonetheless be retrospectively unjustified if it produces
some disproportionate, unnecessary, avoidable or unforeseeable harm. In such cases, it
might be more accurate to describe the interveners’ initial resort to force as excused,
rather than justified.
My critic might argue that we should simply describe any war with some
humanitarian benefits as a humanitarian intervention, and then move on to the more
substantive and independent issue of whether the action was or is justified. Opponents
might say that the definitional debate is entirely unnecessary.
While I see the attraction of this route, I am ultimately not persuaded. In part this
is because I think it would be very difficult to remove the positive attitude towards the
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interveners that the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ often implies, and so some effort
should be made to articulate conditions whose satisfaction would warrant that positivity.
I stress that being rightly called a humanitarian intervention should not make interveners
totally immune to moral criticism. Though it speaks in favour of an action that it is a
properly-called humanitarian intervention, it does not guarantee that the interveners
should be shielded from any and all blame.
Relative to Wheeler’s position, my view has a peculiar implication. It implies that
an action that saves huge numbers of civilians from imminent attack but is intended only
as a means of self-defense will not be a rightly-called humanitarian intervention, while an
action that is largely unsuccessful at protecting innocents but is well-intended will be a
rightly described humanitarian intervention. A critic might dismiss me as a misguided
Kantian, preferring an unsuccessful but well-intended mission to a successful, selfinterested one. I would respond by insisting that actions that are wrongly described as
humanitarian interventions might nonetheless be justified; one is not faced with a choice
between justifying one and not the other. And while I would naturally prefer a mission to
be successful at saving innocents, so too would I prefer it to be intended to save
innocents, and carried out in a manner consistent with that intention. A certain kind of
moral commendation should be reserved for agents or states that actually intend the
humanitarian benefits they achieve, and who achieve their ends using carefully crafted
means. These conditions strike me as implicit in many ordinary persons’ usage of the
term ‘humanitarian intervention’, though they are rarely explicitly stated.
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Chapter 2
The Pacifist Challenge: Can War be Humanitarian?
“A man overeats, smokes heavily, drinks too much, and gets no exercise. He learns he has
high blood pressure and a weak heart. He decides to switch to filters, drink a little less,
skip seconds on desserts, and walk a few blocks now and then. Is that not a step in the
right direction? Certainly. But it probably will not save him. What he needs is a change in
his whole way of life. We, too, can go on fuelling the furnace of war and take our chances
on being able to control the heat. But let us not deceive ourselves that this is likely to save
us either.” 80
“A world where aggressors are allowed to triumph, and then to inflict rights-violating
brutality, is not part of any sane person’s idea of the best life….”81

2.1 Introduction
Any positions allowing that militarily backed humanitarian interventions can ever
be justified must first engage with pacifism. Pacifism comprises a range of beliefs
broadly united by their opposition to warfare. Often in the philosophical literature,
pacifists are lumped together as a homogenous group, pejoratively dismissed either as
idealists out of touch with the real world or solipsists concerned only about protecting
their own moral purity. Though ultimately I argue that pacifists don’t provide adequate
means for responding to humanitarian atrocities, part of the goal of this chapter is to
articulate more charitably some of the central pacifist arguments. I am convinced that
some military ventures identified as humanitarian interventions have been hardly
humanitarian and that we should have a default suspicion of calls for military action. The
possibility that military force might have been successfully used much earlier to prevent
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or halt atrocities such as the Rwandan genocide in 1994, however, stands out as a vivid
counterexample to the value of the pacifist’s wholesale rejection of military force.
Pacifists reject war for varied reasons, but this chapter explores four important
and common kinds of pacifist argument. These four kinds of pacifism do not exhaust
possible or actual pacifist views, and, moreover, many actual pacifists adopt a mixture of
the four views identified. The four examples addressed in this chapter are chosen
because they seem to be dominant views in Western writing and activism. First, I explore
absolute pacifism which is the view that opposes any uses of force, period. Second, I
explore near-absolutist arguments which permit some limited use of force, but reject the
permissibility of any instance of what is identified as violence. Near absolutists are
particularly opposed to the intentional killing or injury of human beings that military
action entails, as opposed to what they think of as the unintentional, defensive killing by
an innocent victim of their unjustified attacker. Third, I consider a consequentialist
version of pacifism that is centrally opposed to the intentional killing of large numbers of
human beings and the mass chaos and destruction attached to military engagements.
Consequentialist pacifists reject the permissibility of humanitarian intervention because
they argue that the use of military force makes bad humanitarian sense. Fourth, I
consider a more deontological version of pacifism which is more particularly against the
killing of innocent human beings. Even if military action could be effective at curbing
humanitarian atrocities, deontological pacifists argue that there is a fundamental
inconsistency between the means and the ends of so-called interventions, and that
genuinely humanitarian effort must, by definition, exclude all military activity.
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2.2 Absolute Pacifism
Those who reject military action because they are against any use of physical force as
a means of conflict resolution are often referred to as absolute pacifists (or absolutists).82
Duane Cady laments that pacifism is usually equated with this absolutist position, arguing
that “few if any actual pacifists have held this view.”83 Nevertheless, the many instances
of absolute pacifism among some Christian communities serve as counterexamples to
Cady’s insistence that the absolutist position is merely a caricature.
Christian pacifism is usually set aside by secular philosophy since it relies on
controversial metaphysical claims that are accepted as articles of faith. Nonetheless,
since many, if not most, practicing absolutists in the Western world identify themselves
as Christian pacifists some brief description of Christian pacifism is relevant. Important
to note is that Christian pacifists are a diverse lot, and this short summary is not meant to
be a comprehensive exegesis of the range of views contained within this version of
pacifism. Moreover, there is some debate about whether an outsider to the tradition can
ever adequately understand or represent it.84
In addition, I stress that it is not the case that most self-identified Christians are
pacifists, Christian scholarship is, after all, where the Western just war tradition gets its
start. However, many absolutists identify themselves as Christians, and believe that their
absolutism follows from their religious commitment.
Despite significant internal differences, Christian pacifism seems to be centrally
derived from the conviction that Jesus was a pacifist who taught that one ought to ‘turn
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the other cheek’ and love even one’s enemies.85 The Peace Churches (the Anabaptists, the
Quakers, and the Church of the Brethren) separated themselves from other Christians in
Europe in the sixteenth century, believing that Christianity had unreasonably drifted away
from Jesus’ original pacifist teachings.86
Some Christian pacifists see forceful defence against aggression as short-sighted
interference in God’s plan. Theodore Koontz argues that,
[H]istory is finally in God’s control, and …it is our responsibility to act as Jesus
teaches us to act, and… as we do so, God will bring about the outcome of history
that God intends. We are simply not smart enough to know what the outcomes of
our various actions will be…We have no “responsibility” to violate standards
revealed to us in order to help God out….the conviction that we do not bear the
burden of history’s outcome alone frees us from a compulsiveness about stopping
what we perceive as evil or achieving what we perceive as good that, in the final
analysis, from a Christian pacifist perspective, reflects a kind of functional
atheism.87
Our inability to fully know God’s plan and our grave epistemic shortcomings, Koontz
argues, will never allow military action to be anything but misguided intrusion.
Scriptural support for this view is sometimes garnered in Romans: 12, “Do not take
revenge, my friends, but leave room for God’s wrath for it is written: ‘it is mine to
avenge; I will repay,’ says the Lord.”88
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Some (certainly not all) Christian pacifists go so far as to encourage nonresistance, as opposed to simply non-violent resistance.89 Moreover, some do not insist
that the spread of Christian pacifism will alleviate violence in the world, resigned as they
are to the fact that, since the Fall, humans have been naturally sinful and imperfect.90
The metaphysical premises for Christian pacifism are naturally rejected by nonChristians and, as well, by Christians who don’t share the presented interpretation of
scripture. It is theoretically possible that absolutism can be secular, but in practice it is
difficult to find anyone who consistently defends a secular version of pacifist absolutism.
Gandhi’s teachings, for example, are sometimes thought of as secular absolutism (or at
least non-denominational absolutism), and indeed in many passages he seems like an
absolutist. Yet, Gandhi also maintained that it would be morally better for a person to
courageously engage in warfare than to hide among pacifists out of cowardice.91 Given
such a view, it is not clear that he’s rightly described as an absolutist.
The chief argument against absolutism regards the unreasonableness of its denial
of the right to self defense. Critics often imagine a case of an innocent victim and a
guilty aggressor and insist on the permissibility of an innocent using strong or lethal force
to repel the threat to life. They argue that the wholesale rejection of physical force,
including in self-defence, unreasonably restricts our ability to handle aggression. Critics
of absolute pacifism often buttress this point by citing Gandhi’s now infamous insistence
that the Jews imprisoned in Nazi concentration camps would have been wrong to try to
89
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overtake their captors had they had the chance.92 Yet, if ever there was a justified case
for forceful self-defence, critics continue, the Holocaust was it.
While an absolutist position is very well meaning, I agree with its critics that,
even in its secular form, a rejection of all force is profoundly problematic. However, I
admire the resolute commitment to non-violence, the refusal to accept that in even the
darkest hour physical supremacy should be the means of conflict resolution between
human beings. It seems especially important to hear an absolutist voice during periods of
tense negotiation, since Western populations so repeatedly reveal an alarming eagerness
to resort to war. As William James noted, with the exception of a small minority, war
taxes seem to be the only taxes that people don’t complain about paying.93 An absolutist
voice reinforces the importance of exhausting non-violent alternatives to military action
and challenges our casual acceptance of the institution of war. At the same time, the
absolute pacifist’s ‘no matter the consequences’ attitude is ultimately unreasonable.
I do not contend that absolutism is inconsistent, as Jan Narveson has argued.94
Narveson rejects secular absolute pacifism as “self-contradictory,”95 “confused,”96 and
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“logically untenable,”97 and argues that an absolutist position reduces to the view that,
“Violence is wrong, and it is wrong to resist it.” “But”, he continues, “the right to resist
is precisely what having a right of safety of person is, if it is anything at all.”98
It is important to note that absolutists needn’t necessarily couch their argument in
terms of rights as Narveson supposes. Moreover, I follow Jenny Teichman in arguing
that there is no logical inconsistency in the contention that violence is wrong and it is
wrong to resist it.99 I agree that a wholesale rejection of force is inadequate, but it is not
self-contradictory or logically untenable to say that defense of one’s rights should be
restricted to certain kinds of means, even if those means are inadequate to the task of
protecting the right in question. Teichman argues that the substantive question is whether
violence “is or is not one of the methods permissible in defence of rights,” and she rightly
says that this simply cannot be answered with a formal, purely conceptual analysis of the
sort Narveson attempts.100

Absolutism does conflict with a considered judgment about

the permissibility of certain kinds of self-defense that most are unwilling to give up, but it
is not incoherent. I do not mean to suggest that actual absolutists are callous to human
suffering, but it is true that absolutism cannot satisfactorily distinguish between force
used aggressively and force used defensively.
A secular absolutist might reply that were we to accept her recommendations,
then all aggression would be eliminated and there would never be any need for defensive
force. Perhaps, she might admit that there would be a period of transition from our own
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world of highly imperfect behaviour to the absolutist paradise, but insist that the paradise
is, nonetheless, achievable.
While I imagine that the world certainly would be a more peaceful place if
everyone resolutely abdicated all use of force, such a world seems a rather far way off.
Though I don’t attribute it to divine punishment, it does seem that human beings are
unlikely to rise above any and all resort to force.101 This is not to say that moral
theorizing in the realm of non-ideal theory should simply accept as morally right
whatever ways we have behaved in practice. I do not propose that we go the way of the
realist. Self-identified realists in the ethics of war literature often seem to identify some
of the worst ways that human beings have behaved in practice and take this behaviour as
paradigmatic of the human condition. The realist’s mistake is that she pessimistically
takes the lowest common denominator as what can be reasonably expected of people.
The secular absolutist’s opposite mistake might be an undue optimism about the potential
for ridding the world of any and all aggression, even at the interpersonal level.102
Admittedly, I have not proven that human beings can be reasonably expected to
behave better than the realists suppose, nor that we can be reasonably expected to behave
worse than some absolutists might hope. I can only repeat my intuition that it is unlikely
that violent rages and the need for defensive force can be made a thing of the past. I
certainly think that much aggression is preventable, but within the realm of non-ideal
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theory (where the ethics of war literature resides) one is required to engage with the likely
prospect of a certain amount of human aggression.
Notice, however, that the Christian absolutist’s case doesn’t necessarily rest on a
belief that the world might rid itself of human aggression, and so remove the desire to use
defensive force. Even in the face of aggression, says the Christian absolutist, one is to
steadfastly turn the other cheek. I have argued that such a view, while not incoherent, is
ultimately unreasonable. It is certainly permissible for individuals to refuse to defend
themselves with violence (if violence is necessary to effectively repel the threat), but it is
unreasonable to argue that even if one wished to, one cannot defend oneself in such a
manner. Equally (if not more) troubling is that the absolutist does not permit one to
physically defend a helpless neighbour, or even one’s child, against brutal assault.

2.3 Near-Absolute Pacifism
Absolutists might respond to the criticism that absolutism unreasonably denies the
permissibility of self-defense by insisting that there is dignity in the endurance, but never
in the infliction of suffering.103 Other pacifists, however, respond by drawing a distinction
between force and violence and then defend some limited use of force, but uphold a
rejection of all violence. These near-absolute pacifists defend the kinds of forceful
actions that might be required to remove oneself from imminent harm, but still denounce
all forms of military action.
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In his book, From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum, Duane Cady argues
that the distinction between force and violence relies on a difference in intention.
Violence, he argues, is “any physical act intending to injure, damage, or destroy a person
or object.”104 Force, on the other hand, is simply “the imposition of physical strength.”105
The kind of violence of particular concern here involves the imposition of physical force,
committed by and against persons. Often the force is mediated by some kind of
technology, and importantly, is not intended to benefit those it harms. Cady concludes
that not all force is violence since it does not always intend injury (imagine, for example,
pushing a child out of the way of oncoming traffic), though all violence (of the kind
we’re interested in here) necessarily involves force.106 Near-absolutists sometimes argue
that police officers may use some limited force in order to apprehend dangerous
criminals. Soldiers, however, employ both force and violence since they not only impose
physical (or technological) strength, but also intend the destruction or injury of an enemy.
For the near-absolutist, typical forms of soldiering are impermissible.
Though on the face of it the near-absolutist seems to more adequately equip us for
handling aggression than the absolutist, it too falls short. In particular, it is still unclear
how it justifies the use of force in self-defence. Suppose, for example, that by an unlucky
turn of fortune one found oneself being attacked in a dark alley and reasonably believed
the only way to escape certain and dire harm was to stab one’s attacker. Assuming the
belief in the threat was reasonable, the stabbing proportionate to the perceived threat and
no less-bloody options for escape were available, it seems that stabbing would be
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justified. It would, however, involve an intention to ‘injure, damage, or destroy’ and it
certainly wouldn’t be intended to benefit the attacker. It should, therefore, on Cady’s
definition, qualify as violence and be unjustified. Absolutists are perfectly content to
deny the permissibility of ever intending to injure one’s attacker as a means for escape,
but if the near-absolutist wants a moral view that can accommodate the permissibility of
self-defense, then somehow it needs to be explained how forceful self-defense does not
intend any injury, damage, or destruction, even if only as a means to a permissible end.
One way that the near-absolutist might respond would be to insist that in stabbing
one’s attacker one would not actually intend injury or destruction, but only one’s own
preservation.107 This is the approach taken by some defenders of the Doctrine of Double
Effect which is the view that although one cannot rightly intend certain harmful effects
either as ends or means, it is permissible to bring about those effects as the undesired but
foreseen side-effects of otherwise good intentions and permissible, proportionate acts.
The near-absolutist might insist that repelling a threat would be the intended end, killing
or injury merely a foreseen side-effect. If the injury or killing of an unjust attacker were
merely a foreseen side-effect, then it is not properly thought of as an intended harm. That
is, it would not be an instance of violence. Evidence that the injury or killing is merely a
foreseen side-effect (rather than the intended end or means) might be issued by the selfdefender’s insistence that she would have preferred not to injure or kill her attacker if
other less destructive means of escape had been available.
I think that this attempted construal of defensive injury or killing as a mere side
effect, rather than an intended means to a permissible end is implausible, even though it is
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not an uncommon view.108 While it is certainly true that the self-defender’s ultimate end
is self-preservation, it seems that he or she no less intends the necessary and available
means. In order to justify self-defense it is unnecessary (not to mention somewhat
bizarre) to say that while one inserts a knife into one’s attacker one does not actually
intend any injury. It seems more accurate simply to say that the harm is intended as a
necessary means to escape and that sometimes (though rarely) intending harm is
permissible.
In this example there are not two distinct effects- repelling a threat and injuring
the attacker- there is one effect, differently described. I certainly do not reject the
intend/foresee distinction wholesale, for example, when I save money for tuition rather
than giving to Oxfam I do not intend the hunger of those who might have been helped by
the charity.109 There are examples where the intend/foresee distinction is very
appropriate. However, it strains credibility to say that in, say, stabbing someone one does
not actually intend any injury. One might as well say that one doesn’t intend to torture a
captive, but only to elicit possibly important information. Certainly in a situation such as
the one we’ve been imagining the self-defender would no doubt prefer to have the option
of using non-violent means for self-preservation and, again, the self-defender’s ultimate
end would not be injury or destruction. This does not mean, however, that the selfdefender does not intend the injury reasonably perceived to be necessary to save him or
herself from certain and serious harm as a means. He or she would intend the injury or
killing, perhaps with deep regret that it was the only effective means of escape.
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The near-absolutist might insist that one does not intend that which one
regretfully brings about, but reasonably feels forced to do for lack of better alternatives.
In the uncomplicated case of self-defense, the innocent is truly faced with a choice
between saving her own life or her attacker’s. Killing in military actions, the nearabsolutist might say, is never so forced; one never has to resort to military force. Perhaps
then, the near-absolutist might argue that the self-defender acts knowingly in injuring his
or her attacker, but does not intend the injury (as a means to his or her escape) because
unlike the soldier he or she genuinely has no other reasonable choice. The idea here is
that one cannot fairly be said to intend the necessary means you take to protect your own
survival, and that contra the self-defender, military forces always have available to them
other means of self or other protection.
Ursula Franklin rather poetically makes a closely related point when she describes
all military action as “resourcelessness” and contrasts it with non-violent resistance which
she describes as “resourcefulness.” 110 Violence, she says, is always a mere failure of
humanity to use all available resources. It involves a lack of imagination. Military
action, for Franklin, always reveals that we have merely given up on (rather than
exhausted) our capacity for finding non-violent solutions.
This argument raises the difficult issue of whether military forces too might ever
reasonably argue that they have no other realistic options for protecting their own lives,
or, in the case of humanitarian intervention, the lives of others who are unable to protect
themselves. Although I think Franklin is correct to suggest that actual military actions
are often falsely characterized as last resorts, I think her blanket description of all military
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force as a ‘giving up’ is too sweeping. Defensive military actions against active
génocidaires with whom all good-faith negotiations and targeted economic sanctions
have failed, for example, would seem wrongly described as a mere lack of imagination.
In a certain sense, Franklin and other near-absolutists are correct in that military force is
always a choice. In the face of ongoing genocides, we can always refuse to fight violence
with violence. The issue is whether, after every other non-violent effort has been
considered, choosing to use the military can ever reasonably appear to be the least evil,
and most humanitarian option available.
Contra the near-absolutist, I prefer to simply deny any categorical prohibition of
intending harm as a means to good. It seems that self-defenders often rightfully (even if
regretfully) intend harm. However, if one claims that the self-defender does not truly
intend any injury (even if only as a means to a permissible end) because she has such
poor options, it opens the door for a similar argument to be made by soldiers. They might
insist that, after exhausting every non-violent alternative to a permissible end, the injuries
they cause are not intended because they too function under a particularly bad set of
circumstances.
A near-absolutist might also attempt to argue that the self-defender doesn’t intend
harm because the target of his or her defensive force is not innocent. That is, only force
used against innocents is truly harmful, non-innocents forfeit their rights to life and thus
proportionate force used against them isn’t rightly thought of as harm. This manoeuvre
also strikes me as one that, for consistency’s sake, would also have to be allowed to the
disciplined soldier fighting in a well-ordered humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian
interveners would then be able to similarly claim that they neither intend nor do harm
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because their targets are non-innocents. In both the interpersonal and the military case, I
find this argument implausible. It seems unnecessary and dishonest to claim that where
the victim is non-innocent, there is no harm. Again it seems like in both cases there is
intended harm, but it may sometimes be justified.
Those who for the most part reject physical modes of conflict resolution often
defend not only the renunciation of war, but also a more fundamental reform in the way
we approach the world and each other. Brian Orend has usefully described pacifists who
primarily emphasize the cultivation of a peaceful, life-revering or loving character as
teleological pacifists since their rejection of war follows from what they take to be the
end or goal for which human beings should strive.111 Gandhi’s sweeping rejection of
physical modes of conflict resolution, for example, is part and parcel of his general
reverence for life that includes a commitment to vegetarianism, environmental
stewardship, and a rejection of ascriptive social hierarchies. Gandhi’s pacifism is part of
a more general prescription to cultivate a compassionate character.112
Orend contends that the absolutism or near-absolutism often associated with
teleological pacifism is problematic since living well may sometimes require that we use
some force.113 While we certainly should strive to live in harmony with the world, there
are times when the world is decidedly not in harmony with us, as when, most
dramatically, some of us become the targets of ethnic cleansing or genocide. In some
kinds of situation when all non-forceful alternatives are either exhausted or utterly inapt,
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the virtuous thing to do may be to use some defensive force. As Orend argues, “A world
where aggressors are allowed to triumph, and then to inflict rights-violating brutality, is
not part of any sane person’s idea of the best life….”114 If justice is a virtue, then, Orend
argues, sometimes living well might oblige us to postpone immediate peace.

2.4 Consequentialist Pacifism
Many pacifists reject war not because of a principled opposition to any use of
force, or because they claim that it is always wrong to intend injury, or because they think
that resorting to physical confrontation reveals bad character and distracts us from our
proper ends, but simply because institutionalizing military action is, overall, too costly.
Consequentialist pacifists argue that military action has a demonstrable record of causing
mass destruction and the killing of large numbers of human beings. In addition, they
argue that military action entrenches disagreement and undermines efforts to establish a
system of non-violent conflict resolution. They oppose war and military action more
generally on the grounds that, overall, its likely harms outweigh its benefits. While there
could exist a pure act-consequentialist pacifism that considered non-violent conflict
resolution as more desirable in every likely or reasonably possible instance, most
consequentialist pacifists seem to defend either a rule consequentialism wherein nonviolent resistance is defended for its long-term prospects, or some mixture of act and rule
consequentialism.

114

Ibid, 247.

60
Consequentialist pacifists tend to reject the use of analogies between military
action and individual self or other-defense.115 In discussions of humanitarian
intervention, an equally popular and potentially problematic analogy is made between
intervening to protect victims of atrocity and rescuing a child from an abusive parent.116
It is not the case, say the consequentialist pacifists, that from the simple case of self or
other defense we can deduce the permissibility of large-scale military action even if that
action is genuinely defensive. Consequentialist pacifists, therefore, sometimes admit the
permissibility of using violent self-defense, but insist that self-defense be restricted to
particular kinds of means; in particular, those means that are unlikely to produce
consequences that are as bad or worse than the ones being averted. 117 Interpersonal selfdefense may more easily be justified since its consequences are apt to be more contained
than, say, the short or long-term consequences of unleashing a large group of young
people, trained to kill without hesitation, into a situation of catastrophic anxiety and
upheaval.
Brian Orend has objected that there is a fundamental inconsistency between the
consequentialist pacifist’s prohibition of military action and her commitment to doing
whatever it is that will produce the best consequences overall.118 The idea is that one
cannot reject all use of military force, while simultaneously insisting, as a
consequentialist does, that nothing is, in principle, impermissible. This is similar to
the more general objection to rule-utilitarianism which says that if one is a utilitarian
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one cannot consistently defend rules that one knows may not maximize overall utility
in every instance.
Act consequentialist pacifists might defend themselves against the charge of
inconsistency by maintaining that the concession, in principle, that some theoretically
possible wars might be justified does little to dilute their resolve against any wars that are
reasonably likely to occur on earth.119 Admitting that, in theory, some logically possible
wars might be justified does not commit one, on pain of inconsistency, to just war theory.
As consequentialists they have to admit that there may be logically possible wars that
produce the best overall consequences. They would insist, however, that given the state
of the world such situations are sufficiently unlikely to occur that they can comfortably
align themselves with a policy of anti-warism. Rule consequentialist pacifists, on the
other hand, prohibit military action as a matter of policy. They would presumably simply
repeat that whatever moral costs might accrue by the abandonment of war in the short
term will be worth the sacrifice if it can bring about the enormous and overwhelming
good of stopping all war, for all time.
A second objection that Orend makes to consequentialist pacifists is that they do a
lot of hand-waving when it comes to specifying those consequences that they seek to
avoid. He says:
There is a lack, in the literature, of a detailed breakdown of war’s costs and
benefits; pacifists prefer instead to gesture towards very general- almost clichédunderstandings of war’s destructiveness…. Could this tendency towards sweeping
generality and abstraction exist due to a lack of confidence in the results of a more
finely grained analysis? 120
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Orend continues to identify the various kinds of costs that can accrue when we refuse
to use military force. Military inaction, he says, can effectively reward aggression and
weaken the stability of the state system. In the context of humanitarian atrocities, he
adds, military inaction can mean the mass killing of innocents.121 He cautions, “It is
very simple to cluck one’s tongue and shake one’s head at the destruction of warfare“War is bad!”- and quite another to think through the costs of pacifism and what they
might involve relative to just war theory.”122 Orend contends that if consequentialist
pacifists made a concerted effort to identify all the potential costs and benefits of
particular military operations, then they might sometimes find the consequences of
inaction worse than military action. Some things, he thinks, could be worse than war.
A common consequentialist pacifist response to the criticism that they
inaccurately calculate the relative costs of military action is to make clear that they do not
recommend passive surrender.123 Pacifists, as Cady notes, are not ‘passivists’, who
fatalistically give in to the whims of wrongdoers.124 According to most pacifists
wrongdoing should be resisted, but resisted non-violently. Pacifists promote first and
foremost negotiation and in the worst case scenarios some endorse massive, organized
campaigns of non-cooperation coupled with economic punishment from without.125
Economic sanctions against an offending regime, however, have come under
increased moral criticism. Albert Pierce, for example, argues that economic sanctions
can sometimes themselves be less humanitarian than overt military action, likening them
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to a kind of siege warfare.126 Pierce warns that sanctions can essentially use the suffering
of an innocent civilian population as a means of obtaining a political end, while the real
culprits either remain insulated from any very serious inconvenience or actually find
ways of profiting from emerging black markets.127
Critics might also retort that even if the consequentialist pacifist doesn’t mean for
us to simply submit to aggression, the kinds of non-violent tactics they recommend are
unlikely to be effective against serious aggression. It is often argued, for example, that
Gandhi’s prolonged campaign of non-violence was only successful in attaining Indian
independence from English rule because the English were relatively reasonable tyrants.
The English, some argue, shared some of Gandhi’s ultimate values, making his nonviolent campaign fall on willing ears.128 Others argue that Gandhi was effective against
the English because of their chivalrous ideals of combat or commitment to just war
theory, which made them shamefully withdraw in the face of non-violent civilian
resistance.129 Still others argue that Gandhi was effective against the English in part
because the English were worn out and broke after the end of World War II.130 The
objection is that non-violent resistance only works against liberal or chivalrous
oppressors, or perhaps against oppressors who are too tired to oppress anymore, but it is
powerless against any truly brutish threats.
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Some consequentialist pacifists respond by countering that non-violent resistance
has indeed been successful against truly brutish threats. Against the argument that the
English were “comparatively nice,” Duane Cady recalls the Amritsar Massacre on April
13th, 1919 where English soldiers trapped and opened fire on a gathering of peaceful,
unarmed protestors, killing 379 and wounding 1137 more.131 Others have noted that
against the Nazis, non-violent resistance also had some encouraging results. Martin
Benjamin, for example, refers to some evidence that Nazi soldiers were, “at least on
occasion, thwarted by resistance and defiance which did not aim at bodily harm.”132
Benjamin quotes B.H. Liddell Hart, a British military historian who interviewed German
generals after the war about the non-violent resistance they had encountered primarily in
Denmark, Holland and Norway and concluded that,
They [the Nazis] were experts in violence, and had been trained to deal with
opponents who used that method. But other forms of resistance baffled them- and
all the more in proportion as the methods were subtle and concealed. It was a relief
to them when resistance became violent, and when non-violent forms were mixed
with guerrilla action, thus making it easier to combine drastic suppressive action
against both at the same time.133

Benjamin does not argue that Hitler himself would have been deterred or flustered by a
more widespread, non-violent civilian resistance, but he does think that such a movement
might have weakened the will of the ordinary German soldiers and thereby enfeebled the
Nazi effort.
Another response to the objection that pacifism is ineffective against serious
threats is to note that military action itself isn’t always effective. The bloody record of
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war is hardly a resounding success. Those with a just cause do not always win, and even
when they do win, they do not always fight justly. It is also far from clear that state
measures meant to improve military security, such as the development of nuclear
weapons and the military reinforcement of borders, always make citizens safer.134
Importantly, Benjamin adds that consequentialist pacifists usually concede that nonviolent resistance has its own bad consequences. He admits that even a well-disciplined,
non-violent resistance against violent aggressors is likely to incur casualties and runs the
risk of failing.135 Relatively speaking, however, he thinks that the consequences of
organized non-violent resistance are bound to be less severe than those produced by
large-scale violence.
Consequentialist pacifists also commonly argue that the kind of peace they seek
simply cannot be achieved by military means. They argue that military conflicts may
well force one side to surrender, but they cannot secure any more meaningful peace.
They seek mutual understanding and reasoned agreement, rather than the temporary
cessation of hostilities brought about by military surrender or defeat. To use Cady’s
language, they seek positive, rather than just negative peace.136 Genuine, deep-seated
peace, they say, cannot be effectively produced through military might.
In many ways, the relative effectiveness of non-violent resistance is an empirical
question that cannot be settled by philosophical argument. Few, however, have been
interested in making a concerted effort to enact pacifist political reforms, such as the
elimination of national armies, or to actively train and mobilize a citizenry in non-violent
resistance. Some pacifists argue that until a determined effort has been made to invest in
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pacifist reforms, then pacifism is doomed to look unreasonable or impracticable.137 This
reluctance to enact pacifist strategies, however, seems to stem from a general skepticism
about the effectiveness of already existing examples of non-violent resistance. Critics
argue, for example, that civilian resistance was neither necessary nor sufficient for the
Allies’ winning the war and that Allied victory was more fundamentally the result of
military triumph. Moreover, it seems that in those places where non-violent resistance
did have some effect on the Nazis, in Holland and Denmark, the populations were viewed
by the Nazis as sharing in racial superiority; they were populations the Nazis did not want
to exterminate.138
Though more empirical work needs to be done, it does seem at least plausible that
significant bloodshed might be avoided if we adopted some of the pacifists’ institutional
reforms. If we eliminated the production and trade of ever more powerful rockets, for
example, it seems plausible that we would appear less threatening to each other and
thereby reduce aggression. And, as Jessie Wallace Hughan argues, if any of us were
attacked but resisted non-violently then we might through sustained and organized noncooperation be able to compel the aggressors’ withdrawal. He says, if there were “no
battles, no opposing armies, no dangers, no chances for heroism…. Neither army morale
nor war fever in the aggressor nation is likely to hold out long against this reversal of all
that makes the spirit of a campaign.”139 If we dismantled some of the very system that
makes people feel threatened and rally around their armies, then it seems credible that at
least some interstate invasions might be curtailed.
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I remain uneasy, however, about the ability for non-violent resistance to
adequately respond to genocides or campaigns of ethnic cleansing. First, non-violent
resistance needs time to work, to sink in, and shame its targets into desisting.
Unfortunately, the victims of atrocities do not often have much time to bend the will of
their oppressors. In the Rwandan genocide, for example, 800,000 people were killed in
the short span of one hundred days. Second, and more importantly, the goal of genocide
or ethnic cleansing isn’t the taking over of a community, but rather its annihilation. Nonviolent resistance might well hold some promise against aggressors who want to colonize
an already inhabited territory and enlist its residents, but it seems to hold less promise
against aggressors who simply want their victims dead. Well-organized forms of nonviolent resistance seem to have enormous power in campaigns to end serious kinds of
oppression such as, for example, in the campaign to end segregation in the Southern
United States, but their ability to adequately deflate wild-eyed genocidal maniacs (often
themselves the victims of propaganda) seems, in some cases, simply implausible.
Now it may well be that if we were to adopt all of the pacifists’ recommendations,
then the racial, ethnic or religious tensions that underlie genocides or ethnic cleansing
would diminish. We might, for example, develop a more cosmopolitan system that
dampens nationalistic spirit, dissolves group-based antagonisms, and roots out ‘us’ versus
‘them’ thinking. The potential for an international cosmopolitan revolution to reduce
group-based antagonism definitely warrants sustained attention by anyone concerned
about war.140 At the same time, however, I think that examples such as the Rwandan
genocide show us that some limited defensive military action might still be justified in
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order to pre-empt or halt mass slaughter. It would be a strange moral position indeed that
refused any military intervention by members of the international community in an
ongoing genocide as a means of enlivening cosmopolitan spirit.
The other objection explored in this section was that consequentialist pacifists
cannot consistently be both consequentialist, thus opposed in principle to nothing, and
against all use of military force. I find this objection generally less persuasive than the
objection about effectiveness. Indeed, I tend to think that there is an admirable
consistency in the pacifist position insofar as it doesn’t just claim that war is bad, but
actively recommends a substitution. If just war theorists agree with the pacifists that war
is ghastly, then it certainly seems strange that we spend so much of our time talking about
when war is justified. Jenny Teichman nicely makes a related point when she concludes,
“We might well say that the point is not to justify war but to abolish it. The pacifist by
his actions in war and peace at least proves that he really believes that.” 141
So while I think that one can consistently or logically be a pacifist and a
consequentialist, I do worry about whether consequentialist pacifists accurately calculate
the consequences of the refusal to use military action in this highly imperfect world. I am
not suggesting that we slavishly and unimaginatively enforce our current domestic and
international institutional arrangements, as though such things are inalterable facts of the
human condition. I think that we should work towards modes of organization that better
incline us towards peace, but unfortunately the future society where intense group-based
hatreds, power hungry tyrants and/or malleable war-loving societies are no more seems a
very long way off. I do not claim that war and large-scale aggression are inherent and
permanent fixtures of humanity as some do. I do claim, however, that if something like a
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pacifist revolution does happen, it will be long, arduous, and incremental. During this
process, it would be unreasonable to refuse to use any military force as a means to ending
a genocidal campaign, especially if such force might realistically be capable of abiding
by the central requirements of the just war tradition.
I think there is something especially sinister in the rule consequentialist’s position
in that it willingly imposes or requires massive sacrifices from the world’s most
vulnerable people now for the sake of people not yet born. Certainly it is often
appropriate for those of us currently living to forgo some material possessions or change
certain economic or environmental practices in order to build a better, more sustainable
world for future generations. Yet, giving up claims to military protection when one
becomes a target in genocide or ethnic cleansing strikes me as a rather substantial and
unreasonable sacrifice, however noble the long-term goal. Rule consequentialist pacifists
refuse to sanction the means that could be required to protect some innocents now with an
eye to saving others, perhaps entirely unrelated to the case at hand, in the future. While
we should certainly strive to achieve institutions and understanding that better incline us
towards peace in the long-run, it simultaneously seems like currently living innocents
who are the targets of mass atrocities can nonetheless have an overwhelmingly
compelling claim to military protection. The long-term project of creating a rights
respecting world and the short-term project of adequately protecting innocents who find
themselves the subjects of widespread atrocities must be made compatible.
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2.5 Moderate Deontological Pacifism
Consequentialist pacifists insist that a policy of widespread institutional change
and organized non-violent resistance will produce the best consequences overall. Other
more deontologically-minded pacifists insist that independent of whether pacifist
proposals will produce the greatest overall good, pacifism is always morally preferable to
military action because, quite simply, military action inevitably and foreseeably kills
innocents. As deontologists, they insist that there are important moral constraints on the
pursuit of even objectively good ends. As moderate deontologists, however, they may
disagree with the absolutists or the near-absolutists that one can never permissibly intend
harm, such as, for example, harm to aggressors. While many moderate deontological
pacifists are likely to agree with the consequentialist pacifists that the long-term
consequences of non-violent resistance are likely to be better than the consequences of
continued war, they do not rest their whole case on it. Often individual pacifists use many
different kinds of arguments in favour of the abolition of military action, so I don’t mean
to suggest that these various kinds of pacifism are discrete and competing factions.
Moderate deontological pacifists are particularly concerned with the conduct of
modern military action, as opposed to earlier methods of military action where it is
believed that warfare generally took place on distant battlefields far removed from
civilians. Indeed, many statistics support the view that warfare is becoming worse, not
better, for civilians. Some estimate, for example, that one in every ten casualties in WWI
was a civilian, that one in every two casualties in WWII was a civilian, and that nine in
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every ten casualties in the wars of the 1990s were civilians.142 Yet, despite such
abhorrent statistics, it would be incorrect to paint war before the twentieth century as
being chivalrous and genteel. Lawrence Keeley, for example, convincingly argues that
the current tendency to look back on wars past as though they were the ‘good old days’ of
clean warfare is a gross oversimplification.143
Often when moderate deontological pacifists condemn the killing of innocents
they have in mind what has come to be known as ‘collateral damage’ when this refers to
the foreseeable yet unintentional killing of civilians who are utterly uninvolved in the
military. Lives lost ‘collaterally’ are often dismissed by military officials and
philosophers alike through this bit of military jargon. The term is problematic because it
implies that the killing is necessarily justified because it is not the work of sadists, but
rather the work of well-intended soldiers. Moderate deontological pacifists insist that it is
not enough that soldiers kill innocents with good intentions. Innocents, they argue, ought
not to be killed at all, thus they defend a moral constraint against doing harm, and not
simply what they take to be the just war theorist’s more lenient constraint against
intending harm.
In his various works, but especially in his book On War and Morality, Robert
Holmes provides a very powerful defence of moderate deontological pacifism. Holmes
argues that though the constraint against the intentional killing of innocents might be
stronger than the constraint against foreseeably killing innocents, both constraints are
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strong enough for the killing of innocents in war to be prohibited. 144 That is, while it
might be worse to intentionally kill an innocent than to foreseeably do so, both kinds of
killing are impermissible. Holmes’s moderate deontological pacifism is in many respects
very compelling, even according to many just war theorists, and so I propose to
investigate his account in some detail.
Holmes contends that innocents have a stronger claim not to be killed, than
soldiers or interveners have a claim to kill them, even if the killing is merely foreseen and
granting that the soldiers’ ends and means are all good.145 As he so concisely puts it,
“Human beings have as much right to be spared destruction by good people as by bad.”146
When pressed with the objection that foreseeably (but unintentionally) killing
some innocents might also save a greater number of innocents from being killed by
another, Holmes simply does not budge. He maintains that those who insist that we
ought to foreseeably kill some innocents when doing so might prevent an aggressor from
killing a greater number of others wrongly suppose that it is always equally wrong to
cause the deaths of innocents as to allow them so that the only thing left to do when faced
with aggression is to attempt to minimize overall fatalities. Though he admits that
sometimes allowing the death of an innocent can be just as bad as killing an innocent
person oneself,147 Holmes denies that doing and allowing are always on a par. For
Holmes, ‘letting’ an innocent die can be just as bad as killing an innocent oneself,
especially if, for example, one intends the death as a means to a private end, or if one has
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a special relationship to the potential victim that might oblige one to provide her with
positive aid.148 But, he insists, letting die isn’t always as bad as doing the killing oneself.
He adds that in general the strength of our obligation to refrain from killing innocents is
stronger than any supposed obligation to save innocents from others’ threats by
sacrificing ourselves and/or killing other innocents.149 Presumably, Holmes’s view does
not prohibit a person’s sacrificing only herself in order to save the life of a distant other,
but simply considers such sacrifice supererogatory.
Insofar as he seems to place considerable stock in what agents do (rather than just
the overall outcomes to which they contribute), his position is importantly different from
the consequentialist pacifist’s. The consequentialist’s case for pacifism seeks to prevent
the mass chaos and destruction attached to military action, Holmes, on the other hand, is
centrally interested in restricting agents from doing certain things. Holmes also
disassociates himself from absolute and near-absolute pacifism.150 He does not condemn
all war by contending that force or violence is always, in principle, wrong. In theory, he
says, an innocent’s entitlement not to be killed could be overridden if enough was at
stake, but the threshold at which the innocent’s entitlement might be overridden is so high
that no prospects involved in reasonably possible modern military actions satisfy it.151
Holmes admits that “any plausible moral theory, to be sure, must take some
account of consequences….”152 He even agrees that agents can sometimes be justifiably
accountable for harmful consequences they foresee but are mediated by others’ actions.
He agrees we should, for example, hold an agent responsible for the chaos she instigates
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by shouting ‘fire’ in a crowded theatre.153 For Holmes it is not the case, however, that
agents are always properly held to account for the harmful responses they foresee will
follow from their actions. Such a principle, he says, would simply be a recipe for the
worst kind of social conservatism, as though interracial marriage could be rendered
wrong because of the foreseeable and harmful reactions of bigots.154 So while Holmes is
appreciative of consequences, and also admits that sometimes agents can be properly
blamed for their causal contributions to mediated consequences, he denies that when
faced with unjust human aggression one ought simply to do whatever salvages the best
overall consequences.
According to Holmes, the overall consequences do matter, but they are not the
only things that matter; it also matters that agents guide their actions according to what he
calls “moral personalism” wherein it seems that persons are expected to behave, as Nagel
puts it, in ways that those persons on the receiving end could reasonably be expected to
accept.155 Holmes insists that, “persons are pre-eminently worthy of respect and have
claims upon those whose conduct may affect them to be treated in certain ways that do
not diminish them.”156 His view is that the killing of innocents that inevitably happens in
the course of modern military action violates the demands that moral personalism impose
between the innocent who is killed and the well-intentioned soldier who kills her.
To summarize this section so far: In the context of war, Holmes defends a
constraint against doing harm to innocents, whether that harm is intended or ‘merely’
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foreseen. That is, according to Holmes, one cannot rightly kill non-combatants
intentionally (presumably as a means of saving other non-combatants), nor kill them
foreseeably in one’s defensive efforts against enemy combatants. Intending harm by
one’s own hand is worse than foreseeing harm by one’s own hand, but causing ‘merely’
foreseeable harm to innocents in military actions is nonetheless impermissible. Holmes is
also generally suspicious of intentionally allowing harm to innocents as a means to an
unjust end, though he has less to say about this than about his restriction against
intentionally doing harm to innocents in war.
Holmes permits harm to innocents that is not intended, but is foreseen and
involves an allowing rather than a doing. An example might be refusing to engage in
military operations that would kill some innocents and foreseeing that, in a certain sense,
this refusal allows the aggressor to continue unimpeded. In addition, he also permits
some harm to innocents when it is unintended and involves a doing, but the foreseen
harm is mediated by the unjust aggression of some other human agent. Holmes insists
that he is not an absolutist about either the constraint against doing or intending harm. In
principle, he says, these constraints could be overridden. In practice, however, he says
the thresholds at which the constraints might give way are simply never met, and couldn’t
reasonably be met by modern military actions.
Holmes’s position might be said to involve a variation on the Doctrine of Double
Effect (DDE). Ordinarily, defenders of the DDE permit a person to do some harm to
innocents when it is neither intended as an end or a means and when the merely foreseen
harm is proportionate to the good achieved. Holmes, on the other hand, seems to say that
one is permitted to allow some harm when it is neither intended as an end or a means to
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one’s end, and when the merely foreseen harm is chiefly attributable to another’s unjust
aggression. He does not deny that there is a moral distinction between intending and
foreseeing harm. What he rejects is the view that forseeably but unintentionally doing
harm can be justified every time so doing contributes to an overall good.
Generally I agree with Holmes and other moderate deontological pacifists that a
person’s refusal to prevent the deaths of some innocents by killing others is not as bad as
being an aggressor oneself. I also agree on his more particular point that just war
theorists sometimes try to pass off as ‘merely foreseen’ consequences that seem more
rightly described as intended means. It may nonetheless be mistaken, however, to refuse
to use military force when enough lives are at stake and the victims of atrocity accept the
added risks of intervention. Thus, while intentionally killing innocents is certainly worse
than allowing them to be killed by refusing to (unintentionally) kill other innocents in
defensive action, allowing an aggressor to kill unimpeded might nonetheless be wrong
when the threat to be avoided is sufficiently grave and the targeted population cries out
for military assistance.

2.6 Innocence and Non-Combatant Immunity
Throughout the discussion so far, ‘innocents’ have been taken to mean noncombatants who are utterly uninvolved in the military, children and the elderly being
paradigmatic examples, whereas ‘non-innocents’ have been taken to mean combatants
and those who are actively engaged in or directing hostilities. However, the categorizing
of all non-combatants as innocents and all combatants as non-innocents is the subject of
considerable debate. The worry is that sometimes combatants are more accurately
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thought of as victims, innocent pawns in the hands of aggressive, war-mongering elites,
while some non-combatants are reasonably thought of as morally guilty, such as
newspaper publishers who fan and exploit ethnic tensions that contribute to war.
Interestingly, both Robert Holmes and Michael Walzer, the paradigmatic pacifist
and just war theorist respectively, lean towards absolving soldiers of responsibility for
their initial decision to fight, insisting that they usually have little grasp over the decision
to resort to war. Even when they are not conscripts, Holmes and Walzer note that
soldiers are often actively deceived by their governments, lack education and opportunity,
and are socialized to see patriotism and self-sacrifice as virtuous and intrinsically
worthwhile.157
If Holmes and Walzer are correct about the moral innocence of many ordinary
soldiers, then it seems that the moderate deontological pacifist’s concerns are only
amplified. If military action is wrong because it foreseeably kills innocents and modernday soldiers are themselves innocents, then for the moderate deontological pacifist even
the most stringent application of the principle of non-combatant immunity is problematic.
Since the killing of combatants would itself be the killing of innocents, it would mean
little to boast that one had successfully restricted one’s killing to combatants. This is not
to say that a moderate deontological pacifist necessarily shares the view that soldiers are
innocent pawns. A moderate deontological pacifist might prefer to side with Jeff
McMahan and Brian Orend, who both argue that the coercive pressures on ordinary, nonconscripted soldiers are sometimes exaggerated.158 A moderate deontological pacifist
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might insist that at least some combatants are rightly described as non-innocents, but still
continue to reject war for its reasonably foreseeable effects on innocent non-combatants.
A person could, rather oppositely, reject the moderate deontological pacifist’s
prohibition on foreseeably killing innocents by denying that most non-combatants are
innocents, thus rendering virtually an entire population a legitimate military target. One
might argue, for example, that because an aggressing country is a democracy and thus is
at least implicitly endorsed as a system by most of its members, most of the collective is
liable to intentional defensive attack. In a similar vein, some have argued that in extreme
circumstances, payment of taxes to a blood-thirsty, genocidal regime can be sufficient to
make one rightly liable to attack in a humanitarian intervention.159 In effect, this line of
argument says that almost everyone is fair game by virtue of their complicity or
association (however attenuated) with an offending authority. This rather extreme
position responds to the moderate deontological pacifist’s concerns by expanding the
category of non-innocents to include ordinary civilians.
While I think that this possible objection rightly challenges the assumption that
non-combatants are always wholly innocent with respect to their states’ aggression, the
moderate deontological pacifist is unlikely to be moved by it. Indeed even most just war
theorists tend to reject an extension of liability to intentional attack to non-combatants
within an unjust regime. Given the huge diversity of opinion that can exist within
modern states and the gulf that often exists between the politicians who initiate wars and
those they claim to represent, any temptation to tar a whole enemy society with the same
brush should be resisted.
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That being said, it’s true that non-combatants have an obligation to try to ascertain
and assess their government’s actions. We should certainly scrutinize our governments
and attempt to separate ourselves from them when they act in ways we deem criminal
and/or morally unjust. I am no apologist for moral laziness, but my concern is that in
times of crisis military personnel and political leaders engaged in what they perceive to
be defensive military actions can rashly portray foreigners as a homogenous and
uniformly hostile group. Philosophers ought not to serve as apologists for this kind of
criminal simplification, however just the ends and however urgent the call to arms. In the
case of humanitarian interventions, it is important not to overstate the case against
ordinary non-combatants as a means to help well-meaning interveners sleep better at
night.
I have two reasons for preferring to maintain the immunity of non-combatants,
despite the fact that non-combatants are admittedly not always rightly described as
innocent with respect to the aggression in question. First, in principle, the most serious
threat of all (i.e. the threat to life itself) should be reserved for those who are themselves
overtly or directly engaged in threatening. Heinous though it is, paying taxes to a
genocidal regime ought not make a person liable to intentional lethal attack in military
intervention. Even when non-combatants are not themselves the victims of terror and
propaganda, and they happily pay their taxes to support a genocidal government, the
principle of discrimination and non-combatant immunity should hold. Making noncombatants liable to lethal attack violates a sense of proportionality between the
wrongdoing and the redress.
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My second reason for preferring to uphold the immunity of non-combatants
despite the obvious problems with describing non-combatants as uniformly innocent is
consequentialist. Put simply, the potential consequences of generalizing liability over an
entire population could be catastrophic. If paying taxes to a rights-violating regime were
sufficient to make one liable to military attack, then there may be very few tax-payers in
the world who could confidently deserve the protection of non-combatant immunity. It’s
worth noting that this tendency by some otherwise progressively-minded liberals to
generalize moral guilt across a whole citizenry as a means of justifying civilian casualties
is not unlike the reasoning used by defenders of suicide bombing and terrorism more
generally. Even those with a just cause need to avoid the inclination to make a monolith
of offending groups, lest they become just like the party they resist. The immunity of
non-combatants may well be more of a conventional than perfectly principled rule, but it
seems one well worth preserving.
Naturally it makes me uncomfortable to defend the immunity of those who
willingly support genocidal regimes, and the worry is that doing so reveals a misplaced
loyalty and is callous to the victims of atrocity. I am not insensitive to the fact, however,
that there could arise a humanitarian intervention that satisfies all of the criteria of a thick
version of just war theory, but can only be executed by risking the foreseeable, but
unintended killing of some non-combatants. Whether non-combatants can ever rightly be
the victims of ‘merely’ foreseeable killing is controversial and on this issue moderate
deontological pacifists and just war theorists part ways. Holmes insists on what in effect
turns out to be the virtually absolute immunity of non-combatants, and Walzer insists
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only on the doctrine of double effect coupled with what he calls the requirement of due
care.

2.7 Due Care and Moral Personalism
Walzer’s requirement of due care requires that soldiers have a “double intention,”
they must intend a good end through a permissible means and must also attempt to
minimize all foreseeable harm to non-combatants by accepting some costs to themselves.
Walzer argues that there can be no fixed rules about how much risk soldiers must accept
but that the “limits of risk are fixed…roughly at that point where any further risk-taking
would almost certainly doom the military venture or make it so costly that it could not be
repeated.”160 For Walzer, the interests of soldiers engaged in a just war or humanitarian
intervention must be risked before innocent non-combatants are foreseeably killed.161
Insofar as his requirement of “due care” can be interpreted to make a fairly
important break from how modern wars tend to be conducted, Walzer can be thought to
share some of the moderate deontological pacifist’s concern with the world’s seemingly
nonchalant acceptance of collateral damage. Indeed he writes that “most campaigns are
planned and carried out well below the line” militaries can be reasonably expected to
absorb in their attempts to avoid civilian casualties.162 By virtue of their having
volunteered for military service, Walzer would rightly support some transfer of risk from
the innocent victim to the humanitarian intervener. He does not, however, go so far as to
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say that innocents have absolute or near-absolute entitlements to be free from attack,
restricting their rightful claims instead to ‘due care.’ Anything more than a civilian’s
right to due care effectively denies the permissibility of any defensive military action at
all, no matter how overwhelmingly significant the cause.163
I side with Walzer on the issue of the strength of non-combatant immunity during
humanitarian interventions but hasten to emphasize that Walzer’s proviso of due care can
be reasonably interpreted to make a radical break from the way modern military
operations tend to be conducted If modern military actions were to be truly conducted in
accordance with the principle of due care, it would take place in a much more restrained
manner. For a humanitarian intervention to be justified it would be crucial for interveners
to err on the side of caution and treat all non-combatants as though they were innocents,
indeed as innocent as the very victims they are intervening to protect. I think the
importance of such caution is buttressed by the likelihood that non-combatants who
support their murderous governments have themselves been manipulated and terrorized
by their governments. At the very least, non-combatants support for their governments
often seems to be the cumulative effect of years of carefully crafted state propaganda that
exploits and manipulates pre-existing tensions, dehumanizes the victims of atrocity, and
gradually wears down a citizenry’s natural moral impulses. This is not meant to justify
the actions of those citizens who fail to disassociate themselves from their blood-thirsty
governments, only to account for my thinking that their killing should be actively and
consciously avoided by even well-intended interveners.
Even though Holmes attempts to distance himself from absolute pacifism which
unconditionally rejects any and all defensive force as a matter of principle, his view is
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equally inadequate when it comes to responding to humanitarian atrocities.

Holmes

himself must admit that there may be certain very undesirable consequences of following
his prohibition of military action, but he insists that it is not the job of the pacifist to solve
the problems created by non-pacifists.164 His line seems to be that since pacifist
recommendations could be consistently followed, there might be no need for defensive
military action and thus it is unfair to require that the pacifist answer those who refused to
listen. Even if it’s true that we could avoid many of the messes we get into if the whole
world adopted pacifist reforms, it seems negligent to refuse to articulate some criteria and
terms for military action in the event that some groups return to (or persist in) military
aggression and, in the case of humanitarian intervention, the world is faced with ongoing
or imminent, large-scale and violent humanitarian atrocities.
I think that imposing the risk of foreseeably killing innocents may, in very
particular and extreme kinds of circumstances, be consistent with the perspective of
moral personalism that both Holmes and Nagel advocate. In very desperate
circumstances, innocents whose lives are risked by military intervention might support
the intervention despite its risks. It seems at least plausible that someone who is herself
faced with near-certain extermination might argue that Holmes’s thresholds for
permissible killing (or risk of killing) are simply too high. It seems false to suggest that
foreseeably killing innocents can only ever appear justified from an isolated, overall
consequentialist perspective. Persons in Nazi-occupied Europe, for example, may well
have cheered on Allied raids, despite the obvious risks such raids posed for their own
security. Moderate deontological pacifists don’t credibly have a monopoly on what
Holmes calls the perspective of moral personalism. I stress, however, that I do not want
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to justify and sweep under the carpet any amount of so-called ‘collateral damage’ by
humanitarian interveners. It is certainly not the case that all that matters are good
intentions. It seems, however, that a person who is herself faced with near-certain
extermination might well argue that Holmes’s thresholds for permissible killing (or risk
of killing) are simply too high.
In writing this, I certainly do not wish to align myself with those who might
reason that it doesn’t matter whether intervention kills innocents since without an
intervention they would have died anyway.

I do not think that interveners can

permissibly do anything to me because my death, or my neighbour’s death, at the hands
of others is already likely. Imposing any risk of foreseeably killing innocents should
always be profoundly disturbing and it understandably leads many to defend some
version of pacifism. Unfortunately, however, in some reasonably possible circumstances
the humanitarian consequences of pacifism seem even worse. It seems even more
disturbing that the world should be restricted to petitions, sanctions, and labour strikes
even when such techniques have no influence on halting mass slaughter. When such
techniques do have some sway we should undoubtedly use them, but when they don’t, the
suitability of other avenues needs to be explored. Both the just war theorist who defends
intervention under very strict terms and the pacifist who insists on only non-violent
means of response face deplorable consequences. Yet, considering the gravity and scale
of the kinds of atrocities here considered, it seems like sometimes military action may be
the lesser of two evils, and may be an evil that its potential victims welcome.
The potentially serious risks attached to even the most carefully executed
humanitarian intervention, however, should make us seek out ways of preventing
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humanitarian atrocities from happening at all. Equally as much as controversial terms for
intervention should be debated, so too should we investigate means for pre-empting the
outbreak of humanitarian crises.165

2.8 Conclusion
This chapter explored various pacifist arguments as a means of determining
whether a case for military action against humanitarian atrocities has any merit at all. If
military action can never be justified, then the argument stops here. Ultimately I have
argued that while I am sympathetic to much that pacifists say, a blanket rejection of all
forms of military action is too sweeping, and leaves the targets of violence ill-equipped to
respond to aggression.
I argued that absolute pacifism and near-absolute pacifism both fail because they
reject or fail to account for the permissibility of forceful or even lethal self-defense in
order to repel a threat to one’s life. Absolute pacifists explicitly reject self-defense,
preferring instead to turn the other cheek, while near-absolute pacifists try to justify selfdefense by implausibly insisting that self-defenders don’t mean their attackers any harm.
Near-absolutists might creatively re-describe the self-defender’s intention as the repelling
of a threat and the aggressor’s subsequent death or injury as an unfortunate, wholly
unintended side-effect. While I certainly have not rejected the intend/foresee distinction
altogether, it is more accurate and intellectually honest to say that the self-defender
intends harm to the attacker as a necessary means to a wholly just end. Sometimes, but
no doubt very rarely, intending injury or death as a means to an end is morally
permissible.
165

Pogge, “Preempting Humanitarian Interventions,” 93-109.

86
Next, I explored consequentialist pacifism and the possibility of using non-violent
methods of responding to aggression. I defended consequentialist pacifists against the
charge that there is an inconsistency between being a pacifist and thus opposed to all
military action and a consequentialist so opposed to nothing in principle. However, I
argued that even a well-organized non-violent resistance may not always be adequately
effective in repelling aggression; in particular it is unlikely to hold much promise against
blood-thirsty génocidaires who simply want their victims dead. Consequentialist
pacifists admit that non-violent tactics may leave some dead, but they insist that it will be
a smaller number than would die through a continued resort to defensive military force.
Yet I am unconvinced that the calculus is necessarily going to work out in favour of nonviolent resistance. By all means, it seems that some of the institutional recommendations
that consequentialist pacifists endorse are worth pursuing, such as, for example, training
populations in tactics of non-violent resistance, eliminating nuclear weapons, and
working towards methods of domestic and international organization that are more
genuinely democratic and better incline us towards peace. Nonetheless, a wholesale
abdication of military action seems to make bad consequentialist sense.
Finally, this chapter explored moderate deontological pacifism for which I took
Robert Holmes as a paradigmatic example. Moderate deontological pacifists reject
military action because they insist that it inevitably and foreseeably kills innocents. After
some discussion regarding who counts as an ‘innocent’, I concluded that while Holmes is
correct to be so critical of the world’s seemingly blasé attitude towards collateral damage,
he is wrong to insist that collateral damage is, in any reasonably possible military action,
wholly unjustified. I emphasized, however, that very stringent conditions should be met
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to make imposing the risk of foreseeably killing innocents permissible. Most notable
among these conditions is Walzer’s requirement of due care which says that soldiers must
increase the risks to themselves in their efforts to shield innocents from foreseeable harm.
In the end, I speculated that sometimes in very desperate and gruesome circumstances,
military intervention and the risks they impose will be allowed by their potential innocent
victims. Even those who are disposed to accept certain constraints on our pursuit of an
overall good can deny that these constraints are so severe as to require that only nonviolent methods of conflict resolution be employed to fight genocide or some equally
weighty humanitarian catastrophe.
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Chapter 3
Reasonable Prospect of Success and Proportionality
3.1 Introduction
After attempting to sift through competing conceptions of humanitarian intervention and
determining, contra the pacifist, that it is at least in principle possible for humanitarian
interventions to be justified, I now move on to consider more particularly some of the just
war conditions under which intervention could be justified. There is no very precise set
of threshold conditions that can be mechanically applied to troubled areas of the world
and that would inform us of whether intervention is justified. This does not, however,
make the effort to articulate any substantive rules useless. So long as mass atrocities
persist, ongoing discussion of the justifying conditions for military intervention is
important. It is, however, unlikely that one could discover any very precise algorithm
that would determine when intervention is justified. The discussion that follows is,
therefore, essential but necessarily broad.
This chapter investigates the just war tradition’s requirements of reasonable
prospects of success and proportionality. I argue that these just war conditions can be
reasonably understood as more difficult to satisfy for humanitarian interveners than for
those fighting in self-defense because interveners are required to weigh a greater range of
harms in their proportionality assessments, and to give an especially high weight to any
foreseeable harm to non-combatants. This interpretation of the proportionality
requirement, I argue, makes certain kinds of modern military tactics off-limits to fully
justified interveners. I also argue, however, that while humanitarian interveners may be
required to include a greater range of harms in their proportionality assessments than self-
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defenders, and weigh harm to non-combatants particularly heavily, they may also be
permitted to include a greater range of goods in their proportionality assessments than
some just war theorists suppose. I begin, however, with a few very general comments
about what it means for military action to be justified.

3.2 The Just War Tradition and Moral Justification
Philosophers sometimes use the word ‘justified’ to mean that an agent is properly
immune from blame and under no duty to compensate those she harms. Sometimes these
philosophers admit that even an agent who is justified in her action should be expected to
feel some regret regarding her connection to (perhaps unintended) harm. If she celebrates
the harms, then it reflects badly on her character and we may become suspicious about
the virtue of her intention. A total lack of regret regarding one’s causal role in bringing
about some harm (in particular, harm to innocents) seems to call into question a person’s
humanity. Nonetheless, some will reserve the word ‘justified’ for actions that, however
deeply regrettable or tragic, the agent is not properly to blame for. Redress is not her
duty, even if she herself is (wrongly) plagued by this belief. Some claim that justified
agents can have a duty to explain why they did what they did, but no more substantive
duty to compensate or apologize to those they harmed.166
Other philosophers contend that blameworthiness and/or a duty of redress isn’t
always and only tied to actions that are unjustified. They argue that one can be
unjustified, but not blameworthy because one was coerced or psychologically impaired in
some way. Equally, and more controversially, one can be justified and also rightly
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blamed for some of the consequences of one’s permissible action. This residual moral
culpability may give rise to certain duties to compensate victims (or their families, or
communities).

That is, a person can owe a debt to someone (or a group of people) she

harms even if she was justified in bringing about (or contributing to) the harm.
Joel Feinberg provides a nice example where an agent is justified but nonetheless
owes a duty of compensation. He writes:
Suppose that you are on a back-packing trip in the high mountain country when an
unanticipated blizzard strikes the area with such ferocity that your life is imperilled.
Fortunately, you stumble onto an unoccupied cabin, locked and boarded up for the
winter, clearly somebody else’s private property. You smash in a window, enter,
and huddle in a corner for three days until the storm abates. During this period you
help yourself to your unknown benefactor’s food supply and burn his wooden
furniture in the fireplace to keep warm.167

Feinberg argues that the back-packer is justified, but nonetheless acquires a duty to
compensate the cabin owner for the damage to her property.168 The property owner has a
right to compensation, and the back-packer’s paying compensation is not supererogatory
or charitable, but rather a duty. Though no rights were violated, because the back-packer
acted permissibly, the cabin owner’s rights were infringed or justifiably overridden, and
this infringement entitles her to some redress. Feinberg doesn’t claim that every time a
person’s rights are infringed she acquires a right to compensation or redress, but
nonetheless argues that some instances of justified rights infringements warrant redress
by the person who did the infringing.
One might think that the back-packer in Feinberg’s example owes a duty of
redress to the cabin owner, but that it would nonetheless be inappropriate or unreasonable
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for her to feel a sense of guilt or remorse for the damage she causes, or for the cabin
owner to blame her. Redress, it seems, can be owed by an agent even in cases where an
uneasy and painful sense of remorse might be inappropriate. In other cases, however, a
benevolent agent who does the right thing, all things considered, but in so doing commits
or allows some serious harm can be expected to feel remorse or guilt.
Michael Slote argues that a well-intentioned public official who violates the rights
of innocents in order to avoid a large-scale disaster should, “feel distaste at what he does
even though he correctly believes that he is acting rightly.”169 This distaste, he continues,
demonstrates “sensitivity to genuine moral cost.”170 Slote rightly argues that this moral
distaste, or residual agony, is inappropriate in those cases where one prima facie
obligation easily overrides another,171 such as when, for example, one breaks a promised
dinner engagement in order to save a drowning child, or burns someone’s wooden
furniture to keep from freezing to death.

He also thinks that this moral distaste or

residue is different from the helpless feeling one should have when anything one can
possibly do is entirely wrong.172
Though the public-official, the back-packer, and the promise-breaker all have
good (or at least permissible) intentions and are justified in their actions, the public
official may be unique if, in her bringing about some very important social good (or
avoiding a grave harm), she causes or contributes to a particularly serious kind of harm.
Particularly serious harms sit uneasily with benevolent intentions. Slote argues that,
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“benevolence …can (must?) also involve a concern not to harm anyone and not to leave
anyone’s well-being neglected.”173 He continues,
Benevolence aims not only to do the best it can in a given situation and to help
rather than hurt people on balance, but also to leave no one- at least no object of its
concern- badly off and uncared for, and this aim can leave a sense of moral
consternation, when one’s maximizing actions have left someone neglected or
worse off than previously.174
Benevolence is, in a sense, double-headed requiring a desire to help as well as a desire
not to harm. Slote’s view about benevolence nicely parallels Walzer’s insistence that the
principle of due care involves a “double-intention,” requiring a military agent to intend a
good end through a permissible means and to attempt to minimize all foreseeable harm to
non-combatants by accepting some costs to herself. Following Slote, I argue that a
benevolent intention coupled with (all things considered) right action can rightly
accompany residual moral guilt and a duty of redress. This is true when the right act
involves committing very serious rights infringements. This conception of benevolence
can be quite demanding, since it will not be enough to simply avoid gratuitous harm to
innocents. Benevolently-intentioned agents must actively try to minimize instances of
serious, prima facie wrong acts. When further harm prevention becomes incompatible
with pursuing the weighty good (or preventing a horrific wrong) perhaps because it
makes the effort unbearably costly, justified agents must still (if circumstances allow)
contribute to reasonable efforts at redress after-the-fact.
War provides many examples where agents’ moral justifications are less than
fully exculpatory and where, despite acting permissibly (even courageously), agents
acquire duties to compensate their victims to the extent that compensation is possible.
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Even agents in very well-intended wars with just causes, carefully planned to risk only
proportionate harm, and who have exhausted all other avenues for achieving the just
cause seem to bear some residual moral blameworthiness for the unintended harm they
cause, such that we expect them to help rebuild, for example, the civilian institutions and
infrastructure damaged by the military action. Even if one thinks that blame would be
inappropriate, one might agree that some remorse (and not merely regret) might
reasonably be expected.
Entering into war, even a just one, seems to involve a kind of moral quicksand. In
part this is because of the severity of the harms that are being imposed by war (i.e. the
killing of innocents) and the great likelihood of harming that war’s unintended
consequences seem to stick to agents so persistently. The kinds of situations where the
use of military force may seem appropriate seem to be the kinds of cases where anything
one can possibly do, including remaining ‘neutral’, involves doing wrong things and one
is destined to bear some blameworthiness, or at least some duty to redress.
In “War and Massacre” Thomas Nagel makes a similar argument when he insists
that in war permissible actions are not necessarily ‘all right.’ Nagel argues that
sometimes all available options are terrible. “[T]he world”, he says, “can present us with
situations in which there is no honourable or moral course for a man to take, no course
free of guilt and responsibility for evil.”175 He describes such situations as ‘moral blind
alleys’ and they exist when the actions of others force us into situations where everything
we can do is morally wrong in some respect, where what we ought to be able to do, we
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cannot. He concludes that, “it is naïve to suppose that there is a solution to every moral
problem with which the world can face us.”176
Academic defenders of various incarnations of the just war tradition often feel
pressed to say that they only very reluctantly endorse the permissibility of some wars.
They usually try to distance themselves from those who are thought to romanticize or
glorify war, such as Hegel or Schmitt. They don’t defend war as a means of building
community spirit, or as a ‘coming of age’ for new states, or as a means of inspiring great
works of art or literature. Rather, academic just war theorists often harbour continued
moral dissatisfaction about the use of military force, even as they recommend it.
Academic just war theorists are somewhat resigned to, rather than inspired by, their own
proposals. Nagel’s moral blind alleys abound and academic just war theories are an
attempt to feel around in the dark, that is, to navigate and guide judgment in morally
overwhelming circumstances.
It has been argued that expanding the just cause condition to include the
prevention or halting of humanitarian atrocities is inconsistent with the reluctance that
normally characterizes academic just war theories.177 If they are truly reluctant to
endorse the permissibility of war, just war theorists shouldn’t be coming up with new
reasons to resort to war, the argument goes. While I don’t think that this argument cuts
very deeply into the just war tradition, I think that it does rightly highlight that
humanitarian intervention is a kind of war. It’s not just about delivering aid, but about
using force to stop the mass slaughter of innocents. Defenders of humanitarian
intervention cannot pretend that such actions can be bloodless; and since interventions are
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likely to kill people, their justification is always accompanied by profound regret and
remorse that things should ever come to this. Even justified intervening forces should
feel remorse for their contributions to harm and will often acquire residual responsibility
to help rebuild the war-torn society after the atrocities are ended. Expanding the just
cause condition to include the halting of mass atrocities does not mean that just war
theorists are now enthusiastic about war, only that the world contains many more morally
dark corners than the traditional focus on self-defense supposes.

3.3 Proportionality and the Just War Tradition
As was briefly noted in the first chapter of this work, the just war tradition
contains three levels of justification. The ad bellum requirements constrain the resort to
war, the in bello requirements constrain the execution of war, and the post bellum level
has to do how to justly end war. Traditionally the ad bellum requirements include some
or all of: just cause, proportionality, last resort, reasonable prospect of success, right
intention, public declaration, and right authority. Failure to satisfy some or any of these
requirements makes the resort to war unjust. The in bello requirements tend to include
some or all of: discrimination (that is, a prohibition on intentionally targeting civilians),
proportionality, and necessity. Within an already ongoing war, each battle or military
excursion must meet these requirements in order for the war to be fought justly.
In a fully just war, proportionality must be satisfied at both the ad bellum and in
bello levels. The resort to war must be reasonably expected, overall, to impose a
proportionate amount of harm, and each action within a war must also predictably impose
only a proportionate amount of harm relative to the expected gains. In the past it has
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been argued that the ad bellum and in bello requirements are entirely distinct.178 So, a
warring party might fail to satisfy the ad bellum requirements and unjustly resort to war,
but nonetheless fight justly. Or, a warring party might justly resort to war but then fight
unjustly. Conceiving of the two levels of just war theory as distinct is supposed to
encourage all parties to a conflict to be reined in by rules that, when upheld, will help to
contain and limit the horrors of war. Regardless of the justice of the resort to war,
everyone must agree not to cause wild and purposeless destruction.179
This traditional view, however, has fallen out of favour with many contemporary
just war theorists including McMahan, Orend, and Hurka who insist that ad bellum and in
bello rules are not entirely distinct.180 A war with an unjust cause, they argue, cannot
possibly be carried out in a proportionate manner since the harms it imposes will not be
outweighed by the goal it pursues. If the goal is unjust, then any harm produced in
pursuit of the goal simply magnifies the wrong. On this view other in bello rules, like
civilian immunity, may be upheld by those fighting an unjust cause, but there is no way
for them to act proportionately.
Other critics of the complete separateness of the two levels of justification have
specifically contested the claim that this separability helps to limit the horrors of war.181
Rather than restraining just combatants, the separation of the two levels of justification
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has the effect, some argue, of wrongly legitimizing the actions of unjust combatants. By
separating the two levels of justification soldiers may feel that they do not have to reflect
on the justice of their cause, but only on their conformity with the in bello rules. This
removes the incentive for soldiers to think critically about their assigned goals, and may
increase, rather than decrease, the occurrences of war.182
Some of the in bello constraints, such as civilian immunity and a prohibition on
certain kinds of heinous weapons, can be upheld by those with unjust causes, but I agree
with the critics that those with a fully unjust cause are simply unable to satisfy the in
bello proportionality requirement.

For this reason, the rest of this chapter is largely

concerned with the ad bellum and in bello proportionality assessments of those with a just
cause. I temporarily set aside the difficult question of whether is it morally prudent to
continue to publicize the complete separateness of the two levels of just war theory.
Proportionality is a bizarre (and morally problematic) standard because it
implicitly suggests that there is some amount of harm (including harm to innocents and
grave rights infringements) that is worth the achievement of a just cause. This makes the
proportionality requirement one of the just war tradition’s most contentious commitments
and one which in practice it is difficult to find agreement. Indeed, as Orend argues, it
may be much easier to identify a disproportionate military action than a proportionate
one. Orend writes,
The common sense of the abstract need for balance and moderation is clearly there,
but it remains very difficult to define precisely, especially under battlefield
conditions. …it may turn out that proportionality is more of a limiting factor, a
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negative condition, so to speak- setting outside constraints on force- than it is a
positive condition which adds new content to the just war equation.183
While there may be clear cases of obviously disproportionate harm, in many instances
assessing proportionality will be highly controversial. Proportionality assessments are
infinitely complex, and if it weren’t for the urgency of the human suffering they attempt
to address then one might be inclined to say, as some pacifist absolutists do, that such
assessments are beyond the abilities of mere-mortals.
Despite its infinitely complex nature, the proportionality requirement holds
considerable power within the just war tradition. It might rule out the permissibility of an
intervention or war even if the military action can reasonably be considered a last resort.
Disproportionate harm is impermissible even if it is entailed by the only available
alternative that might succeed at attaining a just cause. This is a significant power.
The significance of the proportionality requirement on its own is challenged,
however, when appeals to proportionality are used to defend all sorts of truly awful acts
in war. For example, some insist that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were
proportionate to the good of securing Japan’s surrender in WWII.184 Luckily, just war
theorists can appeal to the in bello rules of discrimination and necessity to explain why
the atomic bombing of Japan was wrong. That is, given the potential crudeness of reallife proportionality assessments, just war theorists assure themselves with the additional
civilian immunity and necessity requirements. The proportionality requirement is an
important component of the just war tradition, and its complexity makes it an interesting
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subject for moral investigation. Yet, the proportionality requirement must always be
understood as a part of a larger whole.

3.4 Reasonable Prospect of Success
While the requirements of proportionality and reasonable prospect of success are
usually identified as separate just war criteria, I follow Hurka in his view that the
criterion of reasonable prospect of success can be understood as contained within a robust
interpretation of the proportionality requirement.185 Hurka writes,
Imagine that a war has no chance of achieving any relevant goods. This fact,
which makes it violate the reasonable hope of success condition, surely also makes
it disproportionate, since its destructiveness now serves no purpose whatever. The
same is true if the war has only some small probability of achieving relevant goods,
since then its expected harm is excessive compared to its expected good.
Since the risks associated with even a very carefully executed military venture are so
serious and probable, an intervention with only a small prospect of success will never be
proportionate. In identifying an action as imposing a proportionate amount of harm to
good, one implicitly claims that the proportionate outcome is reasonably likely. One
cannot reasonably identify a military response as proportionate if one simultaneously
thought its successful execution was improbable.
It has been noted that restraining military responses according to their probability
of success makes it particularly difficult for small communities to respond to aggression
by larger ones (e.g. for East Timor to employ the just war tradition to rise up against
Indonesia). However overwhelmingly just their goal, small militaries (assuming the
persecuted have a military) will be hard pressed to ever satisfy the proportionality and
probability of success criterion. It would seem then, that the just war tradition leaves
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small armies or unarmed communities at the mercy of the strong, with no means of just
and forceful self-defense.
Walzer has acknowledged that the probability of success criterion may stifle
efforts at self-defense by small militaries, and has suggested that small militaries be
sometimes permitted a show of self-defense even when the effort is unlikely to be
triumphant.186 The likelihood of success/proportionality criterion, he says, shouldn’t be a
condition used to force legitimate but militarily weak forces to simply submit to
aggression, like lambs to the slaughter, adding that there is a certain kind of moral
triumph in resistance to aggression even when it is not ultimately successful. Walzer’s
argument highlights ambiguity in the concept of success, which can be taken simply to
mean the physical overpowering of an enemy, or, alternatively, to mean the registering of
profound moral disapproval.187 Even so, Walzer is not oblivious to the moral costs of
brutal defeat. He requires that some restraint and caution be exercised by the leaders of
small militaries and insists that military action is not justified simply by virtue of having a
compelling, just cause, writing that sometimes, when the costs might be extreme, “there
might even be a duty to seek peace at the expense of justice.”188
While some might go so far as to completely waive the probability of success
criterion for small militaries fighting against their own unjust persecution, others might
temper that view by insisting that small militaries not persist through to their force’s utter
decimation. Still others will insist that the probability of success criterion does indeed
hold for small forces fighting against their unjust persecution, and contend that where
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reasonable hope of physical triumph is lacking, small forces must restrict themselves to
non-violent modes of collective resistance.

3.5 Humanitarian Interveners versus Self-Defenders
Ned Dobos has argued that those fighting off their own persecution needn’t be
constrained by the probability of success/proportionality criterion. 189 Specifically, that
is, when persons are fighting off what he calls ‘extraordinary’ oppression that threatens
their most basic rights, such as right to life and freedom from slavery. In such cases the
prospect of success/proportionality criterion yields to the urgency of self-defense. He
adds, however, that interveners fighting on behalf of the persecuted must constrain their
actions according to their probability of success. Rebels fighting to free their own
communities from unjust attack do not lose their rights to forcefully defend their
communities because they anticipate poor outcomes, but interveners fighting to protect
those same communities are rightly held back when poor outcomes are predicted.
For Dobos, what accounts for this asymmetrical applicability of the reasonable
prospect of success/proportionality criterion? Dobos answers that interveners are
required to include a greater range of harms in their proportionality assessments than
those fighting on their own behalf, making the condition harder to satisfy for third-party
interveners. He argues that we expect interveners to include in their proportionality
assessments the anticipated and unjust response of the aggressors against their defensive
action as well as any harmful international trends their actions may inspire. Those
fighting on their own behalf, however, are not required to include the aggressor’s
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reprisals in their proportionality assessments, nor the potentially grave consequences of
emboldening others to rise up against their own governments. He writes, “Citizens
facing violations of their basic human rights retain their right of self-defence irrespective
of how others can be expected to react to the exercise of that right.”190 And, “…rebels
need not (while humanitarians must) take mediated consequences into account:
consequences that are brought about via the agency of other parties.”191
The preceding may not be thought to justify the asymmetrical interpretation of the
proportionality/probability of success criterion. Critics might reasonably think it strange
for other-defense to be forbidden when it is anticipated to cause no more harm and
produce no less good than a campaign of self-defense. While I don’t think that Dobos
entirely justifies the more exacting interpretation of the proportionality requirement for
interveners, I think that he correctly identifies a widely-held moral intuition that
interveners need to be especially sensitive to how their actions reverberate in the world.
This extreme sensitivity to mediated consequences is not demanded of those who are
simply fighting for their own or their families’ lives. Of course, this is not to say that
armed interveners can never satisfy the proportionality/probability of success
requirement, only that public opinion expects them to carefully think through the short
and long-term ramifications, the proximate and distant effects, and the mediated and
unmediated consequences of intervention and compare these to the likely consequences
of sticking only to non-military means of pursuing the just cause. Interveners are
expected to include a greater range of harms in their proportionality assessments than
those defending only themselves.
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In part, this may be attributable to the importance of clearly establishing
consistency between interveners’ avowed humanitarian ends and their chosen means, and
of ensuring that they don’t produce humanitarian havoc in the pursuit of humanitarian
ends. The interveners’ more demanding proportionality requirement may be a way of
testing the merit of their claimed humanitarian intentions. Perhaps self-defenders are
permitted to give less weight to mediated consequences in their proportionality
assessments because they needn’t make any similar appeal to impartial humanitarian
good. They may only claim a desire to protect themselves against unjust aggression, a
basic interest that few would deny. Remote, mediated consequences that result from their
self-defense would not undermine or contradict their declared ends.

3.6 Mediated Harms: Anticipated Reprisals
The foreseeable, mediated harm that comes from an unjust aggressor’s unjust
response to defensive action is one of the most morally perplexing harms for
proportionality assessments. The question is if defensive action is likely to motivate the
initial aggressor to pursue some further atrocity, say, by massacring a bunch of civilians,
should the likely massacre count as a relevant harm in the defensive party’s
proportionality assessments? When one party can anticipate that the aggressor they’re
defending against will respond to the defensive action with further aggression, should that
weigh against the proportionality of the proposed defensive action?
Some are inclined to argue that others’ unjust responses to defensive force should
not be included in the proportionality assessments of just combatants. Wrongdoers’
wrongdoing is their own to account for, and cannot render defensive action against them
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disproportionate. This principle seems most plausible at the interpersonal level. For
example, one should be permitted to defend oneself against the dark alley attacker even if
doing so infuriates the attacker and, in his fury, he goes on to attack two other innocents.
The aggressor’s decision to inflict further harm is his own to account for, and it cannot
count against the proportionality of the innocent’s defensive action that it will lead to the
infuriated aggressor’s further wrongdoing.
Sometimes, however, the view that aggressors’ unjust responses are immaterial to
the proportionality of defensive action can be morally problematic. This seems especially
true the greater the number of lives at stake.

Consider the example of the economic

sanctions against Iraq following the 1991 Gulf War. The sanctions, which lasted over a
decade, were a UN response to Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. Their purpose was to get
Iraq to pay war reparations and to disclose and dismantle all weapons of mass
destruction.192 Hussein refused to comply with all UN demands, and so the sanctions
persisted. Yet, the twelve year-long sanctions were known to have devastating
humanitarian effects, and materially contributed to the deaths of over a million Iraqis,
many of them children.193 Two UN civil servants charged with overseeing the UN
Humanitarian Programme, as well as the Head of the World Food Program resigned in
opposition to the continued sanctions.194 Defenders of the sanctions will argue that those
one million deaths cannot properly count against the proportionality of the sanctions
because, while enormously tragic, the deaths are attributable not to the sanctions
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themselves, but to Hussein’s unjust refusal to comply with UN demands. Critics of the
sanctions, however, argue that those deaths are relevant to the sanctions’ proportionality,
even if Hussein himself should be considered most blameworthy.
There is a tension here between two intuitive principles. The first is that political
leaders and military personnel need to be attentive to all of the foreseeable harms of their
actions, no matter their causal history and no matter who is most to blame for those
harms. The second is that those with justice on their side shouldn’t be restrained from
responding to aggression because of the aggressor’s own propensity for bloody revenge
or disregard for civilian lives. Hurka makes the point extraordinarily well when he
argues,
On the one hand, one wants to say that we must take the world as we find it and not
ignore features of our choice situation because we disapprove of how they came
about. If an act of ours will kill civilians, that is the morally salient fact and far
more important than the precise reason why it will do so. On the other hand, one
wants to say that agents should not be morally protected by their bad characters:
that they have performed or will perform seriously wrong acts should not make
tactics against them impermissible that would be permissible if they were less
grossly immoral. At the same time, the issue is vitally important for current moral
debates about particular wars. At the bottom of these debates is a disagreement
about how far, if at all, the harms an act of ours will cause are discounted if they
also depend on others’ wrongful choices.195

An aggressor’s tendency towards brutal revenge shouldn’t insulate her from defensive
responses, but, at the same time, defensive agents need to be sensitive to how their
actions might reverberate in the world. Proportionality assessments shouldn’t ignore
others’ likely wrongful reactions, and there may be cases where those predictable
responses will be so massive and brutal that they undermine the defensive action’s
proportionality.
195
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Earlier I followed Ned Dobos in arguing that outside interveners more than selfdefenders seem obliged to include such mediated harms in their proportionality
assessments. In part this seems to be because interveners have special obligations not to
make things worse than they already are. Humanitarianism rings hollow when, at the end
of the day, more people are dead.

In addition, those who are defending themselves

(rather than defending others) seem permitted at least to give the aggressor’s anticipated
reprisals a more reduced weight in their proportionality assessment because the right of
self-defense is so fundamental and basic. The right seems to trump concerns about
indirect, mediated consequences.
Arguably, one of the important moral differences between interveners and selfdefenders that accounts for differing expectations with respect to the inclusion of
reprisals in their proportionality assessments is that interveners are probably
contemplating reprisals that would hurt others (i.e. the targets of atrocities), while selfdefenders are facing reprisals for which they themselves (or their families) are the likely
targets. Interveners are in the position of making decisions whose consequences are most
deeply felt by others, while self-defenders are making decisions for themselves. We may
be allowed to undertake actions that predictably make our own selves worse off, but
forbidden from making those same decisions for others.
This raises the difficult question of whether intervention could rightly be deemed
proportionate despite the anticipation of brutal reprisals against the targeted community if
that targeted community accedes to the intervention in full knowledge of the likely
gruesome response by the aggressor. One might try to avoid this moral quagmire by
simply insisting that interveners are unlikely to reliably know the informed views of the
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targets of atrocity on this matter, and so must avoid any tactic likely to inspire brutal
reprisals on the targeted community. I don’t think this moral dilemma can be entirely
avoided by citing epistemic shortcomings, though certainly such practical obstacles are
always important to consider. But if, for the sake of argument, interveners did reliably
know that the victims of atrocity wanted armed intervention in spite of the predictable
reprisals by the aggressors, then I think it would be much more difficult to know how to
proceed. Theoretically at least, it seems like intervention in spite of predictable, brutal
reprisals could be described by the targets of oppression as a kind of moral triumph.
They might, theoretically, welcome the additional risks as the cost of the moral triumph
of resistance to aggression, and, theoretically, this consent would give the anticipated
reprisals a reduced weight in the interveners’ proportionality assessments.
Even if, however, the targets of atrocity did welcome the additional risks, I might
be reluctant to endorse the proportionality of military intervention that is likely to
produce grave, extensive reprisals against the targeted population. Persons fighting
against their own subjugation or annihilation seem entitled to pursue armed resistance
that is likely to be, at best, a kind moral triumph insofar as it registers a fierce opposition
to the aggression. Even if the resistance mainly has a symbolic value, armed resistance in
defense of one’s own community may be permissible.196 Interveners fighting on behalf
of the persecuted, however, seem to be less free to pursue actions that are likely only to
have symbolic value (because brutal reprisals are anticipated from the initial aggressor,
cancelling out any humanitarian benefits obtained by the intervention).
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As I have already briefly noted, there exists in the just war literature two very
different conceptions of ‘success’. The first involves the physical overpowering of an
enemy, and the second involves a non-physical, moral triumph. Interveners seem
restricted to uses of force that have a reasonable hope of securing some degree of
physical, and not just moral, success. The success needn’t be complete, it may only be
partial, but it must have more than a merely expressive function. This is all simply to
repeat and expand on Dobos’s essential argument that interveners need to include a
greater range of harms in their proportionality assessments than do self-defenders, or at
least, they must accord any anticipated, mediated harms more weight than self-defenders.
There is no doubt that intervention has a symbolic, expressive power and this power does
warrant inclusion in interveners’ proportionality assessments, but an otherwise
disproportionate action cannot be made proportionate by appeal to the expressive
function of resisting aggression with force. Interveners need to be careful not to privilege
principles above persons, however important those principles are.

3.7 Mediated Harms: Encouraging Unjustified Interventions
A second, more remote kind of mediated harm consists of inspiring others to take
up arms in what they take to be similar circumstances elsewhere in the world. Dobos
argues that while self-defenders don’t have to consider the potential bloodshed that might
result from their inspiring others to rise up forcefully against their own persecution,
interveners must give weight to the possibility of inspiring others to initiate humanitarian
interventions. That is, interveners must consider the harms that might result from further
loosening the presumption against using force across state borders, including the
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possibility of inspiring others to initiate aggressive campaigns that masquerade as
humanitarianism. Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a campaign described by some as
humanitarian intervention, this worry about inspiring faux-humanitarianism seems
especially strong.
It might be added that a humanitarian intervention that turns out to be quite
harmful in some respects might, rather than encouraging aggression that disguises itself
as intervention, discourage future interventions where they might do tremendous good. If
an intervention imposes severe costs on civilians or on the interveners themselves, then
any doctrine of humanitarian intervention will become a tougher sell. States may refuse
to become entangled in international rescue efforts in the future, even where they might
be sorely needed and have great prospects for success. Politicians may revert back to
their conceptions of unconditional state sovereignty and mass-murdering systems may
become protected from international military response. This potential for sullying the
reputation of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention also seems deserving of some
weight in the proportionality calculations of humanitarian interveners, though such
mediated, future harms are no doubt very difficult to quantify.

3.8 Diversion of Resources
Another kind of harm whose inclusion and weight in proportionality assessments
is particularly controversial is the deprivations that are correlated to the diversion of
monetary resources towards the military. Should it weigh against the proportionality of
an intervention that the intervening state will now have fewer resources to commit to
education and health care for its own citizens, or to commit to international aid?
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Alternatively one might put the question this way: Should the victims of atrocities give
up on intervention if the resources that would have to be devoted to intervention could
instead be used to save an even greater number of people from poverty-related illnesses?
David Mellow has argued that such deprivations should count in the
proportionality analysis of interveners only if those deprivations involve needs that the
intervening agent is duty-bound to serve. On his view, such deprivations would not count
in proportionality assessments if the intervening agent was merely permitted, but not
required to fill them. Mellow writes,
While it does seem plausible that certain losses resulting from forgoing one’s
(prima facie) duties often should count in determining the rightness or the
wrongness of an act… the same is not true of losses that are the result of forgoing
virtuous acts that are merely permissions and not duties.197
And he continues, “…general losses from forgoing an alternative course of action should
not be included in proportionality calculations unless that alternative course of action is
one to which one is in some sense duty-bound….”198 Mellow himself speculates that
using every reasonably possible resource to minimize the effects of poverty is not a moral
duty. For Mellow, a leader “does not generally violate her duties if she spends those
[state] resources in ways that do not maximize the benefit for the poor.” 199 It would not
count against the proportionality of a proposed intervention, on Mellow’s view, if it
employed resources that might otherwise be used to relieve the effects of poverty. This is
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because it is not morally required that all available resources are used to improve the lot
of the poverty-stricken or distant needy.200
Mellow adds that a failure to uphold distinct moral duties only counts against the
proportionality of a proposed military action if resources are so constrained that the agent
must choose between either engaging in military action or upholding the competing
moral duties. If a state/agent is perfectly able to pursue a humanitarian intervention and,
for example, provide a baseline level of education, health care, and social assistance for
its citizens (supposing for the sake of argument that this is a moral duty of any state with
the available means), then it cannot count against the proportionality of the intervention
that these basic needs within the intervening state are, in fact, left unmet. Their being left
unmet, he says, is not “necessarily tied”201 to the decision to pursue military action. Both
avenues might have been adequately pursued, and neglect in one area isn’t fairly
attributable to action in the other.
Mellow’s position has some intuitive appeal, but it raises as many moral issues as
it addresses. It forces one to specify, for example, the extent of a state’s duty to help the
poor and needy (both domestically and abroad), and to account for why states don’t have
a duty to minimize the plight of the poor as much as possible when this can be done
without sacrificing the populace’s basic wellbeing.202 Without a clearer articulation of
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what our moral duties actually are, it is not clear what it means to say that only those
deprivations we are duty-bound to address count in proportionality assessments. Those
with a more expansive conception of states’ duties to relieve poverty and provide social
services may find it harder for just combatants to satisfy the proportionality requirement
than Mellow supposes.
Mellow argues that rich countries rarely face a choice between either acting to
halt humanitarian atrocities or helping to relieve poverty.

These deprivations do not

count in the military’s proportionality assessments because they are not “necessarily tied”
to the decision to employ the military. Critics of Mellow’s view on the relevant evils for
proportionality assessments might contend that though it is logically possible for states to
pursue both humanitarian interventions and to simultaneously give substantially to
international aid efforts, for example, states are likely to reduce their contributions to
international aid when they spend millions on humanitarian interventions. Logically
there is no necessity in the deprivations, though practically they are probable.

These

critics might then continue that, given their likelihood, such deprivations should indeed
count as relevant harms in the proportionality assessments of proposed interventions.
Evaluating Mellow’s view of proportionality is further complicated by his own
apparent ambiguity, since he argues that a state’s support for aid can be a relevant good
for choosing to forgo military action, even if a failure to give that same aid wouldn’t be a
relevant harm in the decision to pursue military action. He writes,
(Even though I’ve argued that losses resulting from forgoing nonobligatory acts
should not generally count in proportionality calculations, it still may be the case
that when those nonobligatory actions involve very good consequences, they
provide a leader with relevant reasons for choosing not to go to war. Thus, if leader
A decides not to go to war, her moral case for the appropriateness of that decision
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may well be stronger if not going to war enables the leader to use those resources to
provide domestic or international programs for the poor.)203

Is it not clear to me that one can consistently argue that deprivations do not count against
the proportionality of proposed military action, but the fulfilment of those needs does
count in favour of the proportionality of forgoing military action. It seems like if the
likely consequences on aid programs are relevant for defending the permissibility of
forgoing military action, then they should also be relevant factors in determining the
proportionality of pursuing military action. It can’t be that they count only when it is
useful for defending the choice to forgo military action. Again, this is not to say that if
certain deprivations do count as relevant harms in the proportionality assessments of
military action, then military action will never be justified, only that the proportionality
criterion may be reasonably interpreted as harder to satisfy (because it should include a
greater range of harms) than Mellow admits.

3.9 Chemical Incapacitation
The moral requirement that humanitarian interveners give particular weight to
foreseeable harm to non-combatants (whatever its origin and regardless of the purity of
the interveners’ hearts) in their proportionality assessments makes certain kinds of
military tactics impermissible. I argue that one such tactic is the use of incapacitating
chemical agents. Michael Gross controversially proposes that powerful just combatants
(those fighting a just cause) should be permitted to use weapons that stun or temporarily
paralyze civilians as a means of rooting out any unjust combatants who hide among
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them.204 In the absence of a right to employ such weapons, Gross thinks that the more
powerful, just combatants will be doomed to violate the proportionality requirement by
killing lots of civilians. For every unjust combatant that gets rooted out, twenty, thirty, or
fifty civilians might be killed. Of course, some might try to argue that such harms are
proportionate to the good of rooting out a single unjust combatant. After all, the unjust
combatant might possess key ingredients for weapons of mass destruction, or might go on
to kill hundreds of other civilians, one might say. Gross, however, agrees that the charge
of disproportionality in such circumstances may well be accurate and he concludes, “If
the international community is going to censure nations for violating the principle of
proportionality, then it must also be prepared to consider the merits of non-lethal
warfare.”205 If unjust combatants consistently hide among civilians, and one wants to
minimize civilian casualties and condone the permissibility of the just combatant’s
military goals, then options such as non-lethal weapons must, he says, be opened-up.
There are numerous practical concerns that Gross’s position raises,206 but his
weakening of the civilian immunity requirement is especially problematic. Indeed, Gross
essentially waives civilian immunity as a means of satisfying proportionality. Gross
204
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himself acknowledges the criticism and, in response, he simply bites the bullet, arguing
that it should be permissible to intend some relatively smaller harm to civilians as a
means of avoiding some foreseeable, but unintended, and more severe harm. Earlier I
argued that what sometimes might save real-life proportionality assessments from being
merely crude cost-benefit analyses is the civilian immunity requirement. We avoid things
such as the atomic bombing of Japan by requiring civilian immunity. Yet, here we find
the civilian immunity requirement itself being waived, the very thing that was supposed
to protect the world from the “the abyss of utilitarian apologetics for large-scale
murder.”207
I admit that absolutism with respect to civilian immunity is untenable for just war
theorists. There could be reasonably possible cases where just combatants would be
hard-pressed to argue that their killing of non-combatants was a wholly accidental sideeffect and still, the killing might be justified. I also admit that one can construct an
entirely hypothetical thought experiment where targeting civilians with non-lethal
weapons in order to spare them near-certain death by lethal weapons could be justified.
Such a thought experiment would, however, probably be very different from the kinds of
cases that just combatants are likely to face in actual wars with the technology currently
available. If the non-lethal weapons were truly benign, if the unjust combatants were
easily identifiable and couldn’t possibly be pursued by other means, if the good at stake
in this particular battle was overwhelmingly weighty and the harm imminent, then
Gross’s proposal would be less troubling. As it is, however, such circumstances are
extraordinarily unlikely to obtain. Even though moral theorizing about war involves a
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certain amount of distancing or abstraction from actual cases, it shouldn’t make
pronouncements based on overly idealized and sanitized thought experiments.
Gross would likely argue that the civilians in the cases he imagines are being
targeted as a means of protection from greater harm, whereas the civilians in Hiroshima
were targeted merely as a means of protecting American soldiers. Gross might contend
that soldiers can target innocents for their own good but not for the good of soldiers
themselves. While one can certainly see a moral distinction between the two intentions, I
think one needs to be very careful of suggesting that one is doing someone a favour by
paralyzing her (and her children) with chemical agents. Hiding amongst a civilian
population is undoubtedly a war crime, but the response to such war crimes shouldn’t be
a further weakening of civilians’ rights to immunity. Just war theorists have usually
found some comfort in thinking that the proportionality requirement is restrained by the
civilian immunity requirement. Yet, rather terrifyingly, we’ve seen that the civilian
immunity requirement is now itself being challenged by some who are grappling with
contemporary military dilemmas.208
Civilians who are the targets of genocide or ethnic cleansing may sometimes
willingly accept the imposition of some additional risks if these are necessary for a rescue
attempt.

I cannot imagine, however, that the targets of such atrocities are likely to

consent to the widespread, intentional use of chemical agents as a means of protecting
them from unintended killing by the rescuers. Chemical agents are known to frequently
(though unintentionally) kill those they are intended to protect. Moreover, I think the
208
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targets of atrocity would rightly have little confidence that interveners would be able to
‘pick out’ the aggressors once everyone lay paralyzed and/or unconscious. It strains
credibility to think that such tactics are likely to truly make intervention easier or more
precise. I think if one belonged to a targeted group, then one would likely prefer tactics
that drew the aggressors out of civilian areas, that destroyed the chain of command
leaving enemy soldiers directionless, that destroyed the enemy’s arsenals of weaponry,
that cut-off hate-mongering and propagandizing media, that established safe-areas or (if
necessary) refugee camps, and protected persons and supplies travelling to safe areas.
What I take to be a presumable lack of consent of innocent targets of chemical
weaponry (when chemical incapacitation is meant to spare them near certain death by
bullets or bombs) is a morally relevant consideration in assessing Gross’s proposal, but it
is not necessarily definitive. That is, even if specific victims of chemical weaponry
would or did consent to their use (because they thought it might spare them more certain
harm), that wouldn’t necessarily be sufficient to make their use permissible. Chemical
weapons might be prohibited on the grounds that, as a matter of practice, we ought not
challenge the conventional prohibition on chemical weapons. The consequences of
legalizing the use of chemical war are doomed to be worse than whatever localized
benefits might be gained by their use in particular battles.
Gross himself acknowledges this criticism but answers that it would be possible to
develop firm legal constraints on which chemical agents are permissible to use and when.
He adds that the consequences of continuing to use only weapons that are likely to be
lethal may well be worse than watering down the chemical/non-chemical divide.
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Gross imagines cases where tactics that refuse to target innocents with chemical
weapons won’t be sufficient to achieve the just cause. He is interested in cases where one
has a choice between either unintentionally killing or intentionally incapacitating
civilians as a means of rooting out a very dangerous enemy poised to commit grave
crimes. While I certainly admit that such cases are logically possible, I worry that, like
the hypothetical ticking-time bomb scenarios that are used to defend the selective use of
torture, this scenario opens the door to grave war crimes. I worry that Gross’s proposal
will be used to rationalize the targeting of civilians with chemical agents in all sorts of
situations where there isn’t truly a forced choice between either the chemical
incapacitation of innocents, or their near-certain killing by bullet or bomb. I find Gross’s
proposal a dangerous one because it denies the possibility of simply refusing to directly
pursue those particular enemy soldiers, at that particular time and by means of direct
force.
Moral philosophers are not necessarily wrong to discuss extreme examples like
the ones Gross imagines; and, to the extent that it is possible in morally atrocious
circumstances, we should attempt to provide reasoned argument for what we deem to be
the best courses of action. At the same time, however, moral philosophers and academics
more generally need to be sensitive to how their work might be employed.

Rather than

being viewed as a powerful, critical voice against the relative increase in civilian deaths
in contemporary warfare, academia has come to be viewed by some as merely providing
an erudite endorsement of the industrial-military complex, and a rationalization of war
crimes.209 I worry that proposals like Gross’s will do little to curb the trend of increasing
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civilian casualties, or to establish academia as a critical, restraining voice in
contemporary military ethics.
Gross’s proposal for how just combatants can satisfy the proportionality
requirement seems especially misplaced in humanitarian interventions, where the point is
to end atrocities using means that don’t themselves victimize those whose protection is
sought, or other non-combatants caught in the crossfire. Humanitarian interveners may
have to give up on particular enemies who are deliberately hiding among civilians until
such a time when the unjust aggressor herself can be more easily identified and targeted.
Gross is correct that there may be circumstances when aggressors cannot be easily
targeted and interveners who pursued them might be doomed to violate the
proportionality requirement. Rather than using non-lethal, chemical agents in an attempt
to minimize civilian fatalities while pursuing the aggressors, it may be better for
interveners to simply let those aggressors go (for a time).
As has been noted previously, relative to soldiers in more traditional kinds of war,
humanitarian interveners seem to have a special obligation to avoid even the
unintentional commission of the kinds of actions they try to prevent. Public opinion
seems to hold them to an especially high standard of care given that their whole purpose
is the protection of innocents. Given a humanitarian end, humanitarian interveners are
expected to adopt means that are at least passably humanitarian, and the intentional and
widespread incapacitation of civilians via chemical agents (however pure the agent’s
heart) does not pass. This constraint that interveners employ means that are passably
consistent with their humanitarian ends may mean that given a choice between potentially
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saving many lives but causing lots of harm, or saving fewer lives but causing no harm,
interveners may be required to opt for the latter.
In addition to emphasizing the consistency of interveners’ ends and means, no one
should want to encourage a practice of foreigners imposing themselves in complex,
hostile situations with overwhelming force only to thrash around and kill or injure noncombatants in ways that are, from the perspective of non-combatants, indistinguishable
from the initial wrongdoers. The credibility of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention
depends on its refusal to license interveners who recklessly impose themselves in foreign
lands, killing or injuring non-combatants with naïve, crusading conviction. A special
degree of caution and restraint is expected. In order for the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention to distinguish itself sufficiently from imperialist wars of the past, the
doctrine must particularly emphasize that interveners’ means be precise and carefully
calculated to target wrongdoers.
Gross’s proposal that just combatants use chemical agents on non-combatants
should not be adopted by humanitarian interveners. The proportionality requirement
cannot rightly be satisfied by waiving the civilian immunity requirement. The immediate
and long-term consequences of such a practice are indefensible. The adoption of Gross’s
proposal by humanitarian interveners would cleave a fairly obvious tension between their
pronounced ends and their chosen means. The acceptance of Gross’s proposal by
interveners is also likely to undermine efforts to develop a conception of humanitarian
intervention whose restraint makes it easily differentiated from colonial war.
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3.10 Overwhelming Force
I have argued that the restraint that is expected of humanitarian interveners places
limits on the kinds of tactics that can be used and satisfy the proportionality requirement.
One prominent modern military tactic involves the almost exclusive use of intense air
power, and I argue that this tactic of using overwhelming air force also sits
uncomfortably in a doctrine of humanitarian intervention. This tactic is characteristic of
the Powell doctrine which has come to be understood as the view that US forces should
employ an overwhelming amount of air force as a means of protecting American soldiers
from risk and of securing a speedy end to any war.
Though not specifically concerned with the context of humanitarian interventions,
Paul Gilbert has denounced tactics that rely almost exclusively on intense air power as
disproportionate.210

Gilbert rejects the Powell doctrine because he says it denies enemy

troops the opportunity to surrender in the face of certain defeat, and kills too many of
them all at once.211 Soldiers entering the profession and ignorant about whether they
might ever find themselves overwhelmed, he says, would likely condemn tactics like the
Powell doctrine and prefer modes of engagement that leave open the choice to be taken
prisoner.212
Up to this point in the chapter, the proportionality requirement has been described
as weighing harm to non-combatants very heavily, but Gilbert’s first argument against
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overwhelming air power raises the interesting question of whether an action might ever
be deemed disproportionate because it harms too many unjust combatants. Is there some
great number of Hutu extremists that it would have been disproportionate for interveners
to harm in their effort to protect innocents? While I think that humanitarian interveners
will sometimes be required to expose themselves to some risk, it is much easier to justify
interveners absorbing such risks, and forgoing intense air power, when it helps to limit
harm to non-combatants than when absorbing risk is primarily meant to limit harm to
unjust combatants. If one does think that justice is on one’s side, then it could seem
unreasonable to expose oneself to greater risk by forgoing tactics like the Powell doctrine
as a means of giving one’s opponent (the perceived aggressor) a chance to surrender or as
a means of not harming too many of one’s opponents at one time.
However, I argue that Gilbert provides a reason why one can sensibly reject the
use of overwhelming air force as disproportionate without having to answer the
impossibly difficult moral question of how many unjust combatants can be permissibly
and proportionately harmed in pursuit of a just cause, or determining in any very precise
terms the relative worth of the lives of just and unjust combatants. In his paper, Gilbert
also rejects the Powell doctrine’s use of overwhelming air power as disproportionate
because he says that the imposition of overwhelming losses without the chance for
surrender will erode the commitment of US enemies to other in bello constraints.213 No
matter the justice of the cause, he says, proportionality assessments cannot endorse
overwhelming harms to enemy combatants or else one inadvertently encourages the
enemy to resort to the use of heinous means, including biological weapons or human
shields. Overwhelming losses make the enemy desperate, and such desperation will make
213
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subsequent battles deadlier and more dangerous for civilians. Proportionality, Gilbert
thinks, requires the stronger party to fight, as one American general puts it, “with one arm
tied behind them.”214
While I think Gilbert’s initial contract-based argument against the use of
overwhelming air power is interesting, an aversion to producing collateral damage or to
inspiring others to use chemical weapons may provide the most compelling reason for
powerful forces to forgo such tactics. One might add the obvious point that tactics that
predictably kill overwhelming numbers of combatants may well be tactics that also
predictably and directly kill large numbers of civilians. Even those who deny that just
combatants owe it to the unjust to fight with ‘one arm tied behind them’ might agree that
restrained fighting is preferable as a means of avoiding civilian casualties. One could
agree with Gilbert that the Powell doctrine should be thrown-out, and insist that just
combatants be committed ‘to the ground,’ but deny that this would be for the sake of
limiting harm to unjust combatants or because the lives of unjust combatants weigh
particularly heavily in proportionality assessments.
There is a temptation to believe that just combatants should be permitted all
available means at their disposal to crush their enemies, but in spite of this temptation I
think that a compelling case against the use of overwhelming air power in humanitarian
interventions can be made by citing its likely dire consequences for civilians. If the
plight of unjust combatants seems irrelevant to (or perhaps deserving only a very small
weight in) proportionality assessments, then one might nonetheless reject tactics
advanced by the Powell doctrine as disproportionate because of their likely effects on
civilians. These consequences would include the direct harm that would result to
214
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civilians by the intense bombing, as well as the indirect, or mediated harms that would
predictably result to civilians by virtue of the unjust combatants’ subsequent perceived
desperation.

3.11 Non-Combatants and Just Combatants in Proportionality Assessments
I have been arguing that the lives of non-combatants weigh especially heavily in
the proportionality assessments of humanitarian interveners, and that the special weight
accorded to the lives of non-combatants can rule out the proportionality of certain kinds
of military tactics. These comments lead inalterably to the (grisly) questions: Do the
lives of civilians and just combatants weigh equally? How much risk is an intervening
force rightly expected to absorb in the effort to protect non-combatants? Or, put another
way, what does Walzer’s proviso of due care commit humanitarian interveners to doing?
Before going near these questions I note that there are various kinds of noncombatants involved in humanitarian intervention, including those who are the potential
victims of atrocity, and those who belong to the group largely responsible for the
atrocities. The latter group may include supporters as well as critics of the atrocities
which makes the label ‘enemy civilian’ morally problematic. Matters may be still more
complicated if the supporters of the atrocities have themselves been frightened or coerced
into complicity by threats to their own families. Since it may be difficult to distinguish
the morally innocent civilians from the morally complicit ones, and since the morally
complicit ones may themselves have been strongly coerced into collusion, humanitarian
interveners may be required to treat all non-combatants as if they were as innocent as the
victims of atrocity they seek to protect. In individual, hypothetical cases, I admit that it
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may seem utterly unreasonable for humanitarian interveners to expose themselves to
greater risk in order to protect the supporters of genocide from harm. In practice,
however, strenuous effort to avoid killing non-combatants, in spite of its risk to
interveners, will be the morally best policy given the importance of using means that are
compatible with the claimed humanitarian ends.
In humanitarian interventions, some might argue that interveners should be
prepared to risk a greater number of their own as a means of protecting a smaller number
of civilians, because soldiers lose most of the privileges associated with non-combatant
status by virtue of their volunteering for military service. Hurka makes this kind of
argument when he writes:
[S]oldiers’ deaths in general count less than civilians’… by voluntarily entering
military service, soldiers on each side freely took on the status of soldiers and
thereby freely accepted that they may permissibly be killed in the course of war…
Their situation is like that of boxers who, in agreeing to a bout, permit each other to
do in the ring what would be forbidden as assault outside it. This explains not only
why targeting them in war is not wrong, but also why their deaths count less in
assessing a war or act for proportionality or necessity: by making their deaths not
unjust they themselves gave them less weight.215
Extrapolating Hurka’s view to the case of humanitarian intervention, he might argue that
by volunteering for military service, interveners make their own lives weigh less in
proportionality assessments than the lives of civilians. On this view, it could be
proportionate to pursue an action that killed a greater number of interveners in order to
protect a smaller number of civilians.
Alternatively, some might argue that interveners should be prepared to risk only a
smaller number of their own (or sometimes even none of their own) for the sake of
protecting a greater number of civilians, insisting that rightly-called humanitarian
215
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interveners are as innocent as the lives they are trying to protect. On this view it would
be disproportionate for interveners to risk a larger number of their own in order to protect
a smaller number of foreign civilians. Indeed Samuel P. Hungtington goes so far as to
argue that no intervener’s life should be risked, insisting in relation to the US action in
Somalia that “it is morally unjustifiable and politically indefensible that members of the
[US] armed forces should be killed to prevent Somalis from killing one another.”216
To a certain extent, I think that both of these intuitions are correct. Interveners do
give their lives a somewhat reduced weight in proportionality assessments by virtue of
their volunteering for military service, and interveners can also be innocents whose
deaths should weigh considerably in proportionality assessments. Barring any
particularly special relationship between the interveners and the civilians they seek to
protect, I am inclined to argue that it is proportionate for humanitarian interveners to risk
a smaller number of their own as a means of protecting a larger number of civilians.
Proportionality should not be interpreted to require politicians or military generals to
pursue missions or tactics that risk the lives of as many humanitarian interveners as the
action might save. However, the greater the number of civilians that could be protected
by an intervention (or by a particular battle within an intervention), the greater the
number of interveners it will be proportionate to risk, assuming reasonable prospects of
success.
I have argued that those who undertake interventions should be willing to risk a
number of their own if doing so has the potential to save a greater number of noncombatants. This kind of sacrifice strikes me as implicit in the agreement that soldiers
make when they sign up for military service. When an extraordinary number of non216
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combatants might be saved by the sacrifice of a relatively smaller number of interveners
(as might have been the case in Rwanda), then the sacrifice seems proportionate. I do not
think, however, that proportionality should be interpreted to require interveners to expose
themselves to harms equal to (or greater than) the ones they try to prevent.
Proportionality should give substantial weight to both the lives of non-combatants and
interveners, but the proportionality requirement will be unreasonably demanding if it is
interpreted to require interveners to pursue tactics and missions likely to kill them in
droves. The harm that results to an intervener from her willing and intentional selfsacrifice to protect innocents is rightly given a reduced weight in proportionality
assessments, but, at the same time, proportionality shouldn’t be interpreted to require
interveners to make themselves as vulnerable as the people they try to protect.
A critic might argue that if the interveners’ lives are given a reduced weight, then
the proportionality criterion can be interpreted to require them to sacrifice themselves in
numbers greater than they expect to save. I respond that the interveners’ volunteering for
service helps account for why any sacrifice from their particular group can be reasonably
requested, but their volunteering does not make it reasonable to request that they subject
themselves to the same scale of harm that inspired the world’s moral outrage. A useful,
though admittedly imperfect, analogy might be drawn with firefighters. We expect
firefighters to expose themselves to certain risks that we would not expect of ordinary
civilians by virtue of their having voluntarily entered the profession in exchange for the
living it provides. Yet, we do not request that firefighters submit themselves to
egregious, mass, and dire harm even if doing so would, somehow, save a large number of
innocent people from a burning building.
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3.12 Relevant Goods
Up to this point I have been interested in the relevant harms (and the relative
weighting of the relevant harms) for proportionality assessments. I have argued that
humanitarian interveners are expected to include a greater range of harms in their
proportionality assessments than self-defenders, and that they are required to weigh the
lives of non-combatants particularly heavily. I continued that the inclusion of mediated
harm to non-combatants in interveners’ proportionality assessments, and the significant
weight accorded to direct harm to non-combatants generally makes certain kinds of
military strategies morally off-limits to humanitarian interveners. I turn now to consider
some of the relevant goods for proportionality assessments.
It is generally agreed that proportionality calculations should not include all of the
good consequences that might result from military action. For example, it cannot rightly
count in favour of a war’s proportionality that it will be profitable for the companies that
supply an army with uniforms or weapons. This kind of good is not considered relevant
for proportionality which does not weigh the universal benefits and harms against each
other, but rather includes only a limited subset of the anticipated benefits.
Mellow and McMahan argue that the goods that can rightly count in
proportionality assessments are restricted to those that are contained in the just cause for
military action.217 That is, the only goods that count are those that can be permissibly
pursued by means of military action. McMahan writes:
If just cause indicates the range of goods that may permissibly be pursued by war,
then no goods that fail to come within the scope of the just cause, or are
instrumental to achieving it, can count in the proportionality calculation. If they
217
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did, that would imply that a war is justified, at least in part, by the fact that it would
achieve certain goods that cannot permissibly be achieved by means of war.218
And later he repeats, “when there are no goods that may be pursued by means of war,
there are no goods that can properly be weighed against the bad effects that an act of war
would cause….”219 The kinds of causes that justify the resort to war (e.g. self or otherdefense, or the prevention of mass atrocities) are the only goods that count in
proportionality assessments, and once they are achieved, just combatants must cease
fighting.220
Contrary to Mellow and McMahan, Hurka argues that the goods that can
legitimately count in proportionality assessments can include goods that, on their own,
wouldn’t count as adequate grounds for resorting to war.221 These ‘contributing causes’
can nonetheless strengthen the proportionality of a proposed war after a sufficient just
cause for war (such as self or other-defense, or the halting of genocide) has been
established.222 One contributing cause for war that can increase a mission’s
proportionality, according to Hurka, is the halting of certain human rights abuses that are,
in and of themselves, insufficient grounds for resorting to war. He argues,
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I think most people would say that the Taliban’s repression of Afghan women was
not a sufficient just cause; a war fought only to end that repression would have been
wrong. But once there was a sufficient just cause in the Taliban’s harbouring of
terrorists, the fact that the war would improve the lot of Afghan women became a
factor that counted in its favour and helped make it proportionate.223
In addition to the halting of human rights abuses, other relevant, contributing goods for
proportionality assessments are, for Hurka, the incapacitation of an aggressor for future
aggression, and the deterrence of future aggression.224
Of course, on Hurka’s view, not just any good can count as a contributing cause
for war. Profit for arms manufacturers does not, for Hurka, count as a relevant good. At
one point Hurka argues that there is no unifying feature of contributing just causes,
concluding that they are just ‘items on a list.’225 Later, however, he specifies that the
contributory goods must be directly connected to the achievement of the sufficient just
cause, rather than mere inadvertent side-effects of the means taken in pursuit of that
cause.226 This is, admittedly, a rather broad principle whose application might well yield
different conclusions.227
I find the topic of the relevant goods for proportionality assessments
extraordinarily difficult. It is certainly always beneficial that human rights abuses come
to an end, but McMahan is right that it is morally strange if the suspension of such abuses
223
Hurka, “Proportionality in the Morality of War,” 42. I have been asked why the treatment of Afghan
women before the overthrow of the Taliban would not count as a sufficient just cause for intervention. This
is a difficult and morally challenging question to answer, but I make some attempt in the next chapter on
the just cause requirement.
224
Hurka, “Proportionality in the Morality of War,” 41.
225
Ibid, 43,
226
Ibid, 43. Hurka adds that not just any goods that are causally downstream from the achievement of the
just cause count. For example, he says, it cannot be a relevant good that “a nation’s citizens get pleasure
from its military victory.”(“Proportionality and Necessity,” 134.)
227
Importantly, Hurka argues that precedent effects can sometimes make non-violent, diplomatic
approaches disproportionate insofar as they can teach aggressors that their own violence will not be
forcefully resisted. Diplomacy can inadvertently reward aggression thereby encouraging it, a sentiment
that is commonly emphasized by the US government when it insists that it will not negotiate with terrorists,
for example. Precedent and deterrent capacity is, for Hurka, relevant to proportionality assessments of both
military and diplomatic means of conflict resolution.

131
counts in favour of a war’s proportionality if those abuses are not themselves sufficient to
justify a resort to war. Certainly human rights abuses of all kinds should be addressed,
but whether they can legitimately improve the proportionality of a proposed war is a
separate matter.
It seems like if we allow goods other than the ones that provide a sufficient cause
for resorting to war to enter into proportionality assessments, including deterrent effects,
then defensive war against any aggression (no matter how small) might always be
deemed proportionate by emphatic appeal to its precedent and deterrent effects. States
might defend the proportionality of full-scale wars that kill thousands (or hundreds of
thousands) of soldiers in defense of tiny, insignificant pieces of territory by appeal to the
importance of resisting aggression so as to deter future aggression down the line.
Another worry about opening up proportionality assessments to include things
like the incapacitation of an aggressor and the deterrence of would-be aggressors is that it
may open the door to so-called preventive war and forcible democracy promotion.
Defenders of forcible democracy promotion often repeat what has come to be known as
the democratic peace thesis, which is the thesis that democracies never go to war with
each other and so the forcible spread of democracy will secure world peace. So-called
preventive wars that forcibly impose democracies might always be deemed proportionate
by appeal to the long-term good of having a democracy where there wasn’t one before,
and the deterrence of a potential aggressor. The problem is that virtually any war might
be deemed proportionate if it is promoted as a sure means to world peace. Interpreted in
this way, I worry that the proportionality requirement will become too easy to satisfy, that
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it will hold little power to restrain, and will lead to the increase of aggression with grand,
world altering, humanitarian agendas.
Despite these problems, I think Hurka’s basic view can be made very credible
with certain added qualifications and emphases. First, it is important to emphasize that
there is a sharp limit on the kinds of goods that can be included in proportionality
assessments as contributing just causes. Not just any good can count, for example, profits
for arms manufacturers do not rightly count. The admission of contributing just causes
into proportionality assessments does not render the proportionality requirement a virtual
‘rubber-stamp’ for any proposed armed venture.
If halting those human rights abuses that fall short of genocide or mass atrocities
can help to improve the proportionality of a proposed humanitarian intervention, then it
must be added that these abuses must threaten very basic human rights of a large number
of people, such as, for example, women’s rights to freedom of association. It cannot be
the case that it improves the proportionality of a proposed military venture when it will
enable working adults to enjoy a right to leisure time. I think persons do have a right to
leisure time and that this is a right worth staunch defense; it is not, however, a right
whose promotion should increase the proportionality of military action.
My second qualifier for Hurka’s view is that the cessation of human rights abuses
must only be included in proportionality assessments when the abuses cannot realistically
be ended by any other means. The ending of human rights abuses can only rightly be
included in proportionality assessments if there are no non-violent, alternative means of
bringing the abuses to an end. It seems wrong to include improvements in the lot of
Afghan women in proportionality assessments of the current war in Afghanistan, for
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example, if those improvements might have been accomplished through concerted, nonviolent means. This, of course, might be a topic of considerable debate and I think that
many might reasonably doubt this possibility.
Third, Hurka’s view must be qualified by adding that that the short-term benefits
of military action should be weighed more heavily than the more distant, long-term,
precedent-setting benefits. The bulk of the good at stake in a just military campaign
should consist of immediate lives saved and communities protected. The bulk of the
good needs to be experienced by those communities that are currently living and are
themselves burdened by the use of force. It cannot rightly be the case that proportionality
is achievable when the only ones likely to benefit are far removed in time and place. The
good for distant others may be a relevant good in proportionality assessments, but it
cannot be determinative. A disproportionate war can’t be made proportionate by an
appeal to precedent or deterrent effects.
Finally, a military action that has attained its independent or sufficient just cause
cannot continue for the sake of pursuing contributing just causes, with the possible
exception of the contributing cause of incapacitating an aggressor for future aggression
(when it is reasonable to believe that the aggressor is likely to resume its aggression).
Hurka is likely to agree that once the sufficient just cause is achieved (a genocide is
ended, or an unjust invasion is reversed), all fighting must stop, even if continued fighting
might, for example, reasonably be thought to bring an end to ‘moderate’ human rights
abuses or serve as a deterrent to other potential aggressors.
I have argued that the relevant goods for proportionality assessments may include
what Hurka calls contributory or conditional just causes. These are goods that are not
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themselves sufficient to justify the resort to war, but may increase a war’s claim to
proportionality once a sufficient, independent just cause is established. Contributing just
causes, however, must be strictly limited. I argued that a cessation of human rights
abuses that, on its own, wouldn’t justify the resort to war may be included in
proportionality assessments if the abuses in question threaten the very basic rights of a
large number of people and if, in addition, the cessation of these abuses cannot be
accomplished through any other means but military might. I also argued that
proportionality must give greater weight to those persons and communities that are
currently living and are affected by the use of force. Deterrence of future aggression
while a relevant good is not so weighty as those goods that benefit the currently living
and in whose name military resistance is carried out. The proportionality of a military
venture cannot be won by its anticipated restraining effect on would-be, future
aggressors. The admission of contributory just causes into proportionality assessments
should not be such that it renders the proportionality requirement impotent to restrain.
The proportionality requirement cannot rightly be constructed to run rough-shod over the
interests of flesh and blood humans for the sake of grand principles, however important
these principles are. Finally, I argued that all fighting must cease when the sufficient just
cause is achieved; fighting cannot rightly be sustained by appeal to the contributing just
causes after the sufficient just causes have already been realized.

3.13 Conclusion and Summary
A common and recurring criticism of humanitarian interventions is that just war
theorists endorse inconsistent or selective responses to various humanitarian disasters of
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comparable severity. They will intervene in Eastern Europe, but allow atrocities to
continue unimpeded in places like Chechnya or Tibet. Critics argue that hiding behind
claims about ‘proportionality’ and ‘prospects of success,’ the theory of humanitarian
intervention is really nothing more than an elaborate rationalization of international
bullying by the strong over the militarily weak. For skeptics, the selectivity of
intervention robs the practice of any moral credibility.228 Better not to intervene at all,
some might conclude, than to intervene only when strategic interests are at stake.
While this criticism rightly exposes some of the morally problematic aspects of
real-life proportionality assessments, the selective intervention criticism goes too far if it
discounts the moral permissibility of any interventions at all. Certainly, humanitarian
atrocities shouldn’t be ignored for the sake of protecting the trivial consumer interests of
the rich, and countries should expose and challenge the human rights abuses of their
allies. Undoubtedly, Canada’s record on this score is dismal. Still, prudential
considerations ought to play a part when considering military intervention. As Guenter
Levy warns, “even a good cause is not worth any price.”229 No one should promote
military action that would predictably produce a disproportionate amount of relevant
harm out of a concern for consistency. Indeed, as Walzer notes, “we have to hope that
prudential calculations shape the decision to intervene or not.”(my emphasis)230 So,
selective intervention does not automatically undermine the legitimacy of any given
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intervention, but it certainly should make us examine more closely how proportionality is
being measured.
A failure to engage militarily for a just, humanitarian cause is defensible when
any possible action is doomed to inflict a disproportionate amount of relevant harm.
Inconsistent responses to just causes, however, are indefensible when they depend on
morally problematic proportionality assessments, either because they exaggerate the
benefits to be gained or the harms to be avoided, unduly prioritize the lives of
compatriots, or wrongly privilege economic over more basic humanitarian goods.
This chapter investigated the constraints of reasonable prospects of success and
proportionality, and, on the one hand, I argued that the constraints may be particularly
difficult, though certainly not impossible, for humanitarian interveners to satisfy because
they must weigh a particularly wide range of possible harms. On the other hand, I also
argued that more than the sufficient just cause(s) for resorting to war may be given some
weight in proportionality assessments, and this might make the proportionality condition
somewhat easier to satisfy than McMahan proposes. While I think that properly called
humanitarian interventions are a particular kind of just war, making contemporary just
war theory an appropriate tool for evaluating proposed interventions, I also think that the
requirements of contemporary just war theory may be somewhat differently interpreted in
cases of humanitarian intervention than in cases of more traditional wars of self-defense.
Proportionality is an infinitely complex subject, both for humanitarian interveners
and other kinds of just combatants, and I do not pretend that this chapter is anything like
an exhaustive account. I also do not want to suggest that lives are the only things risked
by military action. Military action often poses environmental harm, or destroys cities.
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Less immediate harms include the normalization of violence as a means of conflict
resolution, the entrenchment of hostilities between communities, the long-term
psychological harm of soldiers and civilians, and, sometimes, the acquisition of nations’
ever larger supplies of weaponry. I noted that with humanitarian intervention there is
particular concern that softening a prohibition against intervention will lead to more
aggressive actions that masquerade as humanitarianism. Some of the harms attached to
military action are immediate and concrete, while others are more ephemeral or distant.
The relative weighting of such disparate, incommensurable values and consequences is
enormously difficult and impossible to submit to exact mathematical calculation.
Nonetheless, I hope to have made some substantive contribution to identifying what the
proportionality condition requires, especially of humanitarian interveners.
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Chapter Four
Occasions for Humanitarian Intervention
“Humanitarian interventions are not justified for the sake of democracy or free
enterprise or economic justice or voluntary association or any other of the social
practices and arrangements that we might hope for or even call for in other people’s
countries. Their aim is profoundly negative in character: to put a stop to action that, to
use an old-fashioned but accurate phrase, ‘shock the conscience’ of humankind.”231

4.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates occasions of justifiable humanitarian intervention. In the first
section, I present the range of arguments given in defense of a general presumption
against intervention, and note some of the criticisms against them. Understanding the
rationale for the presumption against intervention also explains the need for exceptions. I
argue that it is not necessary to be an ethical relativist or radical communitarian to defend
the general presumption against military intervention. Although the need to protect
peoples’ processes of self-determination often carries some of the moral justification for
the prohibition against particular interventions, the general presumption against
intervention can reasonably be maintained on more standard consequentialist grounds.
The next section considers the kinds of harmful acts or circumstances that can
justify exceptions to the general presumption against military intervention; I outline the
kinds of atrocities a state must commit or allow for the presumption against intervention
to give way. Specifically in the second section I argue that there are compelling reasons
to limit full-scale military intervention to cases of mass atrocity crimes. Full-scale
military intervention against severe tyrannies that terrorize their population but that do
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not commit mass atrocities should be resisted in part because permitting such military
interventions may dramatically increase the number of wars that are fought. Such
interventions also seem to have much more difficulty comfortably satisfying the
proportionality requirement than interventions against states that commit or permit mass
atrocities. I concede that there are reasonably possible scenarios where what Walzer calls
‘force-short-of-war’ (for example, the maintenance of no-fly zones) against a non-atrocity
committing tyranny may satisfy the proportionality requirement. Full-scale war,
however, with the killing, maiming, and displacement it entails, should be restricted to
the most heinous situations and just war theorists should resist the temptation to paint war
as an efficient, surgical procedure that can be used to quickly manage any rights-violating
regime.
In the third section, I argue that it would be wrong to insist that intervention is
only ever justified in cases where the atrocities are already on-going, and contend that
under some reasonably possible circumstances pre-emptive intervention may be
permissible. I specify that, in general, justified pre-emptive action must be a response to
an imminent threat posed by aggressors with a distinct, well-equipped plan to carry out
mass atrocities. Humanitarian military intervention is not justified as a response to an
ephemeral or distant threat even when the perception of threat is rational. Full-scale
preventive military action against distant threats has difficulty satisfying the in bello rule
of discrimination since those individuals who would be preventively attacked have not
made themselves into aggressors by carrying out, or mobilizing for any unjust assault.
Full-scale preventive military action will also, in most circumstances, have difficulty
satisfying the requirements of proportionality and last resort.
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4.2.1 The Presumption Against Intervention: Self-Determination
Many contend that helping a foreign population struggle for liberation from a
domestic tyrant using military force is usually and generally wrong. John Stuart Mill
argues that a people’s commitment to liberty is measured by their willingness to defend it
physically, “[t]he only test possessing any real value, of a people’s having become fit for
popular institutions, is that they, or a sufficient portion of them to prevail in the contest,
are willing to brave labour and danger for their liberation.”232 In fighting for their liberty,
he argues persons come to better value and understand the liberty they finally achieve,
making resulting institutions more lasting and stable. Of an oppressed people he writes,
if they have not sufficient love of liberty to be able to wrest it from merely
domestic oppressors, the liberty which is bestowed on them by other hands than
their own, will have nothing real, nothing permanent… Men become attached to
that which they have long fought for and made sacrifices for, they learn to
appreciate that on which their thoughts have been much engaged; and a contest in
which many have been called on to devote themselves for their country, is a school
in which they learn to value their country’s interest above their own.233
Freedom is valuable, Mill argues, but it is best achieved when fought for and won than
when forcibly imposed by outsiders. Hard-won freedom, he thinks, is more deeply felt
and its resulting institutions less easily corrupted or usurped. Foreigners cannot
adequately accomplish what is best achieved by a people themselves.234
Mill’s defense of non-intervention has been criticized as implying that people
always deserve the governments they get, that those suffering under repressive
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governments deserve their repression because their ‘love of liberty’ isn’t sufficient for
them to free themselves. This blame-the-victim criticism is best stated by David Luban
who wrote in 1980, “It seems that Mill suspects that the state would not be there if the
people did not secretly want it. This seems to me to be an absurd, and at times even
obscene view, uncomfortably reminiscent of the view that women are raped because
secretly they want to be.”235
Walzer offers a more deontological version of Mill’s argument for the
presumption of non-intervention. Self-determination, he argues, is valuable in itself even
if the process isn’t guaranteed to yield anything that is philosophically correct.236
Individuals, he argues, have the right to live in communities that are the product of their
shared, local history and to live under whatever institutions they, in their own time and in
their own way, collectively author.237 Many theorists echo this view arguing that
victimized populations usually prefer domestic solutions to intervention and occupation
by foreigners, and this preference requires foreigners to stay out of the way.238
Sometimes it is added that a preference for domestic solutions may inform a patriotic
backlash against humanitarian interveners, making intervention less likely to succeed.239
An advantage of this kind of argument for the presumption against intervention is
that it does not have the unsavoury implication that people deserve the murderous
governments they might find themselves with, and focuses attention on the desires and
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wishes of the victims of aggression. Even in awful circumstances, people are likely to
have preferences regarding how they would wish to emerge from these circumstances and
this argument for a general rule of non-intervention at least takes these wishes seriously.
Both David Luban and Richard Miller contend that Walzer’s argument for the
presumption of non-intervention overvalues political autonomy.240 A political
community may be the authentic product of people trying to organize themselves, and
still be profoundly unjust. Authenticity, they argue, isn’t all that matters; states
genuinely endorsed by (most of) their citizens may still be morally atrocious. A
communitarian might reply that states that commit barbarous acts against their citizens
only ever enjoy consent that is highly coerced, and that such political communities cannot
be said to be robustly self-determining and, thereby, rightly immune to intervention.
Luban agrees that murderous states sustain themselves by coercion, but cautions that
some majorities have a demonstrated capacity to willingly participate in and endorse
heinous crimes committed by their states against internal minorities. Majorities seem
especially able to condone atrocities against internal minorities when the majority has in
the past been done wrong by, or feels threatened by, the now persecuted minority. The
point remains that self-determining societies do not necessarily, by virtue of their
authenticity alone, warrant protection.241 The presumption against military intervention
may well be justified, but not because self-determination is morally supreme.
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Luban and Miller also argue that Walzer overestimates the prevalence of political
communities that really are shaped by a collective effort that includes all or most of their
members. They contend that Walzer’s argument for the presumption of non-intervention
would make more sense in a world where there existed a better ‘fit’ between governments
and the people they represent, but that, as it is, the world includes many states where,
‘[t]he government fits the people the way the sole of a boot fits a human face….’242
Some theorists reject Walzer’s argument for the presumption against intervention
by specifying that the only persons whose wishes warrant moral concern are those of the
targeted population whose rescue is the object of intervention. A torturer cannot
reasonably use her interest in self-determination as a trump against intervention intended
to save the innocent she straps down to torture.243 Nevertheless, Walzer might reply that
those who are the immediate targets of atrocities may sometimes reject military
intervention, and their refusal requires outsiders to forgo military means. Victims of
grave injustice may not want foreign military intervention, or may not want the kind of
military intervention that is offered by the international community.
The self-determination argument for the presumption against military intervention
that depends on the desire of people to sort things out for themselves has also been
countered by Thomas Weiss who argues that vulnerable or targeted peoples generally do
want intervention, citing research on the matter indicating openness rather than
resistance to intervention by foreigners. He writes,
…the only survey done to date of victims in war zones suggests that there is too
little, rather than too much, humanitarian intervention. A full two-thirds of
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civilians under siege who were interviewed in twelve war-torn societies by the
ICRC wanted more intervention, and only 10 percent wanted none.244
Certainly, more empirical research of the sort that Weiss describes would be useful.
Indeed, in general, moral theorizing on war and intervention could be significantly
improved if it involved greater collaboration with those with front-line experience of war
and reliable empirical expertise.
Yet, even Walzer agrees that there comes a point when non-intervention cannot be
convincingly maintained on the grounds that it improves chances for self-determination.
Walzer is not an absolutist regarding the rule against intervention. At a certain point, he
argues, atrocities are of such a sort that any talk of self-determination becomes “cynical
and irrelevant.”245

4.2.2 Ignorant Outsiders
A general presumption against intervention is also sometimes maintained on the
grounds that interveners are unlikely to adequately understand the complexity and history
of the humanitarian situation.246 Foreigners, it may be argued, don’t know the history or
the cultures well enough to act rightly in morally complex situations. Examples of
foreign interveners underestimating or misunderstanding internal strife are abundant, and
the worry is terrifyingly captured in a speech given by Major General Lewis MacKenzie
(head of the UN’s military mission in Bosnia) to the Royal United Services Institute on
December 9, 1992, where he was quoted as having insisted that, “The last thing that a

244

Greenberg Research, The People on War Report (Geneva: ICRC, 1999), xvi, quoted in Weiss,
Military-Civilian Interactions (see n.29), 22.
245
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 90.
246
Walzer, “The Moral Standing of States,” 212.

145
peacekeeper wants to know is the history of the region he is going into. It complicates
the task of mediation.”247
This argument for non-intervention, however, is also criticized on the grounds that
outsiders often can understand intra-state conflict well enough to know how to act, and
that few cultures and societies are so isolated that outsiders would be incapable of
understanding the nature of the conflict.248 Indeed, some might add that an outsider to a
society can sometimes see its moral problems more clearly.

4.2.3 International Stability
A general policy of non-intervention in a people’s struggle against domestic rights
violations is also often defended on the grounds that a policy of foreign military
intervention in states’ domestic policies will destabilize the international order. The
worry is that the relative stability of the international system relies on mutual assurances
that states will not intervene in others’ domestic affairs. This ideal of international
society being composed of self-determining sovereign states that are rightly immune to
international military intervention persists today, but in this past century it was perhaps
especially poignant after the Second World War when, to some, the greatest threat to
humanity seemed to be inter-state aggression.249
While inter-state military aggression continues to be a real threat, aggression
committed or permitted by states against their own people is an arguably equal or greater
threat. Burleigh Wilkins notes that in the twentieth century, four times as many deaths
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were caused by the victims’ own government or civil war than from all inter-state
wars.250 Though, it is not clear if massive campaigns of intra-state violence are actually
on the increase or if it is simply that such campaigns are better publicized. Actually
existing states are increasingly recognized as among the worst violators of their own
citizens’ basic well-being, and a system of unconditional state sovereignty and its
concomitant rule against foreign intervention are increasingly looked on with suspicion.
The current sovereign state system may be stable compared to Hobbes’s hypothetical
state of nature, or a system of unchecked empire-building, but it has hardly enabled the
enjoyment of universal human rights.
More and more, sovereignty and a right to non-intervention have been recast as a
privilege that states earn rather than a basic right or unchallengeable given. Sovereignty
and a right to non-interference by other states are increasingly held to be conditional upon
a state meeting some basic moral needs or rights of its people.251 States that lead or
endorse mass slaughter of civilians are said to lose their right to non-interference by
others in the international community when they patently fail to meet or respect the most
basic moral rights of individuals.252
Sometimes theorists respond to the idea of conditional sovereignty by arguing that
state stability is a necessary precondition for the realization of human rights.253
Intervention may cause the breakdown of a centralized authority, precipitating an even
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greater threat to human rights than tyranny. The view is that prioritizing and honouring
state sovereignty will, in the long run, best serve human rights.254 Sometimes theorists
also respond by repeating that people require freedom from external threat in order to
deal with their own internal threats.255
The argument for the presumption against intervention that appeals to
international stability rightly highlights the destructiveness of war, and the moral
significance of maintaining order. At its extreme, the international stability argument for
non-intervention implies that preserving order is more important than justice.256 Critics,
however, challenge that states’ injustices can and commonly do reach such proportions
that a policy of propping up the status quo is at least as likely to disrupt the world order as
the occasional foreign intervention.257 Justice denied is a recipe for disorder, and in that
sense, justice (through intervention) is more important than, or a precondition for order
and stability.
It would be simplistic to argue that either order or justice is normatively
privileged, and that one value always takes precedence over the other. Both matter
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tremendously, but sometimes the particular circumstances will be such that one value
outweighs the other. And while they can genuinely conflict, it would also be mistaken to
suggest that they are always separable. ‘Order’ based on racial segregation, for example,
is unlikely to be very stable and radical revolution or intervention may be morally
compelling but cannot claim to be just if it means numbers of ‘charred babies.’ Even
those who criticize humanitarian intervention on the grounds of international stability are
not usually absolutists about non-intervention. Modern just war theorists do not
commonly argue that humanitarian intervention is absolutely never justified out of
concern for international instability.

4.2.4 The Horror of War
All of the above arguments for the presumption against military intervention have
merit. However, the general presumption against humanitarian intervention is most
easily, or least objectionably defended using Luban’s most recent argument that war,
even when it goes relatively well, is almost incomprehensibly awful, and so should be
generally avoided. In his recent work, Luban suggests that the presumption against
military intervention is not best accounted for as a rule that is necessary to protect selfdetermination, but rather as a rule to avoid war. He writes, “…it would be a mistake to
suppose that the real evil of war is the assault on sovereignty rather than the untold
sorrow of modern war.”258 His recent view doesn’t deny that self-determination by a
people and international stability are valuable, it only denies that they are what best
account for the general presumption against military intervention.
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I think Luban is correct that the immediate and distant consequences for soldiers
and non-combatants are sufficient to justify the presumption against intervention. In
general, the presumption against intervention holds simply because military action
involves horrifying consequences and agents doing awful acts. There are circumstances
when despite its horrors, military force can seem appropriate, but the point is to avoid war
up to the point where avoiding war calls into question our humanity; we avoid war except
when a refusal to employ some force undermines our moral identity as defenders of basic
rights and yields wholly intolerable consequences.
The presumption against military intervention also seems justified by the sordid
history of wars claimed to be humanitarian. History is rife with examples of aggressors
claiming humanitarian intent, and most critics (and indeed many defenders) of
humanitarian intervention will begin their papers by noting the supposed ‘humanitarian’
impulse of European colonizers of North America and Africa, and of Spanish
conquistadors during the Crusades. There is a palpable and warranted concern that a
permissive doctrine of humanitarian intervention will be used as a façade for aggression,
expansionism, and a desire to forcibly refashion the world in an aggressor’s image.
Yet the presumption against military intervention is only a presumption, not an
absolute rule. Jean-Christophe Merle goes so far as to argue that when non-military
means of conflict resolution are ineffective or inapt, it becomes the duty of powers who
oppose military intervention to justify why it is impermissible. He writes
…there ought to be a reversal of the burden of proof. Whereas intervening powers
previously have had to demonstrate that they were justified in intervening for
humanitarian reasons, today they should have to justify not intervening militarily in
the absence of other efficient means to stop massive human rights violations.259
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While I think that Merle overstates the case somewhat since I don’t agree that the burden
of proof should be reversed, it is undoubtedly true that critics of military intervention
must offer and materially support alternative means of pursuing the just cause. I am also
troubled by his use of the word ‘efficient’ because I think that it reveals a dangerous
tendency to view military action as a way to ‘get results fast’. Even when military action
can be plausibly seen to be the most efficient means to achieve a just cause, military force
is not justified simply because it achieves a desired result faster and with fewer resources
than the alternatives.
I acknowledge that the increasing numbers of large-scale humanitarian atrocities
are making the justified exceptions to the non-intervention rule less and less
exceptional.260 Despite the increase in widely-publicized, mass atrocities, humanitarian
intervention must continue to be an exception to the general presumption against military
force for humanitarian ends. Military force, even when carefully executed, imposes dire
humanitarian risks, and strong states do claim humanitarianism as a shield for power
politics. As J. Bryan Hehir notes,
Because of the diversity of states and the dangers of rationalization, the wisdom of
Westphalia should be heeded. Intervention may be necessary but it should not be
made easy. Hence the need to sustain the presumption against it.261
Hehir continues that “[t]he ‘just causes’ for intervention must go beyond genocide. The
intellectual and political challenge is to identify a wider range of exceptions without
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eroding the presumption against intervention.”262 The next section of this chapter
investigates occasions where the presumption against intervention might give way.

4.3 Occasions for Humanitarian Intervention
There are two related subjects of debate in the literature on the occasions for
humanitarian intervention. The first has to do with the scale of the atrocities that might
rightly trigger an intervention. Here some argue that repressive governments that
routinely violate the basic rights of its citizens are candidates for military intervention.263
Others insist that rightful candidates for military intervention must be not ‘merely’
tyrannical and repressive, but also massively murderous.264 The second debate has to do
with the time when military intervention can be justified. Here some argue that
intervention will only ever be justified against on-going atrocities,265 and others contend
that intervention may also be justified against imminent atrocities.266 Some even defend
military intervention against anticipated future (but not imminent) atrocities,267 or in part
as punishment for past atrocities.268 Yet, the issues of scale and timing are not entirely
separable. A currently popular view is that tyrants who persist in carrying out over a
period of years human rights violations that do not rise to the level of ethnic cleansing or
genocide can become rightful targets of military intervention once they accumulate a
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critical number of victims and non-violent modes of curbing their violence are unlikely to
succeed.
I argue that military intervention should generally be restricted to very large-scale
campaigns of brutal violence, killing, enslavement, or forced displacement calculated to
terrorize and/or kill a particular group. I argue that violence need not be ongoing to
justify intervention, but it should be imminent. Non-military forms of intervention can
and should be used in defense against many kinds of human rights violations, but military
intervention, particularly full-scale war, should only be an option in the most egregious
cases.

4.3.1 Scale
Michael Walzer has consistently argued that the occasions for humanitarian
intervention must be of a particularly serious sort.269 He argues that the relevant
occasions differ in kind, rather than by degree from other kinds of repression. The
circumstances that might call for military intervention are not at the far end of a
continuum of nastiness, but an entirely different sort of horror, separated from others by a
moral chasm.270 “We should not allow ourselves to approach genocide by degrees,” he
writes. On one side of the chasm are a wide range of brutal injustices that states can
commit against their own people and in response to which non-military modes of
intervention or containment may be called for. On the other side is genocide, ethnic
cleansing, or systematic massacre. Such occasions, he argues, cry out for foreign
intervention. In recent years, David Luban has also come around to the view that only in
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such extreme humanitarian crises should humanitarian intervention be considered,
arguing that military force should be countenanced only against behaviour that is
uncivilized to the point of being barbaric.271
Luban admits that the distinction between civilized and uncivilized has been
drawn in different places at different times. He argues that the distinction is grounded in
part on sentiment or conscience, rather than on impartial reason.272 Luban would
acknowledge the strength of Peter Singer’s warning that, “[t]he problem with … [the]
appeal to the “conscience of mankind” criterion is that this conscience has, at various
times and places, been shocked by such things as interracial sex, atheism, and mixed
bathing.”273 Yet, despite the undeniable role of relativistic sentiment and conscience in
identifying some cases of serious rights violations, Luban also argues that uncivilized
behaviour crosses an unmistakable line when it is barbaric in character. He writes,
As an intellectual matter, one can recognize that standards of civilized behaviour
vary greatly among times and places, and that no a priori argument is going to
settle the question. When we witness barbaric evil in action, matters assume a
different aspect. The perpetrators become incomprehensible to us; the victims’
sufferings overwhelm our imaginations. At that point, the distinction between the
civilized and the barbaric appears like a bright line inscribed in the world;
relativistic doubts evaporate.274
It is important to note that neither Walzer nor Luban endorse the view that only
genocide provides a just cause for humanitarian intervention. Both now agree that mass
murder, ethnic cleansing, and similar large-scale acts can be sufficient. Their views
differ from the Clinton administration’s view during the Rwandan genocide when it so
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carefully avoided use of the word ‘genocide’ in public statements, supposing that only in
that event would a moral and legal duty of intervention arise.
Walzer and Luban’s (revised) view on suitable occasions for intervention are
rejected by some as too limiting. Some, such as Fernando Tesón, think that severe
tyranny, unaccompanied by ethnic cleansing or similarly large-scale acts may give a
sufficient cause for military intervention. In ‘severe tyranny’ Tesón includes states that
commit “pervasive and serious forms of oppression.”275 He specifies the kinds of
oppression that meet this standard:
Let us imagine that in a South American country a military junta overthrows the
democratic government, suspends all constitutional liberties and imposes martial
law. The regime dismisses all suspect judges, replacing them with loyalists, and
rigidly controls the media, the schools, and the universities. It targets dissidents for
arrest, and tortures and summarily executes the leaders. All in all, the regime kills
about two thousand people a year and beats up and tortures many more. The whole
population (not just a few members) is subject to surveillance and arrest for
disloyalty. This dismal situation is buttressed by relentless ideological propaganda.
People abhor the regime, but, alas, the prospects of peaceful or violent return to
democracy are nil, as the regime has the weapons. Here, people are not dying in
huge numbers, but their lives depend on the whims of a tyrant, who kills enough of
them weekly so as to keep them subjugated, yet not enough to cause a massacre…
There are no massive killings, no extermination camps, no genocide, no ethnic
cleansing. Yet it seems to me that in these cases the victims have a right to seek
outside help, and that foreign governments may assist them, even by force
(assuming acceptable costs).276

According to Tesón, tyranny that might warrant military intervention must be severe in
the sense described above.
Tesón rightly challenges the sanctity of state sovereignty. However, I am
nonetheless deeply troubled by the prospect of expanding the occasions for military
action in the way he suggests. The first problem with Tesón’s view is the very real
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possibility that permitting intervention against severe tyranny might lead to a third world
war. Severe tyranny similar to the sort that Tesón describes is fairly common, and if
military intervention against such states were permitted, then the occasions for war would
multiply exponentially. It might be argued that in a world where severe tyranny was less
common, there would be nothing wrong with humanitarian intervention against a severe
tyranny that does not commit (or allow) mass atrocities because in such a world these
would be isolated and uncommon cases. In a world where severe tyrannies were rare,
Tesón’s standard would indeed be less dangerous, than in our world. But even in this
hypothetical world, there remains a residual wrongness about using full-scale military
force against a non-atrocity committing tyranny. In this world, intervention will have
difficulty in satisfying the thick conception of proportionality that should be, and often is
expected of humanitarian interveners.
Importantly, Tesón qualifies his view with several conditions; he does not
suppose that the presence of severe tyranny is sufficient to justify military intervention.
He requires, for example, that the intervention not pose an undue burden on the
interveners.277 He also requires that interveners not impose their own brand of tyranny
after ousting the domestic tyrants, and argues that interveners must help to build free
democratic institutions in the reconstruction stage.278 Furthermore, interveners must
generally comply with the doctrine of double effect, injuring innocents only when it is a
necessary and undesired side-effect of well-meaning action.279 Crucially, he insists that
the victims on whose behalf the intervention is launched must welcome the
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intervention.280 In various places he also endorses versions of the just war tradition’s
requirements of last resort and proportionality.
Tesón’s added qualifications abate some fears about his policy. If non-military
modes of intervention have no prospects for success, and if the victims of severe tyranny
want intervention, then why not endorse Tesón’s more permissive view that military
intervention is justified against severe tyranny? Why restrict intervention to cases of
ethnic cleansing, genocide, or other large-scale atrocities?
A critic of Tesón’s relatively permissive rule for intervention might argue that his
position is reasonable in principle, but dangerous in practice because it opens the door to
grave abuse. Under his more permissive rule, any state whose politics or economic
practices are ideologically at odds with the powerful might be deemed tyrannical and
become a target of ‘humanitarian intervention’. Tesón himself admits the danger of
abuse, but responds that it is reasonable to think that some occasions of intervention
against tyranny might be genuine and praiseworthy and specifies that he means only to
280
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justify those instances.281 If the possibility of abuse is extreme, it is not clear that this
response adequately rebuts the objection, and a better defender of his view might try to
look for a creative legal or institutional mechanism to deter abuses.
My own reluctance to endorse Tesón’s more permissive rule regarding the
occasions for interventions stems from his articulation of the proportionality requirement,
and the heavily discounted weight he gives to unintended harm by well-intended
interveners. In the first and second editions of his book on humanitarian intervention,
Tesón reveals a particularly weak proportionality requirement, arguing that a
humanitarian intervention can be proportionate even if it kills more people than it saves,
when, in so doing it achieves a goal with the moral weight of the removal of a tyrant.
That is, the significance of rooting out a tyrant justifies interveners in killing more people
than the tyranny will. He writes, “[h]umanitarian intervention can be just even if the
intervenor infringes the rights of innocents, and even if, in rare cases, more necessary
infringements will occur than the intervention will prevent.”282 He continues, “[i]n some
cases of humanitarian intervention more lives will be lost than saved. The moral
imperative to fight evil sometimes overrides calculations in terms of deaths and
sufferings.”283 In more recent work, Tesón softens his tone, but the underlying
conception of proportionality remains, arguing,
The goal of restoring minimally just institutions and practices is normatively
privileged independently of the advancement of the general welfare… sometimes
innocent persons may be morally bound, as it were, to suffer extreme burdens for
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the sake of an end higher than making sure that the rights of the innocent are not
infringed upon.284

I contend that it is in part because Tesón has such a weak proportionality requirement that
he is comfortable with severe tyranny as an occasion for intervention. In repeating these
quotations, I cannot help but be reminded of Jonathan Glover’s discussion of ideology
and its power to overwhelm ordinarily existing moral sensibilities and restraints.285
Part of what is remarkable about Tesón’s discussion of proportionality (especially
in his early work) is that while he is comfortable condoning military ‘rescues’ that kill
more people than they are expected to save, he simultaneously criticizes a utilitarianism
of rights for its willingness to sacrifice the rights of some for the sake of maximizing
overall rights satisfaction.286 One would expect someone who is critical of individuals
being sacrificed for the majority to be more concerned with interventions that leave more
victims dead than they expect to save. His insistence on the moral urgency of ending
tyrannies (even if doing so kills more than it is expected to save) is also surprising given
his simultaneous resolve that interveners use means that are consistent with the
humanitarian purpose.287 Foreign interveners cannot credibly claim that their means are
consistent with their humanitarian ends if they kill more innocents than the tyranny. His
early discussion of proportionality also fits awkwardly with his repeated claim that the
intended beneficiaries of an intervention must welcome it. It seems unlikely that persons
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would endorse a military intervention that kills more of them than it expects to save.
Though he removes some of the most morally objectionable claims from the 2005
edition of his book, he continues to argue that innocents should be willing to suffer
‘extreme burdens’ for the sake of fighting evil. In a footnote he approvingly quotes
Daniel Montaldi who writes, “It is … conceivable that in situations in which stopping
persons from being grievously disrespected is of greater importance than merely ensuring
that persons enjoy the freedom to pursue their interests.”288 Despite improvements in the
revised work, his underlying, vaguely crusading conviction persists, and it is precisely the
ease with which he dismisses the most basic interests of currently living persons that
makes his proposal worrisome. It is his lack of ‘sensitivity to genuine moral cost’ that is
so alarming.289
Undoubtedly, Tesón is correct in saying that tyrants are particularly heinous and
evil. As he rightly notes, not only do tyrants murder and torture large numbers of people,
but they also abuse their positions of public office, tormenting the very people they ought
to serve.290 Importantly, however, a rejection of Tesón’s view does not mean that liberal
states should continue business as usual with severe tyrannies. Other, non-violent
strategies aimed at containing, or ‘de-clawing’ a tyrant will be required. Tesón often
perpetuates the ‘with us or against us’ reasoning so favoured by some militaristic policymakers, but a refusal to endorse the expanded occasions for war is not, categorically not,
to endorse tyranny.

288

Daniel Montaldi, “Towards a Human Rights Based Account of Just War,” Social Theory and Practice
11, (1985), 145 quoted in Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention, 3rd ed., 107.
289
Slote, “Utilitarianism, Moral Dilemmas, and Moral Cost,” 165.
290
Ibid, 99-100.

160
My critic might argue that intervention against severe but non-atrocity committing
tyranny may still be permissible if it could satisfy a more restrictive conception of
proportionality. Tesón may be wrong to interpret the proportionality requirement the way
he does, but perhaps I am wrong to reject severe tyranny as an occasion for military
intervention. Intervention against severe tyrannies that do not commit mass atrocities
may in some circumstances satisfy a thicker, more restrictive conception of
proportionality.
I admit that in particular cases the calculus could work out in favour of military
intervention against a severe tyranny even if the tyranny does not commit organized,
mass atrocities. The victims of the severe tyranny may be calling out for military
assistance after all other means of containing or overcoming the tyranny have failed.
This is possible, and I don’t claim that any kind of military intervention against severe
tyranny is categorically and in principle wrong, whatever the circumstances. Absolutist
pronouncements are difficult to maintain in the ethics of war.
It seems most plausible, however, that intervention against a non-mass-atrocity
committing tyranny is more likely to satisfy an adequate conception of proportionality if
it involved a very particular, limited military strike, or what Walzer calls force-short-ofwar, including the maintenance of no-fly zones. Since such uses of military force may
impose fewer risks to innocents, they more credibly claim to satisfy a robust conception
of proportionality. I caution, however, that interveners may be over-confident in the
likelihood that they might quickly and easily neutralize a tyranny using limited military
strikes, and add that such strikes may run the great risk of precipitating full-scale war.
So, defenders of force-short-of-war will have a heavy burden of proof even if force-short-

161
of-war may be justified on some occasions where full-scale war wouldn’t be, because it
may, in some circumstances, carry few risks and great prospects for enormous good.
My essential opposition to Tesón’s position stands. Even with heroic interveners
who expose themselves to considerable risk in order to minimize the risk to innocents,
full-scale war imposes risks that are so severe that they may only be proportionate as
responses to mass-atrocity crimes. I agree that respect for basic human rights is to be
promoted, and that nothing about liberalism requires that we stay silent about others’
rights abuses.291 It is permissible and indeed desirable to exert political, social or
economic force on states that fail to respect their populations’ basic human rights and
interests. I conceded also that uses of force-short-of-war may, in some extreme cases, be
justifiable. But full-scale military force, given that it almost certainly entails the killing
of innocent persons, should be restricted to the most egregious cases.
On its own, satisfying a robust conception of proportionality is not sufficient to
justify humanitarian intervention. The other conditions that Tesón requires, including,
for example, last resort and the consent of the intended beneficiaries, are also crucial and
necessary. His position is not morally incomprehensible, but it is dangerously detached
from the welfare of the currently living.

4.3.2 Timing
Theorists are also divided on the time when humanitarian intervention can be
justified. Some argue that humanitarian intervention is justified only as a response to
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ongoing atrocities, and not as a response to merely possible or past atrocities.292 An
attraction of this view is that interventions against atrocities that are already underway are
more likely to satisfy other just war criteria, such as last resort and proportionality. In the
face of ongoing atrocities, non-violent modes of intervention might more reasonably
appear ineffective, and the use of military force more persuasively be advanced as a last
resort. Limiting military force to such occasions would also put proportionality
assessments on firmer ground since in the case of ongoing atrocities it is more apparent
what consequences are being avoided or curtailed by military might; in the absence of
ongoing horrors, it would never be clear what exactly was avoided. On a more practical
note, even if interveners are correct in thinking that mass atrocities are very likely to take
place, foreign publics may be reluctant to authorize the use of their military resources and
personnel against humanitarian disasters not yet seen.
However, restricting humanitarian intervention to cases where the atrocities are
already ongoing seems short-sighted and unreasonable. There may well be cases where
atrocities are imminent, though physical aggression has not yet been overtly initiated and
intervention is reasonably called for. The discovery of arms caches and the military’s
detailed plans for widespread killing in early1994 in Rwanda seems to be one such
example. Rt. Gen. Roméo Dallaire has argued that the pre-emptive action of raiding the
arms caches might have prevented the genocide altogether and required fewer intervening
soldiers than would have been needed to stop the atrocities once they were underway.
The claim that intervention is a permissible response only to already ongoing atrocity
appears inadequate when faced with virtually certain impending atrocity, and the
possibility for fairly precise means of pre-emption.
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The raiding of arms caches in Rwanda might better be described as a pre-emptive
attack, rather than a full-scale pre-emptive war. Precise, limited, pre-emptive attacks of
this sort are easier to justify than pre-emptive wars given that they are more likely to
satisfy the proportionality requirement, posing as they do fewer risks to innocents.293
Importantly, The International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS) similarly condones intervention for what it refers to as “actual or apprehended”
atrocities. According to ICISS, the killing need not be underway for intervention to be
justified; however, the atrocities must be imminent and preparatory steps by the aggressor
must already have been taken. Merely the suspicion that a regime is capable and willing
to commit atrocities cannot justify intervention, according to ICISS.
I am drawn to the view that interveners should, when possible, act to stop
atrocities from breaking out, rather than acting merely to contain them after they have
already materialized. If acting now, rather than later, will protect lives, and if the
outbreak of atrocities is reasonably expected to be imminent, these are powerful reasons
for acting now. However, I am also attentive to the dangers of this kind of reasoning. I
do not want to falsely imply that military force is best when it is initiated long before the
‘enemy’ has had a chance to arm itself. I am keenly aware that this kind of reasoning is
used to defend so-called ‘preventive wars’ that anticipate future threats before they are
fully-formed.
Tesón goes further than defending genuinely pre-emptive attacks aimed at
outmanoeuvring soldiers poised for atrocities (or destroying arms caches), arguing that
“the requirement of imminent or ongoing massacres, genocide, or crimes against
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humanity is too strict.”294 He argues that military intervention can be justified not only to
pre-empt imminent atrocity, but also against a state that might commit future atrocities
revealed by its history of past atrocities and/or continued tyrannical behaviour.295 Tesón
supports not only a limited doctrine of pre-emptive war against aggressors who have
already explicitly conspired to commit atrocities and stock piled arms for that purpose,
but also an expansive doctrine of preventive war against states with atrocious
humanitarian records, even if these states do not have any current plan to repeat their past
atrocities.
Tesón is not alone in defending humanitarian intervention to prevent possible
future, but not imminent atrocities. Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane endorse a more
limited doctrine of preventive humanitarian intervention in those cases where it is
reasonably believed that there is a high degree of probability that massive and serious
violations of basic human rights will be carried out at an unspecified, but not imminent
point in time, that uses weapons of mass destruction, and that cannot be deterred by any
other means.296 It is important to Buchanan and Keohane’s argument that the threatened
human rights violations be massive and severe, and that the aggressors are reasonably
expected to use weapons of mass destruction that will, very suddenly, produce massive
devastation (they use the example of a virulent lethal virus).297 It is also crucial to their
argument that there be no reasonable alternative to preventing the outbreak of hostilities
except by preventive military action. In cases of justified preventive action the
aggressors must have a distinct plan to carry out the aggression (a condition not required
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by Tesón), but the planned hostilities may be somewhat removed in time, suggesting that
“several weeks”298 would satisfy this description. They argue that it is this lack of
imminent aggression that makes any force used against them rightly-described as
preventive rather than pre-emptive.
Acknowledging the risk of states abusing a doctrine of preventive
war/intervention, Buchanan and Keohane insist that any proposed preventive force be put
to a vote at the Security Council or a coalition of democratic states. If preventive action
is endorsed, the intervening agents must then submit themselves to an impartial body for
review after the fact. This impartial body will determine whether, knowing all of the
facts, preventive action was reasonable, and if so, authorize sanctions against those who
opposed the preventive action. Alternatively, the impartial body may determine that
preventive action was unreasonable, and so authorize sanctions against those who
endorsed and carried out the preventive action. Buchanan and Keohane’s hope is that
such an institutional arrangement would hold everyone to account, both proponents and
opponents of preventive action alike, and encourage responsible international conduct. In
their view, preventive military action is not inherently wrong, and the challenge is to
ensure that states are bound by institutional arrangements that discourage bad faith claims
about the need to use force preventively.299
Echoing an argument made by Walzer, Steven Lee argues that Buchanan and
Keohane fail to show that the targets of preventive intervention are rightly liable for the
298
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use of force against them.300 Lee argues that since the soldiers who would be the targets
of preventive action are not actually doing harm or preparing to do imminent harm,
preventive war/intervention cannot possibly satisfy the just war tradition’s in bello
requirement of discrimination. He writes, “… the military personnel of the state that is a
target of preventive intervention are not at that time causally responsible for harm they
may be ordered by their leaders to undertake in the future.”301 He continues, “An
individual is a combatant in the morally relevant sense not simply by being in a military
organization, but rather by being part of a military organization that is engaged in
conflict.”302
Critics debate whether military personnel are only rightly treated as combatants
when they are overtly engaged in fighting and while this is an important debate, I think
that the permissibility of preventive intervention may also be challenged with reference to
the requirement of last resort or necessity. If the planned atrocities are not imminent,
then it is difficult to understand how there may be no other way to deter them than by
carrying out preventive military action. Without imminence, it’s hard to see force as a
last resort to averting the anticipated, future atrocities. Even if legal action is practically
impossible, attempts should be made to publicize the plan (and protect informants) and
impose targeted economic restrictions on elites. And even if future uses of weapons of
mass destruction are being planned, the 2003 Iraq war gives us reason to question
whether the agents of preventive war/intervention are likely to be in a position to make
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accurate or reliable calculations regarding the risks they seek to avoid.303 It is not
logically impossible to satisfy all of Buchanan and Keohane’s conditions simultaneously,
but perhaps very unlikely.
My view of Buchanan and Keohane’s argument on the permissibility of
preventive war is similar to the feeling I have about Michael Gross’s proposal (discussed
in the third chapter) that just combatants should be permitted to use non-lethal, chemical
weapons to incapacitate a civilian population in order that the unjust aggressors who hide
among them can be rooted out. While I agreed that Gross’s proposal has some
plausibility if an enormous number of conditions are satisfied, I argued that it is likely to
serve as a rationalization of war crimes, and will do little to curb the trend towards
increasing civilian casualties or to establish academia as a restraining voice in military
ethics. Buchanan and Keohane’s argument in defense of preventive war may have
similar results. Bits and pieces of their view may well be selected and used to rationalize
aggression, while others are quietly dismissed as unreasonable or impracticable.
Of course, this worry does not undermine the truth of their argument. An
argument is not made wrong because people are likely to misuse it. But the problem isn’t
just that people might misuse their view, for this is a problem with any moral proposal,
but that the multiple conditions it requires of justified preventive force are unlikely to
obtain and the temptation to resort to preventive force is, in some quarters, very strong. I
concede that just war theorists must consider new moral problems raised by the
emergence of biological weapons that are, we are told, relatively easily acquired and are
massively destructive. A refusal to engage intellectually with this new mode of killing
will make just war theorizing even less relevant to policy makers than it is now.
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My great fear, however, is that any benefit gained by isolating the remote, hypothetical
scenario in which preventive war is permissible, is outweighed by the danger of
loosening the prohibition on preventive war. The moral prohibition on preventive force
is a levee holding back immeasurable bloodshed.
At the same time, specifying the conditions under which military force is morally
justified is the first step in discovering the best possible laws of war, and determining to
what extent our actually existing laws are justified or need amendment. It is perfectly
consistent to endorse the desirability of something like Buchanan and Keohane’s
institutional reforms while insisting that the prohibition against preventive war should be
upheld given that the actually existing institutional order is very different from the one
they recommend. The difficulty then becomes figuring out how to accomplish their
institutional reforms.

4.4 Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the occasions for humanitarian intervention,
understood as the use of military force. I argued that the presumption against
humanitarian intervention can be defended on various grounds, but that the least
objectionable argument regards the importance of avoiding the horror of war. Against
Fernando Tesón, I also argued that given our current institutional order humanitarian
intervention should generally be restricted to cases of ongoing or imminent mass
atrocities.
Much of my argument for the occasions for humanitarian intervention has
centered on how to justify actions that will involve killing innocent persons. Even if
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humanitarian interventions are carried out exactly as they ought to be, they will be
imperfect. There is no quick and easy way to end atrocities, and no perfect resolution to
horror. If one isn’t going to defend pacifism, then one needs to develop thresholds and
rules for interventions in full appreciation of the non-surgical nature of modern war.
Some theorists resist the articulation of moral rules for intervention and prefer to
leave it to a case by case analysis. I think that articulating general rules regarding the
occasions for intervention is an important moral enterprise because it provides a way to
measure the consistency, authenticity, and urgency of claimed humanitarian military
ventures. In the absence of pre-established moral parameters we are easily duped into
supporting aggression that masquerades as humanitarianism. Without explicating and
justifying general rules for intervention we leave ourselves easy prey for government
spokespersons.
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Conclusion

This thesis investigates definitional and moral problems surrounding humanitarian
intervention. Specifying a definition of humanitarian intervention is important because
the word carries enormous rhetorical power and is currently used to describe very
different kinds of military venture. I argue that humanitarian interventions are rightly
understood as military actions that are carefully crafted and conducted to protect
innocents from massive and brutal violations of their most basic rights. I argue that
neither the purity of the interveners’ hearts nor an entirely positive outcome is a
necessary or a sufficient condition for a rightly-called humanitarian intervention. I also
argued that humanitarian interveners must possess an agenda that is centrally
humanitarian and does not undermine the autonomy and interests of the victims they seek
to rescue. I further argue that, no matter how good the initial intention or how good the
final outcome, actions that systematically violate the in bello requirements of the just war
tradition ought not be described as humanitarian interventions.
In chapter two I explore various pacifist objections to humanitarian intervention
and argue that, while some versions of pacifism are much more powerful than others,
pacifism usually leaves victims ill-equipped to respond to aggression. I argue that
deontological pacifists who reject war because it predictably kills innocents pose a potent
challenge, and I admit that the very concept of humanitarian war has an air of paradox.
While there is tension between humanitarian ends and military means, I argue that the
stakes may be high enough and the military efforts restrained enough that military means
can be consistent with a humanitarian purpose and may be acceptable to the persons
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whose lives they risk. In particular, I argue that humanitarian interveners must plan and
abide by Michael Walzer’s requirement of due care, which requires that combatants
minimize risks to non-combatants by accepting some costs to themselves. Abiding by the
requirement of due care not only helps to earn the necessary moral support of the
intended beneficiaries of intervention, but satisfies the requirement that interveners make
their military means as consistent as possible with the declared humanitarian purpose.
The third chapter investigates the just war tradition’s requirement of
proportionality and reasonable prospect of success. I argue that humanitarian interveners
are expected to include a greater range of harms in their proportionality assessments than
self-defenders, and to weigh harm to non-combatants heavily. The relatively thick
conception of proportionality that interveners must hold is another way of attempting to
ensure that humanitarian interveners not only pursue just ends, but minimize harm as
well. The interveners’ proportionality requirement is not simply a consequentialist duty
to bring about the best overall state of affairs, but it is a dual-duty to seek good and
minimize harm to non-combatants. This means that there may be times when interveners
are required to give up achieving certain great goods if doing so will cause great harm to
innocents, and restrict themselves to more modest goals risking fewer lives. This
relatively thick understanding of the proportionality requirement for humanitarian
intervention makes certain kinds of modern military tactics morally off-limits, such as the
use of incapacitating chemical agents to root out unjust combatants who hide among
civilians, or the use of overwhelming air power.
The fourth and final chapter considers more particularly the kinds of situation
where humanitarian intervention might be called for, and sides with Walzer and Luban
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that the occasions for humanitarian intervention ought to be of a particularly egregious
sort. Walzer argues that the presumption against intervention as well as the permissible
exceptions to this presumption are best accounted for by the value of self-determination.
I argue that the importance of self-determination carries some of the justification for the
presumption against intervention, but a considerable portion of its justification is carried
by the moral importance of refraining from activities that will knowingly cause
disproportionate death, injury and dislocation to innocent people. I argue that concerns
about proportionality do a considerable amount of the justification for why exceptions to
the non-intervention rule should generally be limited to cases of mass atrocity. The moral
requirement of avoiding disproportionate harm, as well as the requirement of last resort,
also account for the importance of preserving the general prohibition on preventive force
against distant or unformed threats. In addition, this final chapter briefly considers the
purpose of just war theorizing, which I argue is not merely to engage with abstract
possibilities but to have an appreciation for how academic pronouncements might be
actually applied.
At the end of this thesis, I realize that I have only scratched the surface and that
the moral issues raised by the argument are extensive. In future work I would like to
examine the requirements of last resort and right authority, and the issue of whether
humanitarian intervention is properly understood as a permission or a duty (or neither). I
also look forward to participating in the emerging and enormously difficult discussion of
how to end wars justly. I am particularly interested in whether humanitarian interveners
should aim at regime change, and, if so, what sort of regimes they should erect or
promote.
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I hope in this thesis to provide greater philosophical clarity to some of the moral
problems that surround the definition, the conduct, and the occasions for humanitarian
intervention. I mean this thesis as a contribution to an infinitely complex debate that
must include lawyers, political scientists, historians, military personnel, governments,
human rights activists, and civilians with direct experience of tyranny, mass atrocities,
and war.
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